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ABSTRACT 
 
MAKING THE POLITICAL PERSONAL: HEALTH INSURANCE, STATE VISIBILITY, AND CIVIC 
PERCEPTIONS  
Ashley Tallevi 
Matthew Levendusky, Ph.D. 
Marc Meredith, Ph.D. 
 
Over the past half-century, much of the growth in US government programs has 
been carried out by non-state actors, creating the so-called hidden or submerged 
state.  For instance, although Medicaid is a government-funded health insurance program, 
private entities administer most Medicaid insurance plans.  In this dissertation, I identify 
how shifting administrative authority away from the state generates attitudinal distortions 
that ultimately serve to reinforce public support for the submerged state.  This process 
functions in multiple steps, which I refer to as the Privatize-Attenuate-Distrust-Divest 
(PADD) cycle.  First, I show that privatizing social programs introduces hurdles that 
attenuate the role of government, causing the policy’s target populations to underestimate 
when they are directly affected by this government initiative.  Next, I connect these 
distorted perceptions of government’s relevance to decreased trust in government.  I 
conclude by showing that diminished trust in government enhances support for 
submerged policy mechanisms and the rhetorical strategies that undergird them, creating 
a political environment that is ultimately more favorable to the continued enactment of 
policies that divest government of administrative authority.  I study this process in the 
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context of Medicaid managed care and federal contraceptive policies using a series of 
observational surveys and original survey experiments.  Overall, this research 
underscores the relationship between policy submersion and democratic 
accountability.  It shows that the proxy administration of public policies can fracture the 
basic premise of democratic accountability by distorting perceptions of whether 
government affects you personally, and it demonstrates that these distortions have 
tangible consequences for how people evaluate government. 
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Introduction: The Cycle of Submersion 
	  
	  
The set-up provides a popular trope for late-night TV hosts.  Find people on the 
street, ask them questions about government, and show how little they know – bonus 
points for emphasizing the inconsistency of their comments.  This is the format used in a 
recent recreation of a 2013 viral video sensation, which asks passersby about their 
preferences for Obamacare versus the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Rosenmann 2017). 
Respondents’ voice vociferous support for one or the other, but prove incapable of 
articulating the substantive difference between the two programs.  At the end of the clip, 
the interviewer points out that Obamacare is simply a nickname for the ACA.  Of course, 
the ACA is the abbreviated name for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or 
PPACA.  While these videos provide a nice “gotcha” moment, and potentially some 
laughs, they also highlight a pervasive truth about the structure of American government, 
namely, that the proxy administration of federal programs has significant consequences 
for how the public sees government.  Proxy administration, also known as delegated 
governance, refers to the shifting of government administrative authority to non-state 
actors.  This process has become a defining feature of American government and affects 
every policy area, including healthcare and the ACA (Mettler 2011; DiIulio 2014; Kettl 
1988).  One of the more infamous examples of the ACA’s proxy administration involves 
Heathcare.gov, the web platform on which people can locate health insurance plans 
offered through state exchanges.  Healthcare.gov crashed on the first day of open 
enrollment – with only six applications submitted (Thorp 2013).  This disastrous roll-out 
was a consequence of building the platform with multiple poorly-managed and poorly-
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coordinated private contractors who failed to ensure that the website’s constitutive 
components worked in tandem (Tozzi and Whiteaker 2014).  The ACA health exchanges 
also operate via administrative delegation.  The US government created these 
marketplaces and subsidizes approximately 85% of plans purchased, but the insurance 
plans themselves are administered by private entities (Pear 2015).   
Beyond their comedic fodder, the ACA versus Obamacare interviews suggest that 
a reliance on proxy administration is intensifying the difficulty of communicating 
government’s actions.  Transferring administrative responsibility away from the 
government and onto non-state actors attenuates the link between program recipients and 
government.  This attenuation, in turn, can create obstacles for recognizing the role of the 
state (Mettler 2011).  One of the most notorious instances of the informational 
disconnect, or submersion, that this policy delegation creates arose amidst the debates 
that surrounded the enactment of the ACA.  As the battle over health reform intensified, 
concerned citizens carried the refrain of “Keep your government hands off my 
Medicare,” to public protests and town halls.  When one Republican congressman tried to 
clarify that Medicare was a government program, he recalled how the constituent, "wasn't 
having any of it" (Rucker 2009).  It may seem tempting dismiss these cries to keep 
government out of Medicare as ignorant rabble-rousing.  After all, Medicare is a 
perennially popular government program, providing much-lauded health insurance to 
America’s senior citizens (Norton, DiJulio, and Brodie 2015) . Yet, a closer look at the 
system of health care delivery under Medicare illustrates how the delegation of 
administrative authority can obscure government’s role in this major social program.  
Traditional Medicare (Parts A and B) functions as a conventional public program to the 
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extent that plan enrollment is facilitated by federal employees.  However, the healthcare 
covered under Medicare is generally delivered via private providers.  Medicare 
Advantage (Part C) further distances the state by using private insurance companies to 
administer its health insurance plans, which serve approximately 1 in 3 seniors (Pear 
2016).  The prescription drug plan under Medicare (Part D) is also administered via 
private firms.  Accordingly, even for a welfare state program as well-established and 
well-publicized as Medicare, there are multiple points at which non-governmental 
administrative entities can obfuscate the public origins of this program.   
This disconnect between the creation of a public program and government’s role 
in administering the program extends throughout US social policy.  For instance, when 
states gained greater autonomy over administering the welfare program Temporary Aid 
to Needy Families (TANF), many state governments began shifting the administration of 
this program to non-profits and private, for-profit agencies (Riccucci and Meyers 2008).  
TANF’s stringent employment mandates, in particular, strained states’ administrative 
capacity and encouraged the outsourcing of job training and placement programs to a vast 
network of contractors (Sanger 2001).  US housing policy also highlights this disconnect.  
The majority of federal spending on housing support is funneled through tax subsidies 
(such as the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction) and vouchers, and government-owned 
housing is often maintained by independent contractors (Collinson, Ellen, and Ludwig 
2015; HUD 2017).  These programs underscore that while government’s footprint may be 
vast, its actual administrative capacity can remain quite limited.                    
In this dissertation, I examine how the shifting of administrative authority via 
policy delegation affects program recipients’ perceptions of government’s personal 
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relevance, their trust in government, and their understanding of how government should 
be structured.  Pervasive delegation in healthcare policy provides this research with 
valuable case studies for exploring these questions.  However, as the previous examples 
indicate, policy delegation is not unique to health policy; in fact, policy delegation can be 
found in every sector of American government (DiIulio 2014).  Accordingly, the case 
studies that I utilize can be understood as providing insight into a phenomenon that is of 
broad relevance.  By asking how proxy administration influences the political 
conceptions of program recipients, I am inquiring into whether the design of government 
programs impacts how political attitudes and identities are formed.  The answer to this 
question sheds light on the ways in which policy delegation can entrench a status quo of 
inequality and a lack of accountability as well as how this process can be challenged. 
 
Defining Key Terms 
Policy Delegation 
Policy delegation is far-reaching and can take many forms.  At its most 
fundamental, however, a delegated policy can be distinguished from “direct state” 
policies based on its use of private delivery mechanisms.1  The administrative 
mechanisms commonly used to achieve this delegation include deferral of administrative 
capacity to non-governmental organizations and reliance on the tax code for wealth 
transfers, rather than providing benefits directly.  For the purposes of simplicity, I use the 
terms privatization and policy delegation interchangeably in referring to these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Policy delegation can also refer to the shifting of administrative authority between levels of 
government.  When responsibility is transferred from the federal government to subnational units, 
this process is more specifically referred to as policy devolution (Morgan and Campbell 2011).   
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administrative practices, although privatization is most commonly associated with the 
direct deferral of administrative capacity to private organizations.  The consortium of 
policies that constitute policy delegation has also been described as proxy administration 
(or leviathan-by-proxy), the hidden state, anti-bureaucratic state building, and state 
submersion (Howard 1999; Skocpol and Finegold 1982).  Although these different terms 
contain unique features, they all involve the process of shifting administrative capacity 
away from state actors.  
Government’s involvement in primary and secondary education can clarify how 
this movement toward delegated administration manifests.  Traditional public schools 
operate via direct governance.  These schools are publically-funded and their teachers are 
hired as government employees.  Conversely, in charter schools, teachers are hired as 
private (nongovernmental) employees by the company or non-profit that is charged with 
administering the school.2  Financing for charter schools, however, predominantly comes 
from public coffers.  Accordingly, charter school teachers present an example of 
delegated governance because they are carrying out a function of the state (providing 
primary or secondary-school education), with public funding, as private actors.  
Delegation can also occur via “consumer-choice,” whereby the government 
provides designated funds or tax credits to subsidize a selected activity.  School vouchers, 
which provide families with funds earmarked for tuition at private or religious schools, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The National Labor Relations board issued two recent rulings that affirmed charter school 
teachers’ designation as private (nongovernmental) employees (see Hyde Leadership Charter 
School—Brooklyn, Case No. 29-RM-126444, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 88 slip op. at 1 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 
24, 2016) (board decision); Pa. Virtual Charter Sch., Case No. 04-RC-143831, 364 N.L.R.B. No. 
87 slip op. at 1 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 24, 2016) (board decision)).    
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are an example of consumer-choice delegation.  Tax credits for child care are another 
popular form of consumer-choice delegation.  Some consumer-choice delegation 
programs rely on a complicated interplay of tax credits and private actors.  For instance, 
Tax Credit Voucher Programs have become an increasingly common form of financing 
private education using public funds, with enrollment in these programs growing by more 
than 500% since 2005 (Carey 2017).  While specific details vary by state, under this 
arrangement, taxpayers (including businesses) can make donations up to a certain amount 
to private organizations that fund tuition to private or parochial schools.  Under this 
program, the donor receives a tax credit for the full amount of the donation.  As these 
donations are matched dollar-for-dollar with tax credits, the state fully subsidizes these 
tuition vouchers; yet it does so by adding another private actor to the administrative 
process of distributing these funds.3 
Although these examples highlight how policy delegation differs from direct state 
administration, privatization does not occur as a binary phenomenon.  At its most 
fundamental, this delegation involves a transfer of responsibility from government to the 
private sector (Lundqvist 1988).  Lundqvist clarifies that in this formulation, “it is the 
direction that counts… not some final or eternal location of that which is transferred” 
(1988: 4).  Policies exist along a spectrum ranging from almost fully privatized to entirely 
directly administered.  The more a public policy relies on private actors for program 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The added complexity created by delegated governance programs like the Tax Credit Voucher 
Program has been described as a policy “kludge.”  According to Steven Teles, a policy becomes a 
kludge if it relies on administrative mechanisms that are “substantially more complicated than the 
problem it is trying to solve dictates” (Klein 2013).  Policy kludges, in short, add superfluous 
complexity to the administration of a policy objective. 
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administration, the more delegated a policy becomes.  As this suggests, different 
elements within a government program can make the policy more or less delegated.  If a 
school voucher program uses a government agency to distribute vouchers, this 
administrative component (the distribution of vouchers) occurs via a direct-state 
mechanism, although the education itself is proxy administered.  However, the use of 
private voucher-granting organizations, such as those used to distribute tax-credit 
voucher donations, shifts this policy further toward the delegated end of the continuum 
by replacing the administration of this function with a private organization and by 
funneling the funding stream through private individuals and business.  As this shows, 
there can be varying degrees of program privatization both within a policy area as well as 
within a specific type of program. 
 
Figure 1.1: The placement of education policies along the direct-to-delegated policy 
continuum 
 
 
Defining the Submerged State 
Submerged policies are distinct from delegated policies to the extent that the 
concept of policy submersion adds the corollary that in delegating administrative 
responsibility away from the state, this shift creates hurdles to recognizing the role of 
government.  The totality of these submerged policies constitutes the “submerged state” 
(Mettler 2011).  As with policy delegation, policy submersion operates along a 
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continuum, with policies ranging from very visible to very submerged (Mettler 2011).  
Delegated policies move to the submerged end of this spectrum the more that they rely on 
administrative mechanisms that erode the traceability of the benefit back to government. 
For instance, compared to a public agency that administers school vouchers, private 
voucher-granting organizations provide the families who receive these vouchers with an 
additional hurdle for tracing this funding back to the state.  Here, it is not simply the shift 
in administrative authority that submerges the state; rather, this submersion is created by 
how the shift is implemented.  A private voucher granting organization further submerges 
the state by making it appear as though these vouchers are purely the product of private 
donations, rather than tax-payer dollars earmarked for education.  Similarly, the federal 
government's former policy of paying subsidies to private lenders that offer student loans 
constitutes “policy submersion” (as well as policy delegation) as the use of these private 
banking institutions, over public loan-granting organizations, makes it more difficult for 
students who have taken out these private loans to recognize how government facilitated 
this interaction.  If loan-granting institutions were required to provide students with 
information on how their loans were being subsidized by government, this program 
would become less submerged, although it would be no less delegated.   
In defining policy submersion, it is critical to note that policies are designated as 
submerged because of their administrative design, not the public’s response to the policy 
at any point in time.  As Hackett notes, “what the public feels and thinks it knows about 
the effects of submerged policies is not the same thing as objective institutional 
characteristics of policy design (2016).”  Mass opinion, or knowledge, can fluctuate 
rapidly and is affected by a host of factors beyond policy design.  Consequently, public 
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opinion is a poor metric to use for designating administrative typologies.  The 
institutional design of a public policy, however, provides a more stable and direct 
measure of the attendant concept of policy submersion.  Accordingly, the extent of a 
policy’s submersion is determined by the degree to which the policy utilizes 
administrative elements that present potential hurdles to recognizing the role of the state, 
not the public’s response to these administrative hurdles at any point in time (Mettler 
2011; Hackett 2016). 
 
 Defining Policy Feeds (or Putting Politics Back into Political Behavior) 
This research examines how the use of submerged administrative features 
influences perceptions of, and attitudes toward, the state.  By examining the attitudinal 
consequences of submerged administrative designs, my research contributes to a growing 
body of literature known as policy feedback studies.  This literature seeks to center the 
role of political institutions in the study of mass political behavior and public opinion 
formation.  E.E. Schattschneider’s well-worn adage notes that “new policies create a new 
politics” (1935).  Under this formulation, government policies impact the political actions 
of interest groups and individuals, thereby shaping the terms under which political 
engagement occurs.  Adopting this approach, policy feedback analyses trace how 
“policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes” (Skocpol 1992: 58).  
More specifically, this research agenda explores how government policies generate 
behavioral, attitudinal, and material changes in their target populations, and it assesses 
how these changes can in turn influence the construction of new policies (see Schneider 
and Ingram 1993; Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993).  As the name suggests, policy 
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feedbacks have two stages: the “feed” process, in which the policy impacts the public, 
and the “back” portion, whereby the changed public influences the government.  
Analyses of the feed stage have taken to describing a policy’s impact on the public as a 
“feed forward” effect.  These feed forward effects are frequently bundled into two 
categories: resource effects, which refer to the material benefits that a policy bestows, 
and interpretive effects, which concern changes to behavior, attitudes, and political self-
conception (Pierson 1993).4  By examining how policy submersion influences recipients’ 
perceptions of government’s personal relevance, this dissertation functions as an inquiry 
into how state submersion impacts the manifestation of interpretive effects.   
 
Defining Political Trust  
In delving into the political consequences of policy submersion, the potential for a 
relationship between the submerged state and trust in government stands apart as a 
particularly fruitful and important line of inquiry.  A prominent conceptualization of 
political trust treats this measure as an evaluation of whether government is responsive to, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A case study of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, also known as the G.I. Bill, 
highlights the processes that can produce resource and interpretative effects (Mettler and Welch 
2004; Mettler 2005).  The G.I. Bill is best known for funding education, job training programs, 
and low-interest mortgages for veterans returning from WWII.  Initially, the feed forward effects 
of the G.I. Bill manifested as interpretative effects.  The efficient and uniform administration of 
G.I. Bill programs helped to confer a sense of dignity and civic obligation on the veterans who 
utilized these benefits.  Over time, the G.I. Bill also helped veterans to accumulate resources – 
particularly education and wealth – that facilitated political participation.  Although this example 
describes normatively positive resource and interpretive effects, policy feeds do not necessarily 
move in a uniform direction.  For instance, concentrated police surveillance (i.e. stop-and-frisk) 
can depress community-level outreach to local government (Lerman and Weaver 2014).  
Similarly, the paternalistic administration of the former welfare program, Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), created negative perceptions of government and depressed political 
engagement (Soss 1999).  These findings show that a policy’s structural design and objectives 
influence the direction in which a policy feed moves.   
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and accountable for, the needs of its citizens (Levi and Stoker 2000).  Robert Stokes, who 
authored what would become one of the most widely-used measures of political trust, 
noted that he drafted these survey questions with the intent of capturing people’s “basic 
evaluative orientations” toward the state (Stokes 1962: 64).  Critically, perceptions of 
government performance commonly affect these evaluative responses.  Research into 
political trust has shown that “political trust is a feeling that people have about 
government based on their perceptions of its performance relative to their expectation of 
how it ought to perform” (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015: 34).  This formulation 
suggests that political trust should rise when expectations of what government should be 
doing are met and fall when it does not.  Other researchers have noted that political trust 
is responsive to the political process producing this government performance.  When 
people feel that a government decision was reached in an equitable manner that was 
accountable to the public, trust in government increases (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
2002).  Conversely, political scandals and perceptions of government corruption can 
diminish trust in government (Keele 2007).  The political environment also affects 
political trust.  Political trust increases when threats to national security are prominent, 
and, in the current era of elite polarization, it decreases when partisan control of 
government does not match your partisan preferences (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015).  
Taken together, these findings show that political trust is affected by a multitude of 
factors, all of which are based on how people see the state.  
The substantive importance of studying shifts in this attitude is evidenced by the 
growing body of research detailing the critical role of political trust for the functioning of 
democratic societies. When trust in government plummets, it becomes more challenging 
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to forge compromise and pass new legislation (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015); it 
becomes less likely that people abide by existing laws (Marien and Hooghe 2011); and it 
increases the likelihood that people will buy into political conspiracy theories (Miller, 
Saunders, and Farhart 2016).  Moreover, political trust has “a profound effect on people’s 
preferences across a broad range of issues” (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015: 38; see also 
Hetherington 2005; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000).  Accordingly, when 
investigating how political processes affect attitudes at both the mass and elite levels, 
political trust is a critical measure to consider.    
Dissertation Overview 
 
 The following chapters explore how submerged policies influence the political 
attitudes and perceptions of both their target populations and the mass public.  This 
research breaks from earlier work on this topic by focusing on the attitudinal 
consequences of submerging “traditional” welfare state policies, which are 
disproportionately relevant to low-income Americans, particularly low-income women.   
Through this investigation, I identify a cycle wherein policy submersion generates 
attitudinal distortions that ultimately serve to reinforce public support for the submerged 
state.  This process functions in multiple steps, which I refer to as the Privatize-
Attenuate-Distrust-Divest (PADD) cycle.  First, I show that privatized policy designs 
create confusion over a policy’s (and therefore government’s) personal relevance.  This 
attenuation of government causes target populations to underestimate when they are 
directly affected by a government initiative.  Next, I connect these distorted perceptions 
of government’s relevance to decreased trust in government.  I conclude by showing that 
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diminished trust in government enhances support for submerged policy mechanisms and 
the rhetorical strategies that undergird them, creating a political environment that is more 
favorable to the continued enactment of the policy designs that initiated this process of 
divesting administrative authority away from government.   
 
Figure 1.2: The PADD Cycle 
 
 
 
 
This research highlights how submerged policies can fracture the basic premise of 
democratic accountability.  I show that policy submersion creates informational 
distortions that affect trust in government, and that this diminished trust in turn 
encourages support for the practices producing these distortions.  In highlighting this 
process, my research provides insight into a puzzle whose prominence re-emerges with 
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each election cycle. Why do we see counties that overwhelmingly benefit from major 
government interventions (like Medicaid expansion) support candidates or platforms that 
are committed to rolling back these programs and reducing the role of the state?  If we 
recognize that the design of government policies creates obstacles for understanding 
government’s relevance, and that these obstacles ultimately promote anti-statist attitudes, 
however, this pattern seems far less surprising. 
 In Chapter Two, I introduce the theoretical framework for my research by 
situating my argument in the relevant scholarly literature.  My research builds on the 
intersection of policy design and public opinion, and I use the discussion of these 
research areas to detail how the dominant understandings of public opinion formation, 
along with the evolution of policy submersion, create the potential for submerged state 
policies to influence political perceptions.  Chapter Three provides the first empirical test 
of my theory.  In this chapter, I use a unique dataset that links Medicaid administrative 
records to the American Community Survey, an annual Census survey that includes 
questions on health insurance and Medicaid enrollment.  Through my analysis of this 
linked data, I find that the administrative features of Medicaid privatization that scramble 
signals of state involvement are related to an increase in the underreporting of Medicaid 
enrollment.  I replicate these findings using the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health).  Methodologically, these analyses emphasize 
the necessity of treating privatization and policy submersion as more than dichotomous 
measures.  Substantively, they show how submerged-state program administration 
influences recipients’ ability to recognize the personal relevance of government welfare 
initiatives.    
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 Next, I connect these misperceptions to decreased trust in government.  In 
Chapter Four, I expand my analysis of the Add Health data to examine the relationship 
between increased Medicaid privatization and trust in federal and state government.  I 
find that, among those who are eligible for Medicaid, the same features of Medicaid 
privatization that increase confusion about Medicaid enrollment are also related to 
reduced trust in government.  This finding isolates decreased government visibility as a 
mechanism that is altering political trust.   In Chapter Five, I strengthen the causal link 
between government visibility and political trust by conducting original survey 
experiments that manipulate the visibility of government’s involvement in expanded 
insurance coverage of contraceptives.  Here, I find that increasing awareness of the 2010 
federal contraceptive mandate enhances trust in government.  The greatest change in 
political trust occurs for women, the population for whom the policy is most directly 
relevant.  These results establish that submerged policies affect how their target 
populations perceive and, critically, trust in, government.   
 Chapter Six examines how decreased trust in government creates an environment 
that is conducive to entrenching and expanding state submersion.  I explore the 
relationship between political trust and support for policy submersion using the 2012 
American National Election Survey (ANES).  In this analysis, I show that trust in 
government affects the specific political attitudes that are used to justify submerged-state 
policies, including: opposition to government intervention in favor of reliance on the free 
market; support for reducing the number of federal employees in government; and 
support for decreasing the number of services government provides.  I also find that 
decreasing trust in government strengthens opposition to specific direct state policies.  In 
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the final sections of this chapter, I detail how public opinion in this area affects legislative 
outputs.    
 My dissertation closes with a discussion of the larger political implications of this 
covert feedback loop.  I highlight the PADD cycle’s implications for the maintenance of 
American civic culture and democratic accountability, and I encourage political leaders to 
consider how submerged state policies affect the ability to mobilize policy constituencies.  
I also address the administrative implications of submerged policies, their propensity to 
create a more porous safety net, and what this feedback loop – and its promotion of 
submerged state policies – means for the prospect of addressing inequality in America.  
In the proverbial pluralist heaven of American democracy, submerged policies favor the 
interests of private entities over the public good.  Accordingly, there is a strong normative 
imperative to promote policy alternatives that break the PADD cycle and that utilize 
state-based – and democratically-accountable – administrative elements.   
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Chapter Two: The Causes and Consequences of Policy Delegation 
 
The leviathan of the United States government is adept at slipping from sight.  
Take Medicaid, a government health insurance program for low income adults, children, 
and people with disabilities.  Enrollment in Medicaid has nearly tripled since 1975.5  Yet, 
for many of its approximately 70 million enrollees, the experience of using this public 
health insurance is devoid of government actors.  It is possible to enroll, receive medical 
care, and speak with your insurance provider all without ever encountering a single civil 
servant (Kettl 2009).  This experience is not limited to individuals with minimal medical 
needs nor is it unique to Medicaid.  On the contrary, one of the most well-known 
examples of this lack of government engagement involves an elderly woman named 
Mildred.  Mildred was enrolled in both Medicaid and Medicare and lived in a 
government-funded nursing home.  Despite her extensive health care needs, neither 
Mildred nor her family ever encountered a government employee when dealing with her 
medical care (Kettl 2009).  Her experience, which has been dubbed the “Mildred 
Paradox,” reflects the divergent trends in which the government has expanded the scope 
of its engagements while its direct administrative capacity has stalled.  
 Delegating administrative authority away from the federal government, and 
transferring this responsibility to non-state actors, have been key to sustaining this 
process.  This delegated governance can be found in nearly every policy area (DiIulio 
2014).  One of the largest social service providers in the country is Catholic Charities, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In 1975, ten years after Medicaid was enacted, enrollment hovered around 20 million. By 2015, 
enrollment had grown to more than 68 million (Klemm 2000; CMS 2016).  By comparison, the 
US population grew from 196,560,000 in 1966 to 321,418,820 in 2018 (The World Bank 2016).   
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network of nonprofit organizations whose program areas include disaster relief, 
temporary shelter, refugee resettlement, and food assistance.  The scope of Catholic 
Charities services is made possible by federal financing.  In 2010, their organization 
received approximately $2.9 billion (62% of its total revenue) in funding from the federal 
government, which it used to help serve over 10 million people (Gautier and O’Hara 
2011).  Similarly, Meals on Wheels, a national network of over 5,000 community-based 
programs that address hunger and isolation among the country’s elderly, gets 
approximately 35% of its funding from the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
Older Americans Act Nutrition Program (Godoy 2017; Meals on Wheels America 2017).  
Meals on Wheels also receives funding from federal block grants that are distributed 
through state and local governments.  
The practice of shifting administrative authority to non-state actors extends 
beyond social services.  Within the US Department of Defense, service delegation 
includes the hiring of private contractors to carry out security functions.  One of the most 
infamous of these contractors, Blackwater (which has since rebranded as Academi) 
attracted international attention when its employees killed 17 Iraqi civilians (Apuzzo 
2014).  However, the Defense Department’s outsourcing is most pronounced with respect 
to equipment procurement.  The largest federal contractor, Lockheed Martin, received 
over $36 billion in contracts for military equipment in 2015 (FPDS 2016).  Privatization 
has also become a fixture of US prison administration.  The housing of inmates in private 
prisons run by for-profit corporations emerged in the 1980s, with the founding of the 
Corrections Corporation of America, which rebranded in 2016 as CoreCivic, and the 
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, now known as the GEO Group (Shapiro 2011).  In 
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2013, nearly one in ten inmates in the US prison population was housed in a private, for-
profit facility, and the valuation of CCA and The GEO Group had reached $3 billion 
(Carson 2014; Shapiro 2011).  The privatization of detention centers also grew to 
incorporate immigration-based facilities.  As of September 2016, 65% of immigrants 
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) are held in for-profit detention 
facilities (Homeland Security Advisory Council 2016).  
The scope of delegated governance is reflected in Figure 2.1, which plots the 
growth in federal expenditures and federal employment.  As this chart illustrates, federal 
spending has increased more than five-fold since the early 1960s.   
Figure 2.1: Federal Spending and Federal Employment Trends (1965 – 2015) 
 
 
 
This spending increase in part reflects the broadened purview of the federal government.  
Since 1965, the federal government has created six new federal agencies and numerous 
subcabinet agencies (DiIulio 2014).  Notably, these new agencies did not translate to vast 
increases in federal bureaucrats.  Instead, the number of federal employees has remained 
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largely unchanged over the last four decades (US Office of Personnel Management 
2015).  It may be tempting to attribute this federal employment stagnation to 
mechanization.  However, the growth in federal spending on private contractors 
undercuts this potential explanation (DiIulio 2014).  The federal government’s 
engagement of private contractors has become so pervasive that even the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) is unable to provide a firm estimate of the number of contracted 
federal employees.  However, the CBO has determined that  
“federal agencies spent over $500 billion for contracted products and 
services in 2012. Between 2000 and 2012, such spending grew more 
quickly than inflation and also grew as a percentage of total federal 
spending. The category of spending that grew the most in dollar terms was 
contracts for professional, administrative, and management services” 
(Elmendorf 2015).  
 
These statistics indicate that the disjuncture shown in Figure 2.1 reflects a pattern of 
expanding government responsibility while outsourcing administrative capacity.  The 
Department of Energy exemplifies this trend.  This department, which was created in 
1977, uses for-profit firms to administer all of its programming, including those that 
cover sensitive security domains like the Plutonium Disposition Program (DiIulio 2014).  
The scope of this reliance underscores how an increasingly broad range of government 
responsibilities is executed by non-state actors.   
Why Delegated Governance Has Flourished in the United States 
 
Policy delegation is longstanding phenomenon.  The American government has 
relied on non-state actors to provide goods, services, and defense since its inception 
(Kettl 2009; Kosar 2006).  As early as 1789, Congress enacted a statute assigning the 
Secretary of the Treasury the responsibility of hiring private contractors to build and 
maintain a new lighthouse at the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay (Kosar 2006).  
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Similarly, the private construction of the first transcontinental railroad was subsidized by 
federal financing (Klein 2006).  More infamously, in the mid-to-late 1800s, the federal 
government contracted the private firm, The Pinkerton Detective Agency, to provide 
security and investigative services (Morn 1982).  However, policy delegation grew both 
in size and form in the latter half of the 20th century.  The timing of this upswing can be 
attributed to a conflict that emerged between public demands and elite interests.  The 
expansion of federal responsibilities under the New Deal and during WWII fostered a 
post-war political landscape in which the American public placed increasing demands on 
the federal government, particularly with respect to social service provision (Kettl 2009).  
These pressures, however, conflicted with a main tenet of American political thought – 
the ideal of limited government.  Lockean liberalism’s emphasis on restricting the power 
and role of the state has retained a potent hold on American political discourse dating 
back to the colonies’ revolt against the centralized government of King George III.  In the 
post-WWII years, conservative politicians turned to policy delegation in an attempt to 
preserve limited government, while also addressing the growing demands for social 
services (Morgan and Campbell 2011).  This practice is evident in the design of the 1965 
legislation that created Medicare.  The insurance program that this legislation produced 
relies explicitly on private accreditation organizations and private healthcare providers 
(Morgan and Campbell 2011).  Thus, while Medicare marked a major expansion in the 
scope of the federal government’s commitments (and spending), it did so in a way that 
preserved the power of the private sector. The federal government replicated this reliance 
on policy delegation throughout emergent agencies and programs.  For instance, policy 
delegation was instrumental to the post-war development of the nation’s space 
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exploration program.  In 1966, NASA managed 36,000 “in-house” federal employees, 
but it employed over 360,000 private contractors (Levine 1972).   
The growth in policy delegation during these early post-war years indicates that 
this acceleration predated the neoliberal dominance of the last quarter of the 20th century 
(Morgan and Campbell 2011).  Yet, neoliberalism’s ascent assisted political elites in 
promoting government’s separation from service provision.  By championing free 
markets and economic liberalization, this economic philosophy reinforces the ideological 
justification for shifting administrative authority toward the private sector (Gotham 2012; 
Cohen 2016).  Moreover, economists Friedman Hayek and Milton Friedman’s cultivation 
of neoliberalism also influenced the shape that policy delegation assumed (Jones 2012).  
While post-war privatization favored a reliance on non-profits, Reagan and Clinton-era 
delegation became increasingly characterized by consumer-choice delegation and 
subsidizing private (for-profit) entities (Morgan and Campbell 2011).  In consumer-
choice delegation, the government transfers funds to an individual – either in the form of 
designated cash transfers (i.e. vouchers) or tax credits – to subsidize activities such as 
childcare, private school tuition, and buying a home.  In theory, these wealth transfers 
allow individuals to use public funds in a manner akin to how a consumer purchasing a 
service would engage with the market.  This emphasis on market supremacy and for-
profit operators tracks well with the core tenets of neoliberalism, and the popularity of 
these policy tools grew with the entrenchment of this ideological framework.   
While elite political and ideological support was central to germinating a political 
environment that favored policy delegation, several interrelated factors accelerated this 
policy approach, the most prominent of which include: networked special interests, 
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conflicting mass opinion, electoral pressures, and the structure of American legislative 
institutions.   
i.   Special Interests 
Perhaps the most visible entities that drove the outsourcing of government’s 
administrative capacity are the special interests who benefit from this form of 
governance.  Although it can be difficult to disentangle the causal impact of lobbying on 
legislative outcomes (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Burstein and Linton 2002), 
recent research has shown that well-organized and well-funded interest groups can shape 
federal legislation (Bawn et al. 2012; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Heaney 2006).   Private 
organizations have played a particularly influential role in lobbying to limit the 
concentration of power within government agencies.  For instance, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) sought to minimize government encroachment into the health care 
sector by becoming a key opposition figure in early efforts to create a single-payer health 
care system (Hoffman 2003).  The success of this effort helped the AMA to retain its role 
as an influential stakeholder in debates over health reform, while limiting the role of what 
is now known as the Department of Health and Human services.  The federal spending 
that accompanies outsourcing also allowed previously small outfits to flourish, which in 
turn enabled these private actors to play a more prominent role in lobbying for 
outsourcing and in blocking attempts to reign in delegation (Morgan and Campbell 2011: 
7).  The private prison industry provides a prime example.  Having grown to over a 
billion-dollar valuation since its founding three decades earlier, the Geo Group was well-
positioned to make large donations to super PACs supporting Donald Trump’s 
presidential campaign and, later, to his inauguration committees (Schouten 2017).  Once 
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in office, the Trump administration reversed a previous order that was phasing-out 
private prison contracts.  While this relationship is suggestive, it is important to stress that 
this reversal cannot be solely attributed to these lobbying efforts.      
The lobbying efforts of special interests in the latter half of the 20th century were, 
and remain, particularly effective because they occurred within a network of think tanks, 
industry leaders, and politicians that sought the entrenchment of neoliberalism as a policy 
paradigm (Jones 2012).  By the time of Reagan’s election in 1980, this consortium of 
interests (including Reason, Cato, Heritage, and the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC)) was well-positioned to offer a coherent policy and ideological response 
to the collapse of Bretton Woods and the stagflation and fiscal strains of the 1970s (Jones 
2012; Cohen 2016).  The density and placement of this network created the 
organizational capacity to permeate the policy agenda of subsequent presidential 
administrations and shape policy proposals from both the Republican and Democratic 
parties (Cohen 2016).  Entrenched business interests that financially benefitted from 
policy delegation were central to funding this network.  For instance, ALEC, which 
counted Corrections Corporation of America as a board member and financer, actively 
lobbied for (and provided states with model legislation that would expand) private prison 
contracts and the use of inmate labor for private manufacturing (Elk and Sloan 2011).  
The success of these efforts exemplifies how powerful private interests that have a vested 
interest in policy delegation have amplified their influence by funding a network of actors 
that work to institutionalize policy delegation and the ideological traditions that support 
it.  
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ii.   Public Opinion 
However, elite support for policy delegation functioned as such a capable driver of 
this practice in large part because of the contradictory ways in which this idea manifests 
in mass opinion.  In Reagan’s first inaugural address, he famously pronounced that 
“Government is not the solution to our problem, government is the problem” (1981).  
This sentiment has retained its salience, with variants on this message repeated by 
politicians throughout election cycles.  Yet, despite these vocal calls for less government, 
there has not been a decrease in the demands that the public places on the federal 
government.  This has created the paradoxical situation whereby people want less 
government, but they do not necessarily want less from government.  Although more than 
70% of the country feels that the government wastes “a lot” of money, the vast majority 
of Americans also support increased government spending across a range of social 
programs.  Even among those who are most skeptical of government’s power, there is 
clear support for greater government involvement.  For instance, a majority of those who 
feel that government in Washington is too strong also say that the federal government 
should spend more on the homeless, financial aid for college, child care, social security, 
and public schools (Morgan and Campbell 2011).   
As these conflicting preferences suggest, the American public is symbolically 
conservative, but operationally liberal.  Americans tend to identify with conservative 
ideals, while simultaneously advocating for government involvement in a range of issue 
areas. This preference manifests among self-identified conservatives as well as liberals, 
although the effect is most pronounced for conservatives.  Social scientists have long 
noted this pattern of symbolic conservatism and operational liberalism (see, for instance, 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   26	  
Free and Cantril 1967), which can be traced empirically as far back as the 1930s (Ellis 
and Stimson 2012).6  During the height of the New Deal, the majority of Americans 
rejected the label of “liberal,” while embracing its policy solutions, a pattern that 
persisted as the 20th century progressed.  These divergent preferences help to explain why 
otherwise identical policy proposals gain greater public support when they plan to use tax 
expenditures as delivery mechanisms compared to direct spending (Faricy and Ellis 
2014).  Policy delegation, consequently, has provided legislators with a valuable political 
tool for meeting the public’s symbolic commitment to less government while 
acknowledging their concurrent support for expanded social services. 
iii.   Electoral Pressures   
The nature of the policymaking process further incentivizes members of Congress 
to support policy delegation.  Designing social programs requires difficult choices.  The 
architect must decide who get what benefit, at which level, and who is excluded from this 
policy.  Although new legislation creates the potential to claim credit, it also requires 
politicians to make difficult decisions that may frustrate constituents.  Legislators can 
avoid these hard choices (and hope to sidestep any attendant blame) by delegating the 
implementation of these policies to a third-party.  Morgan and Campbell use the example 
of Medicare Part D to illustrate this point (2011).  Part D creates a prescription drug 
benefit for Medicare enrollees. By administering these plans through private insurance 
companies, however, legislators avoid the responsibility of determining the full scope of 
coverage and the price points of specifics drugs.  Instead, under this arrangement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This seeming disjuncture is attributed to a lack of confidence in government efficiency and an 
attraction to conservatisms’ cultural appeal (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Goodman and Loveman 
1991).   
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legislators can claim credit for creating this new benefit without engaging in protracted 
debates on the details of its implementation.   
iv.   The Diffusion of Power within American Political Institutions   
The institutional design of the US Congress similarly encourages policy 
delegation.  Legislative coalition-building is needed to clear the multiple veto points that 
congressional committees and their respective chambers create.  Policy delegation can 
help to sustain these coalitions by appealing to conservatives, in form, and liberals in 
substance.  The resulting coalitions affect how administrative authority is divided among 
governmental institutions.  For instance, these coalitions have used the promise of 
devolving administrative authority to local actors to gain bipartisan congressional support 
for new social policy legislation.  In crafting the 1996 welfare reform legislation that 
produced Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), Democrats used the 
prospect of increasing state’s administrative control over welfare spending – by 
transforming this program into a block grant – to gain conservative legislators’ support 
for this bill (Bertram 2015).  
The need for Congressional majorities, or supermajorities, to pass legislation has 
also promoted the shift in administrative authority toward non-state actors.  The 
legislative bargaining that occurred during the drafting of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
exemplifies this process.  A key objective of this legislation was to expand access to 
health insurance.  However, a government-sponsored health insurance plan (i.e. a public 
option), failed to gain broad-based support.  Republicans strongly opposed the public 
option as did several key centrist Democrats in Congress.  Senator Joe Lieberman’s 
opposition to the public option was particularly critical in this measure’s defeat.  
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Lieberman caucused with Democrats7 and provided the vital 60th vote needed in the 
Senate to overcome a filibuster.  These institutional roadblocks, coupled with less than 
full-throated support from the White House and a perceived lacked of public support, led 
to the demise of the public option as part of the 2009-2010 healthcare reform legislation 
(Halpin and Harbage 2010).  In its place, the primary means by which the ACA improves 
access to health insurance, in addition to its Medicaid expansion,8 is through the 
establishment of state exchanges that sell private health insurance plans, the vast majority 
of which are government-subsidized (Pear 2015).  This market-oriented arrangement 
appealed to the centrist legislators whose support was needed to avoid a filibuster of this 
bill.  The ACA’s legislative evolution illustrates how the diffusion of power in the 
American legislative process, coupled with the ideological undercurrents that came to 
dominate the latter half of the 20th century, have facilitated the growth in policy 
delegation, both in scope and in form, in recent years.   
 
The Theoretical Foundations of the PADD Cycle 
 
The Politics That Policy Delegation Makes  
In addition to understanding the causes of policy delegation, there is a growing 
body of literature that investigates its consequences.  Most scholarship on the impact of 
shifting administrative authority away from the state emphasizes the consequences of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lieberman had previously been elected to the Senate as a Democrat from the state of 
Connecticut, but he lost the 2006 Democratic primary nomination to challenger Ned Lamont.  
Lieberman consequently ran in, and won, the general election as an independent candidate 
(Kornblut 2006).    
8 Notably, although Medicaid is a federal-state partnership program, Medicaid expansion also 
represents an expansion of delegated governance, given that many states administer their 
Medicaid programs via private Managed Care Organizations (MCOs).  Consequently, expanding 
Medicaid broadens the reach and responsibility of Medicaid MCOs.    
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process for service delivery.  These analyses show that delegated governance often 
results in less efficient policy administration and a more porous social safety net 
(Bowsher 1982; DiIulio 2014; Howard 1999).  While these conclusions are supported by 
a robust literature on the effects of policy submersion for administrative outcomes, far 
less is understood about the attitudinal consequences of this administrative design.  In 
particular, much remains unknown about whether and how state submersion influences 
the emergence of interpretive policy feeds.  Recall, policy feeds are the attitudinal and 
behavioral consequences that a public policy generates.  Interpretive policy feeds refer 
specifically to the effects that a public policy has on people’s perceptions concerning the 
role of the state and their place in the polity.  Through illuminating the PADD cycle, this 
research reveals submerged policies’ interpretive effects and their consequences.  In the 
ensuing discussion, I detail the theory that I draw on to uncover the processes that 
produce this cycle.    
------- 
 
 
 Policy feeds emerge based on the size, proximity, and traceability of a 
government action (Patashnik and Zelizer 2009; Soss and Schram 2007).  Here, size 
refers to how large the benefit is for the policy’s target population. The more substantial 
or prolonged a government intervention is, the more likely it becomes that this policy will 
affect the political thoughts or actions of its target population (Mettler and Soss 2004).  A 
second key element for generating policy feeds is proximity.  Policies often affect some 
groups of people, or publics, more directly than others.  For instance, although taxes 
levied on liquor sales would affect anyone in that jurisdiction who attempts to purchase 
alcohol, the imposition of this taxation is experienced differently among those who 
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abstain from alcohol, compared to those who imbibe.  Similarly, regulations requiring 
insurance coverage of mammograms will have a different financial impact on women 
compared to men in the same age cohort.  Ceteris paribus, policy feeds are expected to 
emerge most clearly for those located within a policy’s target population (Soss and 
Schram 2007).  The more proximate a policy becomes – i.e. the greater relevance that a 
policy has to you personally and to those in your social network – the more likely it 
becomes that the policy will affect your political attitudes and behaviors.  
 A third factor influencing the emergence of policy feeds concerns policy 
traceability, or the ease with which a citizen can “connect a perceptible policy effect to an 
identifiable government action” (Patashnik and Zelizer 2009: 13).  If a policy creates an 
output that can be attributed to government, the likelihood that this policy influences how 
people react to and engage with the state increases.  This third factor is critical to 
understanding the potential interpretive effects of policy submersion because it suggests 
that this submersion could stunt the ability of these policies to generate policy feeds.  By 
definition, submerged state policies attenuate the link between a policy output and the 
government, which creates a challenge for political learning.  This attenuation has been 
used to explain why policy feeds fail to emerge for some submerged policies (see 
Buckley and Schneider 2009; Fleming 2014).   
However, the failure for policy feeds to emerge in some forms – such as the 
creation of an easily mobilized public – does not mean that they will fail to emerge in all 
forms, nor should their failure necessarily be characterized as a non-effect.  Soss and 
Schram maintain that, particularly among a program’s target population, low-traceability 
policies “are especially likely to shape broad patterns of belief, expectation, and 
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behavior” (2007: 121).  Although submerged policies can inhibit learning about the 
specifics of how a particular program functions, the attenuation in government visibility 
that they create nonetheless imparts important signals to program recipients about the 
scope and relevance of government intervention.  This suggests that among a policy’s 
target population, submerged policies have the potential to generate interpretive effects 
concerning the role and the responsibilities of the state, even if they do not generate 
positive, or accurate, informational feeds.   
 In her landmark study on state submersion, Mettler demonstrates how submerged 
policies can generate interpretive effects by encouraging program recipients to 
underestimate the extent to which they rely on a government social policy (2011).  Here, 
the informational consequences of submerged state policies’ administrative designs 
distort how their target populations view state actors and the relevance of government 
social policy.  Many people who recognize their use of submerged state programs still do 
not think of themselves as having ever used a government social program.  In fact, as 
Figure 2.2 shows, a majority of those who report using either education savings accounts, 
the mortgage tax credit, learning tax credits, federal student loans, and child care tax 
credits also believe that they have never used a government social program.  Conversely, 
those who utilize more visible government programs, such as public housing and food 
stamps, are more likely to recognize their engagement with government programs. 
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Figure 2.2: Percentage of people who believe they “have not used a government social 
program” by self-reported use of a specific government program 
 
Source: Social and Governmental Issues and Participation Study, 2008 (Mettler 2011) 
 
These disparate findings show that submerged policies can shift how people view their 
relationship with the state by decentering the role of government initiatives.  
This foundational research, however, is limited both in terms of the types of 
policy submersion that it analyzes as well as the scope of the attitudinal consequences 
that it explores.  Mettler’s empirical research primarily operationalizes policy submersion 
as wealth transfers located in the tax code.9 As a result, it only studies a portion of the 
vast array of policies that exhibit state submersion.  Moreover, although Mettler carefully 
conceptualizes submersion as occurring in degrees, her empirical analysis clusters 
policies into dichotomous groupings of “submerged” or “visible” policies.  This prevents 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Beyond these descriptive patterns, Mettler found that the use of visible government programs is 
related to an increased understanding that you have benefitted from federal social policy.  
Notably, the use of tax credit programs is not associated with this increased recognition. This 
research also shows that as the use of “visible” policies increases, people are more likely to agree 
that government has provided opportunities to improve their standard of living. However, the 
reverse is true for tax expenditure programs.  As the number of tax expenditures that a respondent 
reports using increases, respondents become more likely to disagree with the statement that 
government has improved their standard of living. 
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her research from studying how the extent, or degree, of policy submersion shapes its 
attitudinal feeds.  This also precludes inquiry into how variation in policy submersion 
within a government program shapes the consequences of this submersion. 
Another concern with this empirical analysis is that it relies on self-reported 
program enrollment.  Submerged policies, by definition, introduce hurdles to recognizing 
when you are interacting with the state.  By relying on self-reports of enrollment in 
submerged government programs, this research cannot study a key potential consequence 
of submerged policy designs, namely, whether policy submersion prevents recipients 
from understanding when they participated in, or were affected by, a specific government 
program or initiative.  Lastly, given that the focus of Mettler’s work is to define and raise 
awareness of the presence and scope of the submerged state, this research is limited in the 
space that it has to investigate many of the potential downstream consequences of the 
misperceptions that policy submersion creates.      
As a result, Mettler’s research opens an important avenue of inquiry, but it leaves 
many attendant questions underexplored.  In place of these answers, it provides a 
springboard for studying policy submersion and its consequences for the American 
public.  By building on this foundational work, new inquiries can tackle questions such as 
whether government submersion, beyond wealth transfers located in the tax code, affect 
perceptions of the state. If so, when?  And to what extent?  What happens when we 
explore this submersion in the context of ostensibly “traditional” welfare state programs?  
Can submerged state policies create hurdles to recognizing when you are affected by 
these prominent welfare-state government policies?  And if so, can these distortions 
affect how you evaluate the state? Answering these questions is critical to understanding 
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how one of the most pervasive trends in public administration is shaping the political 
perceptions of the American public.  In Chapter Three, I probe these queries by 
measuring how variation in Medicaid privatization relates to awareness of program use.  
These analyses identify when privatization can distort policy recipients’ understanding of 
the personal relevance of a well-established, means-tested welfare program.  This finding 
shows that the distortions created via policy submersion are more pervasive, and extend 
to more policy domains, than has previously been established.  It also illustrates that these 
distortions manifest not just as a failure to understand how government programs 
function as social welfare, but that they also affect understandings of whether a specific 
social policy is a government program as well as whether this program affects you 
personally.   
 
Submerged State à Political Trust? 
 
In the following chapters, I turn to examining the attitudinal consequences of this 
informational distortion.  The precipitous drop in government trust since WWII (see Pew 
Research Center 2015) stimulated a vibrant research agenda on the origins and 
consequences of this attitudinal shift (Levi and Stoker 2000).10  The resulting scholarship 
shows that the factors predicting political trust are manifold and that they are informed 
mainly by exogenous events, rather than psychological or demographic-based 
characteristics (Levi and Stoker 2000).11 Which lived experiences matter, however, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The political upheaval of the 1960s and 1970s and the publication of two influential texts that 
sought to position trust in government as organizing political principles (Easton’s A Systems 
Analysis of Political Life and Gamson’s Power and Discontents), also galvanized this research on 
political trust (Levi and Stoker 2000).   
11 Although political trust is derived from lived experiences, aggregate rates of trust in 
government do vary by demographic groups – including age, race, income, and gender (see 
Dalton 2005; Perrin and Smolek 2009; Hahn and Perez 2014; Howell and Fagan 1988; Michelson 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   35	  
how they matter are wide-ranging.  Fluctuations in political trust have been tied to 
evaluations of the national economy, perceptions of crime-levels, and the visibility of 
recent political scandals, among other factors (see Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; 
Keele 2005; Citrin and Green 1986; Hetherington 1998; Mansbridge 1997; Orren 1997).  
As Levi and Stoker note, however, “Nearly all of this research, whatever its specific 
conclusions, agrees on one point.  Whether citizens express trust or distrust is primarily a 
reflection of their political lives” (2000: 481).  Put differently, political experiences and 
environments are the main factors structuring trust in government, and this holds whether 
government trust is broadly or narrowly construed.  As this makes clear, personal 
experiences with government and the welfare state can influence evaluations of 
government.  These types of experiences are particularly impactful for shaping 
evaluations of political actors, although they can also influence trust in political 
institutions and the political system at large (Kumlin 2004).12  This finding makes 
intuitive sense.  If you have a positive or negative experience with the government, this 
experience is likely to appear most immediately relevant to evaluations of the 
government representatives, or institutions, that are connected to this experience.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2003; Lawless 2004).  This finding is compatible with the “lived experiences” understanding of 
government trust’s determinants, considering that those in the same socially-constructed 
categories may encounter similar patterns of political experiences.   
12 A key axis of the debate over the meaning of political trust centers on whether commonly-used 
measures of political trust tap evaluations of diffuse or specific political support.  Diffuse (or 
system-level) support refers to evaluations of the larger political environment, whereas specific 
support captures evaluations of specific political actors.  While the distinction between diffuse 
and specific support has important conceptual and methodological value, they are nonetheless 
interconnected concepts that can covary, and some government referents – such as Congress or 
the federal government – can straddle both categories.  As this overlap indicates, the most 
common survey measures of trust in government (the NES trust-in-government battery) have 
been shown to capture both system-level and specific evaluations (Levi and Stoker 2000).  This 
finding implies that a documented change in political trust is capturing an attitudinal alteration 
that can have both narrow and broad political importance.      
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The recognition that political trust is shaped by lived experiences, including past 
experiences with government, indicates that there is a clear potential for administrative 
designs such as policy submersion to influence evaluations of political trust.  Aggregate 
trends concerning policy submersion and political trust are likewise suggestive of this 
relationship.  Over the same time that the submerged state has flourished, trust in 
government has plummeted.  In the 1950s, more than 70% of Americans felt that they 
could trust the federal government to do what is right most of the time.  Today, less than 
20% of Americans share this sentiment.  While these concurrent patterns do not prove 
that submerged state policies are causing trust in government to decline, they indicate that 
a relationship between the two factors may exist.  In Chapters Four and Five, I measure 
this potential relationship directly using observational and experimental data.  Through 
this analysis, I establish a causal relationship between the personal relevance of 
submerged state policies and trust in government.  
 
Why Political Trust Matters     
I probe the effect of policy submersion on government trust in part because of the 
critical role that political trust plays in structuring political attitudes, or belief systems. At 
the individual level, trust is a concept that is simple for most people to grasp (Levi and 
Stoker 2000).  In this way, it functions similarly to how the Supreme Court treats 
pornography – you know it when you see it.  Evaluations of trust evoke an affective 
response, rather than a resource-intensive, cognitively-taxing process (Hetherington 
2005; Hetherington and Husser 2012).  The cognitive ease of forming affective 
judgments enhances the influence that these types of evaluations have in orienting 
political belief systems (Converse 1964; Popkin 1994).  For this reason, affective 
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judgments, such as trust in government, are often used as a heuristic, or cognitive 
shortcut, when making other political decisions.  Rather than undergoing the cognitively 
taxing process of evaluating the merits of a particular policy proposal or design, people 
can use trust in government as a heuristic for determining their support (Hetherington 
2005).  Accordingly, if the design of public policies influences political trust, this shift 
can have broad ramifications for how one thinks about politics.   
In Chapter Six, I theorize that one of these far-reaching consequences includes 
moderating mass attitudes toward the appropriate size and role of the state.   In assessing 
the relationship between political trust and policy attitudes, it is important to note that 
political trust is not synonymous with conservatism.  American conservatism, as a 
political philosophy, emphasizes limited government involvement in many areas of 
domestic spending.  Comparing aggregate changes in political trust and self-reported 
conservatism shows that over the same time-period that political trust has fluctuated 
dramatically, the portion of Americans who identify as conservative has remained 
relatively constant.  Since 1992, between 36 and 40 percent of the American population 
identified as conservative (see Figure 2.3). 13  Over this same time-period, the number of 
Americans who trust government hit a floor of 19% and a ceiling of 46%.  These non-
monotonic patterns suggest that conservative self-identification and political trust are, at 
least in part, independent measures.  Establishing that political trust and conservatism 
differ in the aggregate, however, does not prove that political trust is shaping opinions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This time series data captures whether a respondent self-identifies as a conservative, which is 
different from whether a person adopts political views that could be classified as consistent with 
conservatism. 
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toward public policies nor does it fully eliminate the concern that government trust 
functions as a proxy for conservatism.    
             
      Figure 2.3: Conservatism and Trust in Federal Government,  
       1992 – 201514 
 
 
 
 
Critically, however, political trust has been shown to affect perceptions of 
government policies, even after controlling for conservatism.  Compared to those who 
report low levels of political trust (meaning their reported trust levels were below the 
midpoint on the self-reported trust scale), those who trust government are 6 percentage 
points more supportive of welfare programs, 13 percentage points more supportive of 
food stamp programs, and 20 percentage points more supportive of spending on foreign 
aid.  Differences in support for these programs is statistically significant even after 
accounting for potential correlated factors including partisanship, conservatism, race, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This data is drawn from The Gallup Poll Series (measures of conservatism) and The Pew 
Research Center (measures of trust in government).  The trust measure is constructed as the 
percent of respondents who trust government at least most of the time.    
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income.  Similarly, political trust functions as a predictor of the American public’s degree 
of policy liberalism, with lower levels of aggregate political trust leading to more 
conservative national policy moods (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000).  Notably, 
aggregate policy mood fails to predict trust in government, establishing that causality 
flows from trust to policy mood (i.e. relative support for liberal or conservative policies) 
(Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000).15  By influencing the general policy trends that the 
public supports, this research shows that political trust can shape attitudes related to state 
capacity.         
Trust in government has its greatest impact on political attitudes when a judgment 
evokes a sense of risk or requires a sacrifice (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2015).  For instance, trust in government has a larger effect on attitudes toward 
health care reform among those who already have health insurance, as changes to the 
status quo of this landscape are seen as most risky for those who already have insurance 
(Hetherington 2005).16  Accordingly, political trust should be particularly impactful in 
moderating attitudes toward submerged state mechanisms and specific submerged state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This study’s measure of policy liberalism is captured using Stimson’s policy mood index 
(Stimson 1999: 20).  Stimson operationalized the concept of “policy mood” by creating an index 
of the public’s favorability toward a range of domestic issue areas, including environmental 
policy, student aid, gun control, abortion, welfare, health policy, and education policy.  Measures 
of these attitudes are drawn from multiple national polls, including the NES and the General 
Social Survey (GSS), and this index is regularly updated. 7/5/17 3:57:00 PM 
16 Similarly, when assessing support for programs that have a broad beneficiary population, and 
that concentrate their costs on a small group of people, Hetherington finds that support for these 
programs is also related to political trust, but that this effect is less consistent across survey years.  
The policies examined as part of this classification include: financial aid for college students, 
funding for public schools, funding for child care, and spending on the poor.  Hetherington 
classifies support for spending on the poor as part of this minimal risk group because the public 
holds a more positive view of “the poor” as a collective referent compared to welfare recipients 
(2005: 160 f.13).  For social security, crime prevention, and environmental protection – policies 
which he describes as “universally beneficial” programs requiring little risk – Hetherington does 
not find a relationship between trust in government and program support.   
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policies, given that these assessments are essentially judgments on how risky direct-state 
administration is, compared to the private sector.  I explore this hypothesis, and its 
consequences, in Chapter Six.  
	  
Summary of the PADD Cycle 
 
The theories detailed in this chapter outline the foundation for the PADD cycle, 
which positions political trust as the lynchpin in a series of processes explaining both the 
pervasiveness of policy submersion and the consequences of policy submersion’s 
dominant role in American life.  In testing these predictions, I demonstrate that this cycle 
functions as follows: policy submersion distorts perceptions of the personal relevance of 
specific government initiatives; these distortions erode program recipients’ trust in 
government; and this diminished trust in government generates greater public support for 
the policies and ideas that undergird the submerged state.  Establishing these linkages 
highlights how policy submersion forms a self-perpetuating cycle, with decreased 
government visibility leading to lower trust in government, and lower trust in government 
generating fertile conditions for further government submersion.  Ultimately, through 
revealing this process, I show how submerged policies are fracturing both the basic 
premise of democratic accountability and the prospect for more equitable governance.   
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Chapter Three: How the State Was Lost 
	  
	  
Privatization is a persistent presence within the United States government and has 
been since the nation’s founding (Kosar 2006).  Over the past half century, however, the 
process of shifting the administration of government services to non-state actors has 
grown in political salience and form (Verkuil 2007).  This expansion and its 
consequences for service delivery are well documented (see, for instance, Hacker 2002; 
Kamerman and Kahn 1989); yet much remains unclear about how privatization impacts 
its target population’s political perceptions.  Privatization, also known as policy 
delegation, creates an additional institutional layer between the public and the 
government.  As Chapter One makes clear, however, this is a process that occurs in 
degrees and not all privatization initiatives look alike.  In the ensuing chapter, I leverage 
this variation to examine whether and how privatization shapes people’s understanding of 
when they are interacting with a public program or service.  
In examining when privatization interferes with the ease of tracing a service or 
program back to government, I am exploring how privatization maps onto the submerged 
state (Mettler 2011).  Previous research has measured engagement with submerged 
policies based on self-reported measures of program use (see, for instance, Earle and 
Gehlbach 2003; Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011).  By definition, however, a 
submerged program creates obstacles for recognizing when you are interacting with 
government.  This suggests that there is a strong potential for self-reported estimates of 
enrollment in submerged policies to be biased downward.  Accordingly, reliance on self-
reports alone does not allow for the measurement of a key theoretical consequence of the 
submerged state, namely, its effect on people’s awareness of program use.     
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I avoid these measurement concerns, and instead take advantage of an opportunity 
they present, by using survey self-reports that are linked to administrative records of 
program enrollment.  The Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) data on 
Medicaid enrollment has been linked to the American Community Survey (ACS), a 
Census survey that contains questions on health insurance, including self-reported 
Medicaid enrollment.  By validating the accuracy of self-reports, these linked data allow 
me to measure how Medicaid privatization impacts awareness of program use.  The 
substantive domain of this dataset is also well-suited for this inquiry.  Medicaid 
privatization, in its most widespread form, occurs via Medicaid managed care.  As a 
federal-state partnership program, states have flexibility in how they adopted Medicaid 
managed care, creating substantial between-state differences in the implementation of 
this privatization.  I can isolate which administrative features of Medicaid privatization, if 
any, are driving shifts in state visibility by exploiting state-level differences in the 
administrative design of these privatized (managed care) plans.  This focus on Medicaid 
is also notable because it allows me to explore how privatization affects state visibility 
using a traditional means-tested welfare-state program, which is generally understood as 
difficult to submerge and which has not yet been studied in this context.   
My findings show that the form of the privatization can alter when program 
recipients recognize their use of this privatized program.  When I measure privatization 
simply using managed care enrollment, which is the most widely-used measure of 
Medicaid privatization in studies of Medicaid underreporting, I fail to find a relationship 
between privatization and self-reported Medicaid enrollment.  However, when I specify 
administrative features of Medicaid managed care organizations (MCOs) that affect the 
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ease of tracing a health insurance plan back to government, I find that these 
administrative features are related to the underreporting of Medicaid enrollment.  When 
states utilize Medicaid MCOs that mix Medicaid recipients and commercial enrollees 
together, and when they use Medicaid MCOs that are named after a private insurance 
company, Medicaid self-reporting declines.  This differentiation is significant because it 
shows that whether privatization generates informational distortions is conditioned on the 
use of administrative designs that attenuate the role of the state.  In linking these 
privatized administrative elements to patterns of Medicaid self-reporting, these findings 
also offer a partial explanation for the “Medicaid undercount,” the phenomenon in which 
surveys of insurance enrollment drastically undercount the size of the Medicaid 
population. 
This chapter concludes by showing that this pattern is robust across datasets.  
Specifically, I find that the same program design elements that drive Medicaid reporting 
rates in the linked ACS-MSIS data similarly affect reporting rates in the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health).  The Add Health data 
also indicate that when this misreporting occurs, Medicaid enrollees are frequently 
reporting enrollment in private insurance plans.  This suggests that when privatization 
obscures the role of the state, it is encouraging Medicaid participants to think of 
themselves as outside of the Medicaid population and to underestimate the role that 
government plays in the provision of their health insurance.  This finding is critical 
because it demonstrates that privatization can affect both whether you identify as a 
program recipient as well as whether you connect this program usage back to 
government.   
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Privatization and the Submerged State  
 Submerged policies can be distinguished from direct policies based on their use of 
private delivery mechanisms for administering government policies, creating potential 
difficulties for tracing this policy back to government (Hackett 2016).  The administrative 
mechanisms commonly used by submerged policies include deferral of administrative 
capacity to non-governmental organizations (commonly referred to as privatization) and 
reliance on the tax code for wealth transfers, rather than providing benefits directly 
(Mettler 2011).  The implementation of these measures has allowed the federal 
government to address a range of policy agendas without a corresponding increase in the 
size its formal institutions (DiIulio 2014).  In her seminal work on the submerged state, 
Mettler details how submerged state policies have led Americans to underestimate the 
extent to which they engage with, and benefit from, state actions.  For instance, 60% of 
respondents who reported using the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction (a tax credit for 
home ownership) also said that they have never used a government social program.  In 
documenting this disjuncture, Mettler relies on self-reports of program use.  By analyzing 
self-reports alone, however, this research is unable to measure whether submerged state 
policies influence people’s understanding of whether they are benefitting from a specific 
government program.  Put differently, it does not test whether policy submersion affects 
people’s perceptions of program receipt.  Moreover, the submerged programs that 
Mettler surveys are primarily wealth transfers located in the tax code.  Consequently, 
while this research does much to identify the submerged state and further our 
understanding of how it functions, we still lack a rigorous test of how one of the main 
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mechanisms of the submerged state – privatization – influences government visibility 
among a program’s target population.  
 Privatization can refer to a broad range of policies, which complicates how we 
understand the relationship between privatization and the submerged state.  Privatization 
transfers administrative responsibility from government to the private sector (Lundqvist 
1988).  In practice, this transfer of responsibility occurs in degrees, with policies shifting 
varying portions of their administration to non-state actors.  The more extensively that a 
policy relies on non-state actors, the more privatized it becomes.  Like privatization, 
submersion also occurs in degrees, with policies ranging from deeply submerged to 
highly visible (Mettler 2011).  Policies become more submerged the more that they rely 
on administrative mechanisms that attenuate the traceability of the benefit back to 
government.  In this context, privatization makes a policy more “submerged” the more 
that this privatization serves to hide the role of the state and state actors.    
Variation in the administration of privatization suggests that the effect of this 
practice on state visibility may be conditioned on how privatization is implemented.  A 
recent study of the Milwaukee school voucher program showed that parents of children 
who utilized school vouchers were more likely to feel that government impacted their 
child’s education and that this interaction taught them about government (Fleming 2014).  
This finding suggests that vouchers remind people that government is responsible for 
privatized public services.  Critically, however, Fleming studied voucher programs that 
were administered by state agencies.  It is less clear whether vouchers administered by 
private tax-credit agencies would have the same informational effect, particularly 
considering Mettler’s research showing that tax credits diminish recipients’ awareness of 
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their interactions with the state (2011).  The divergent implications of these studies 
indicate that not all forms of privatization have the same impact on policy submersion 
and that additional research is needed to determine when and how privatization affects 
state visibility.   
Medicaid: A Case Study 
 
 Medicaid presents a valuable domain from which to assess the relationship 
between privatization, program design, and awareness of government.  Medicaid’s 
prominence in state budgets, the health care system, and political rhetoric underscore the 
program’s central role in US social policy.  This suggests that Medicaid could be a 
difficult program to obscure from the public consciousness.  However, Medicaid can also 
be a confusing program: it is jointly administered by federal and state governments as a 
federal-state partnership program; eligibility and coverage differ by state and recipient 
group; and the name of Medicaid programs differ between and within states.  Similarity 
between the names of the Medicaid and Medicare programs, as well as overlap between 
the two program populations, add to the muddle over what Medicaid is and who it serves.  
The complexity surrounding Medicaid suggests that if privatization affects perceptions of 
government’s role in people’s lives, Medicaid is a policy area where we should expect to 
find evidence of this trend.  Accordingly, by studying Medicaid, this chapter tests 
whether the submersion of a social welfare program that looms large in government 
budgets and national discourse, but whose administration is fragmented, impacts 
recipients’ awareness of this government intervention in their lives.         
Variation in Medicaid privatization between states is critical to this inquiry 
because it allows me to isolate the interpretive effects of different administrative designs 
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while holding the privatized policy (Medicaid) constant.  Medicaid managed care plans 
present one of the earliest moves toward Medicaid privatization, having emerged less 
than a decade after the creation of this program (Tater et al. 2016).  Under Medicaid 
managed care, states contract with managed care organizations (MCOs).  States provide 
MCOs with a set monthly payment (capitation), and MCOs provide health insurance 
benefits to the enrollees.  MCOs currently represent the most widespread form of 
Medicaid privatization in terms of enrollment (CMS Managed Care Enrollment Report 
2014).17  I expect that Medicaid MCOs may hide the role of the state considering that 
when these managed care enrollees interact with their insurance company and its 
employees, they are interacting with a private entity.  The added institutional layer of the 
MCO moves Medicaid administration away from the government by creating a 
nongovernmental (i.e. private) organization that directly interfaces with the Medicaid 
recipient.   
However, not all managed care plans are administered alike.  The Social Security 
Act’s Section 1915(b) waiver program grants states flexibility in determining whether 
and how to implement Medicaid managed care, and Section 1115 allows states to apply 
for waivers granting additional administrative flexibility.  Over time, these measures have 
allowed for substantial between-state variation in Medicaid MCO administration.  If 
some Medicaid MCOs utilize different administrative features that affect the ease of 
tracing this health insurance back to government, then I would expect for these plans to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A voucher system did not become an approved form of Medicaid delivery until 2013, when 
states applied to the CMS for waivers to use vouchers for their Medicaid expansion under the 
Affordable Care Act (Kaiser Family Foundation “Medicaid Expansion in Arkansas,”  2015).  
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have a particularly pronounced effect on submerging the state and obscuring recipients’ 
recognition of the public origins of their health insurance.   
In comparing the design of Medicaid MCOs, two structural elements stand out as 
most likely to strain this ease of traceability.  The first concerns how Medicaid MCOs are 
named.  As is common with employer-based insurance plans, Medicaid managed care 
plans have plans names.  The name of Medicaid MCO plans vary depending on the 
MCO.  For instance, Medicaid MCO enrollees in San Joaquin, California, can be enrolled 
in the Health Plan of San Joaquin while Indiana-based Medicaid enrollees may be 
covered by a MCO named Anthem MCO.  As this suggests, some Medicaid MCO plans 
include the name of the insurance company administering the plan in their plan name, 
other MCOs keep Medicaid or the name of the geographic region being served in the plan 
name, and still other plans do neither.  It stands to reason that plans which keep the word 
Medicaid, or the geographic unit served, in the plan’s name are more likely to be 
recognized as Medicaid plans than Medicaid MCOs whose plan name includes the name 
of a private insurance company.  When Medicaid enrollees in Anthem MCO refer to their 
health insurance card, or list their insurance on a medical form, they are referring to a 
private company.  This branding is likely to remind enrollees of the nongovernmental 
administration of their health insurance plan, further obscuring the public (Medicaid) 
origins of this health insurance.      
Another administrative element that varies between Medicaid MCOs that may 
further strain one’s ability to trace this health insurance back to government concerns 
who else is enrolled in the MCO.  According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), Medicaid managed care plans can be classified as either commercial 
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MCOs or Medicaid-only MCOs.  As the name indicates, Medicaid-only MCOs provide 
services to Medicaid beneficiaries only.  Commercial MCOs, however, provide services 
“to both Medicaid and commercial and/or Medicare” enrollees (CMS 2008 Managed 
Care Enrollment Report).  States adopted commercial MCO plans in attempts to increase 
the provider network and reduce stigma associated with Medicaid plans.  In theory, the 
private population in a commercial MCO also offers a “financial cushion” for the MCO 
(Pracht 2007).   
Commercial MCOs may be more likely to cause confusion about Medicaid 
enrollment because these MCOs are also providing services to non-Medicaid enrollees.  
Accordingly, commercial MCOs’ plan materials (including their website and their plan 
brochures) engage with and are targeted toward a broader population, whereas Medicaid-
only MCO plan materials and personnel are solely targeting the Medicaid population.  In 
turn, the branding for Medicaid-only MCO documents is more likely to address and 
reinforce their Medicaid affiliation compared to commercial MCOs.  Commercial MCOs 
also create the potential for Medicaid enrollees to remain with the same insurance 
provider as they switch from private to public health insurance.    
Isolating these features of Medicaid managed care plans (how plans are named 
and who else is enrolled in the plan) may also help to address a conflict in the Medicaid 
undercount literature.  Inquiries into the Medicaid undercount have centered on two of 
the most prominent surveys used to measure Medicaid enrollment: the Census’s Current 
Population Survey (CPS) and the American Community Survey (ACS) (see, for instance, 
Abraham, Karaca-Mandic, and Boudreaux 2013; Boudreaux et al. 2015; Cantor et al. 
2007; Davern et al. 2009).  These studies show that although it is seemingly 
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straightforward to measure who receives Medicaid – just ask – the resulting responses 
can underestimate the size of the Medicaid population by more than 40% (Davern et al. 
2009).  Leading explanations of the Medicaid undercount attribute this mismeasurement 
largely to question wording and survey design (Davern et al. 2009; Klerman et al. 2009; 
O’Hara 2010; Pascale, Roemer, and Resnick 2009).  However, the theoretical connection 
between privatization and the obscuring of government’s presence suggests that Medicaid 
privatization may also contribute to the Medicaid undercount.  Numerous studies have 
examined this potential impact by testing for a relationship between Medicaid managed 
care and the Medicaid undercount.  These analyses, however, produced conflicting 
findings.  On one hand, Eberly et al. suggest that managed care usage can reduce the 
accuracy of Medicaid self-reports (2009).  Chattopadhyay and Bindman study Medicaid 
managed care enrollment within the state of California and similarly find that increased 
Medicaid managed care penetration correlates with lower estimates of Medicaid 
enrollment (2006).  Conversely, other researchers maintain that managed care enrollment 
fails to predict, or even lessens, the Medicaid undercount (see Call et al. 2008; Kincheloe 
et al. 2006).  In this vein, Plotzke, Klerman, and Davern use individual-level data 
matched to administrative records and show that managed care usage does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the accuracy of Medicaid reporting in the CPS (2010).  
Notably, although these studies offer disparate findings, they are identical in that they all 
treat Medicaid managed care as a dichotomous variable.  They measure whether a plan is 
administered by an MCO, without accounting for variation between managed care plans.  
By isolating specific Medicaid managed care administrative features, however, I can 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   51	  
identify whether there are program design elements that shift managed care plans’ effect 
on the Medicaid undercount.    
Given the theorized relationship between submerged policy designs and 
awareness of program use, I test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Increased Medicaid privatization should lead to decreased Medicaid self-
reporting among Medicaid enrollees.    
 
I operationalize Medicaid privatization using the following indicators: MCO penetration 
in the Medicaid population; the construction of Medicaid MCO plan names; and the 
member composition of the Medicaid MCO (i.e. commercial MCOs or Medicaid-only 
MCOs).  
  
Measuring Medicaid Privatization and Medicaid Reporting: The ACS Survey 
 
 To test this hypothesis, I build on the previously conducted linkage of Medicaid 
enrollment records to survey self-reports.  The American Community Survey (ACS) is a 
nationally-representative survey, conducted by the Census Bureau, which contains a 
battery of questions on health insurance. These health insurance questions allow 
participants to select the option of whether they obtain their health insurance through 
“Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for those with 
low incomes or a disability.”  This inclusive phrasing suggests that even if people fail to 
recognize that they are part of Medicaid specifically, if they recognize their participation 
in a government-assistance health insurance plan, they would select this program 
option.18  This indicates that Medicaid enrollees who do not select this option are not just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This phrasing also suggests that the ACS health insurance question cannot be used to track 
Medicaid over-reporting, as respondents can accurately select this response option if they are 
enrolled in government health insurance plans beyond Medicaid. 
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confused about the term Medicaid, they are also explicitly rejecting the public origins of 
their health insurance.  In 2013, the State Health Access Data Assistance Center 
(SHADAC), in conjunction with the U.S. Census Bureau, matched ACS insurance data to 
Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) administrative records.  They conducted 
this linkage using an anonymized version of the internal Census ACS survey, which 
contains over 4 million personal records for the 2008 survey.  These records were then 
linked to MSIS records via Protected Identification Keys (PIKs), which the Census 
Bureau developed.  This linkage enabled researchers to estimate the size of the Medicaid 
undercount in the 2008 ACS (see Boudreaux et al. 2015).  For each state and the District 
of Columbia, they calculated the Medicaid undercount using the following ratio: 
The number of persons who reported having Medicaid in the  
ACS and who were enrolled in Medicaid according to the MSIS 
The number of persons who were enrolled in Medicaid  
according to the MSIS 
 
I use this ratio as my dependent variable.19  Due to disclosure concerns, this linked data 
could not be released at any geographic unit smaller than the state level (Boudreaux et al. 
2015).20  The use of a dependent variable measured at the state-level does not present a 
methodological problem for my analysis because the independent variable of interest is 
also measured at the state level.       
 My key explanatory variable is a state-level measure of Medicaid privatization.  
This variable was constructed from an index based on each state’s Medicaid managed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The published SHADAC paper codes this variable so that higher values indicate lower levels of 
Medicaid reporting (i.e. a larger Medicaid undercount) (Boudreaux et al. 2015).  To make 
interpretation of the data more easily comprehensible for the purposes of this paper, I rearranged 
the coding of the dependent variable so that higher values indicate higher levels of Medicaid 
reporting.  
20 Disclosure concerns prevent the Census Bureau from releasing new analyses that include 
respondent-level indicators for commercial MCO enrollment and privately-named MCOs.   
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care arrangements.  All items in this index were calculated at the state-level and they 
include:  
•   The percent of the Medicaid population enrolled in managed care. 
•   The percent of the Medicaid population enrolled in a commercial MCO. 
•   The percent of the Medicaid population enrolled in a MCO with the private 
insurance company’s name in the plan name.  For clarity, this measure will be 
referred to as “privately-named Medicaid MCOs.”   
 
The index of these three measures has a Cronbach’s alpha of .45.  Given the moderate 
degree of internal consistency shown by this measure of scale reliability, I analyze the 
components of this measure together as an index, but I also examine each item of the 
index separately.  By testing the measures independently, I can identify whether certain 
privatization design elements are driving my findings. 
 For my analysis, I specify relevant control variables to limit the possibility that a 
correlation between privatization and the Medicaid undercount is the product of a 
correlated state-level variable.  One such potential feature is the size of a state’s elderly 
population.  Persons aged 65 and older are eligible for Medicare.  Persons who are 
eligible both for Medicare, because of their age, and Medicaid, because of their financial 
status, may be particularly vulnerable to misreporting their Medicaid enrollment due to 
their dual-eligible status.  However, their Medicare eligibility may also give them a 
heightened awareness of, and attention to, government’s role in their health insurance.  
To control for the potential that this population behaves differently than the population at 
large, I include a variable that measures the percent of the Medicaid population aged 65 
or older in each state, as this portion of the population would also be eligible for 
Medicare.  Another concern is that potential language barriers could harm Medicaid 
reporting.  It is possible that language-based cues, such as the private naming of Medicaid 
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MCOs, would affect non-English speakers and persons with only limited English-
language skills disparately.  To control for this possibility, I include a measure that 
captures the percent of each state’s adult population that is Limited English Proficient 
(LEP) according to the US Census Bureau’s ACS survey estimates.21 
My analysis also includes a measure of the adult population enrolled in 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  Until the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWOA), Medicaid eligibility was linked to Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a federal program that provided financial 
assistance to low-income families.  AFDC was a highly stigmatized program and this 
stigma spread to Medicaid, impacting how Medicaid was structured (Pracht 2007; Soss 
and Schram 2007).  In particular, the size of the adult AFDC population was shown to 
influence states’ decisions to switch to Medicaid managed care.  States with larger AFDC 
populations were more likely to adopt Medicaid managed care because it was considered 
a less generous alternative to fee-for-service care (Pracht 2007).  As the 1996 welfare 
reform legislation restructured AFDC into TANF, including a measure of the adult TANF 
population may help to control for an element of the political calculus that is related to 
implementing privatization initiatives.22  To avoid the bias introduced by TANF 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Persons are deemed Limited English Proficient if they report speaking English less than “very 
well.” Given the correlation between the size of a state’s LEP rate and the size of a state’s 
Hispanic population, I also specify a version of this model that includes a measure of the percent 
of a state’s Medicaid population that identifies as Hispanic.  The inclusion of this variable does 
not affect any of the substantive findings presented in this chapter.  Regression output with this 
additional control variable can be found in the Appendix.  
22 I also address the political calculus behind the decision to implement Medicaid managed care 
by including a measure of the percent of each state’s employed population that is in a union.  
Strong union membership was shown to be correlated with resistance to managed care initiatives 
(Pracht 2007).  The inclusion of this variable did not affect my findings.  Regression output with 
this control variable can be found in the Appendix.   
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underreporting (see Klerman, Ringel, and Roth 2005; Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan 2009), I 
use administrative records of state-level adult TANF enrollment, as reported by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HSS).  The historical development of 
Medicaid also suggests that racial identity has the potential to influence willingness to 
report Medicaid enrollment.  In the latter half of the twentieth century, attitudes on 
welfare became strongly correlated with attitudes on race (Kellstedt 2003).  In the 
process, welfare became a pejorative term that could conjure racialized images of an 
undeserving non-white population dependent on government largess (Gilens 2000; Katz 
and Thomas 1998).  The race-coding of AFDC was ultimately a key motivating factor in 
the push to remake AFDC into TANF (Meyerson 1996).  However, TANF and Medicaid 
at least partially retained the perception that they were programs for poor African-
Americans (Gilens 2009; Soss and Schram 2007), even though the majority of Medicaid 
enrollees are white (CMS Statistics Report 2014).  Given that this racial stigma may 
manifest as an unwillingness among the white population to report their Medicaid 
enrollment, my regression analysis includes a measure of a state’s Medicaid population 
that identifies as white. 
 My final two control variables address educational achievement and state 
ideology.  As education levels rise, people should be increasingly capable of shouldering 
the cognitive burden imposed by survey questions.  Education is a widely-recognized 
predictor of political knowledge, and persons with higher levels of education are more 
likely to answer political knowledge questions in surveys correctly, particularly when 
asked about specific facts relevant to declarative memory storage (Delli Carpini and 
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Keeter 1997; Prior and Lupia 2008).23 Accordingly, I include a measure that captures the 
percent of the adult population in each state that has at least a high school diploma.  
Lastly, given concerns that privatization may merely be operating as a proxy for state 
ideology, I delineate the effects of privatization (on Medicaid reporting) from those of 
state ideology by including state ideology in my model.  My measure of this variable is 
taken from the state ideology index created by Tausanovitch and Warshaw as part of the 
American Ideology Project (Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2013).  The inclusion of state 
ideology as a control variable is also particularly important considering that another 
explanation for the Medicaid undercount, aside from lack of awareness or confusion 
about the program’s public origins, is that respondents are consciously misreporting their 
Medicaid use.  In particular, stigma attached to this public benefit may encourage the 
misreporting of Medicaid enrollment.  This form of error is only a concern for my 
analysis to the extent that these conscious misreports are correlated with the state’s 
degree of privatization.  The most plausible mechanism through which the two would be 
connected is political ideology.  Persons in more conservative states may be less willing 
to admit their use of social welfare programs. Accordingly, the state-level political 
ideology variable helps to control for the effects of this alternative cause of misreporting.     
 To summarize, I use the following model (model one henceforth) to measure the 
consequences of privatization for Medicaid reporting: 
Y = β0 + β1XState Medicaid Privatization + β2XPercent of State Medicaid Pop. over 65 + β3XPercent of State 
Adult Pop. that is Limited English Proficient + β4XPercent of State Adult Pop. on TANF + β5XPercent of State 
Medicaid Pop. that Identifies as White +β6XPercent of State Adult Pop. with a H.S. Diploma + β7XState Political 
Ideology + ε  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Prior and Lupia’s research takes care to note that quick memory recall is distinct from political 
learning skills (Prior and Lupia 2008). 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   57	  
I use robust standard errors in my analysis of this model.  Estimating regression 
parameters using robust regression analysis protects the resulting estimates from being 
unduly impacted by deviations from modeling assumptions created by heteroscedasticity 
and outliers (Western 1995). 
 
Findings from the Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
 
  To ensure that any observed relationship between privatization and Medicaid 
underreporting is not a product of copious control variables, I first test for a bivariate 
relationship between Medicaid reporting and privatization.  While I present model-based 
results here, the appendix contains graphical illustrations of these bivariate relationships.  
To begin, I find a statistically significant relationship between Medicaid reporting and 
commercial MCO penetration (p = .019), with Medicaid reporting decreasing as 
commercial MCO penetration increases.  By decreased Medicaid reporting, I am 
referring to decreased Medicaid reporting among persons who are enrolled in Medicaid 
according to MSIS Medicaid administrative data.  Similarly, I find that increased 
penetration of privately-named MCOs relates to decreased Medicaid reporting (p = .012).  
The index variable, which was constructed from all three privatization measures, is also 
statistically significant at the .05 level (p = .014).  However, I fail to find evidence of a 
statistically-significant bivariate relationship between managed care penetration and 
Medicaid reporting (p = .941) (see column 1 of Tables 3.1 – 3.4 for bivariate output).  
 Next, I reanalyze this data with the full set of control variables listed in model 
one.  To address the potential for multicollinearity among my control variables, I 
successively add the control variables that are likely to be correlated (race, language 
proficiency, TANF enrollment, and education).  Across all specifications, my results are 
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consistent with my findings from the bivariate analysis.  As the percent of the Medicaid 
population that uses a commercial MCO grows, the portion of the Medicaid population 
that reports their enrollment decreases (i.e. the Medicaid undercount grows) (p < .05; see 
Table 3.1). 24  Similarly, as the percent of the Medicaid population enrolled in privately-
named plans grows, Medicaid reporting among Medicaid enrollees declines (p < .05; see 
Table 3.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The significance of the commercial MCO variable is particularly noteworthy given the 
construction of this variable.  Recall, the 2008 CMS Managed Care Report defined a Medicaid 
MCO as commercial if it provides services to either a non-Medicaid population or to Medicare 
enrollees.  This means that the commercial MCO variable also accounts for plans where the non-
Medicaid enrollees on the insurance plan are also on public health insurance (because they are on 
Medicare).  I would expect this to attenuate the effects of the commercial MCO variable because 
I cannot disaggregate non-Medicare commercial MCOs from Medicare commercial MCOs.  
Compared to plans that serve a general, non-Medicaid population, I would not expect for plans 
that serve the Medicare population to look significantly more like commercial plans than 
Medicaid-only MCOs.  The commercial MCO variable’s statistical significance is also notable 
given that I control for the potential confusion created by the Medicaid-Medicare overlap, and 
that a larger dual eligible population is related to improved Medicaid reporting.   
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Table 3.1: State-Level Medicaid Commercial MCO Enrollment and State-Level Medicaid 
Reporting25 
 
 Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: State-Level Privately-Named Medicaid MCO Enrollment and State-Level Medicaid 
Reporting 
 
 Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 * p < 0.05 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Although the education variable is not statistically significant, the sign of this variable is in the 
opposite direction to the one anticipated, with higher high school diploma rates associated with 
less accurate Medicaid reporting.  This finding may in part be reflective of recent research 
suggesting that the effects of education on political knowledge shrink when asked about policy-
specific domains compared to general political knowledge questions (Barabas et al. 2014). 
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The privatization index also relates to Medicaid underreporting, with increased 
privatization levels correlating with decreased Medicaid reporting across all model 
specifications (p<.05; see Table 3.3).  However, I fail to find evidence of a statistically 
significant relationship between managed care penetration and Medicaid underreporting 
at any conventional level of statistical significance in any model specification (see Table 
3.4). 
  Table 3.3: State-Level Medicaid Privation Index and State-Level Medicaid Reporting 
 
  Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.05 
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Table 3.4: State-Level Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment and State-Level Medicaid Reporting                                                           
 
  Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.05  
 
 
I further isolate privatization as the mechanism driving this misreporting by re-
specifying my model to address the politics of healthcare more directly.  One concern is 
that Medicaid privatization proxies for a state’s larger treatment of Medicaid recipients 
and that I am incorrectly attributing Medicaid underreporting to privatization rather than 
an antecedent, such as a state’s general neglect of, or support for, its Medicaid program.  
Accordingly, I re-specify my model to include control variables for Medicaid generosity 
both in terms of average spending per adult enrollee and the expansiveness of a state’s 
Medicaid eligibility.26  I also control for states’ Medicaid take-up rates, meaning the 
percent of eligible recipients who are enrolled in Medicaid.  This measure reflects a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 I capture expansiveness of Medicaid eligibility by measuring the percent of the population that 
lives below 200% of the poverty line and the percent of the population on Medicaid.  Accounting 
for the percent of the population that lives below 200% of the poverty line allows the Medicaid 
penetration variable (i.e. percent of the population on Medicaid) to capture Medicaid generosity 
with respect to the expansiveness of the state’s Medicaid eligibility and not simply the number of 
low-income residents in the state.   
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state’s commitment to registering Medicaid-eligible persons for this health insurance 
program as well as Medicaid-eligible persons’ willingness and ability to enroll.  In this 
vein, I include a series of indicators measuring Medicaid enrollment hurdles, including 
whether the state allows for joint family applications, whether the state has an in-person 
interview requirement,27 and whether the state has asset tests for eligibility.28  I add these 
control variables both individually and as groups.  Across all specifications, I find that 
commercial MCO penetration and privately-named MCOs continue to have a significant 
impact on Medicaid underreporting (see Tables A3.1- A3.4 in the Appendix for 
regression output).  Additionally, overall MCO penetration remains statistically 
insignificant.   
I also check for the possibility that my findings are simply the result of a few 
influential states, or outliers.  I identify influential states by calculating the Cook’s 
distance for each observation across the different measures of privatization and across all 
model specifications.  I find that my results do not change when I exclude these 
influential states from my analysis.  I also specify influential states using DFBeta 
calculations and I once again find that my results do not change when I exclude the states 
that this method identifies as influential.  These robustness checks indicate that my results 
are not driven by a few highly influential states.   
Overall, these analyses show that the form of the privatization matters.  MCO 
plan name and commercial MCO penetration – two program elements that have a strong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Although in-person interviews present an enrollment hurdle, I expect for this requirement to 
increase Medicaid reporting, as the interview is likely to make clear that the recipient is applying 
for Medicaid.    
28  For simplicity, the output in the Appendix displays these variables in the same regression; 
however, my results remain the same when these measures are added to the regression 
individually.    
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potential to obscure the public nature of Medicaid – have a clear and consistent 
relationship with Medicaid underreporting.  However, when I measure privatization 
simply using Medicaid managed care enrollment, I fail to find a significant relationship 
between this measure of privatization and Medicaid underreporting.  These disparate 
results demonstrate the value of incorporating variation in program design into studies of 
privatization to better isolate when privatization relates to decreased state visibility.   
With respect to the relative size of the impact of privatization on Medicaid 
underreporting, my results show that for every 10 persons added to either a commercial 
MCO or a privately-named MCO, approximately 1 less person will report their Medicaid 
enrollment.  To get a sense of how this plays out at the state-level, my results show that 
Pennsylvania’s commercial Medicaid MCO population of 968,713 relates to 
approximately 91,000 fewer persons reporting their Medicaid enrollment in the state.  
Similarly, its privately-named Medicaid MCO population of roughly 3,357,000 relates to 
approximately 396,000 fewer people reporting their Medicaid enrollment.   
In interpreting these results, it is important to stress that although these findings 
highlight a robust association between privatization and Medicaid underreporting, this 
does not prove causation.  While I have included theoretically-relevant control variables 
to account for other potential causal explanations, this does not eliminate the possibility 
that the patterns shown in this research are caused by an alternative correlated factor.  
Moreover, although the linked MSIS-ACS data provides a measure of Medicaid 
enrollment free from the bias of self-reporting, it does so by utilizing state-level 
measures.  This use of aggregate data, which protects the anonymity of the survey 
respondents, also prevents me from directly assessing how Medicaid privatization 
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impacts individual behavior.  The phrasing of the ACS survey question on healthcare 
indicates that Medicaid enrollees who do not select the “Medicaid” response option both 
do not think of themselves as Medicaid enrollees and do not think of their health 
insurance as part of a government-assistance program.29  However, my reliance on state-
level measures means that any attempt to extrapolate individual-level behavior from this 
analysis risks engaging in an ecological fallacy.  Accordingly, to study the relationship 
between Medicaid privatization and self-reporting at the individual level, I turn to the 
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health), which contains 
individual-level measures of Medicaid reporting.   
  
Measuring Medicaid Privatization and Medicaid Reporting: Add Health Survey 
Data 
 
The Add Health survey is a multi-year panel survey that followed a nationally-
representative sample of young adults through to adulthood.  In this analysis, I use the 
restricted-use version of the Add Health survey.  These restricted-use files provide a 
sample size that is three times larger than the public-use files.30  The third wave of this 
survey contains more than 7,000 respondents aged 18 - 28 earning less than 200% of the 
federal poverty level (FPL).31  As this income distribution suggests, this survey should 
contain a substantial number of Medicaid recipients from across the United States.  
Ideally, I would connect the Add Health data to MSIS records; however, such a linkage is 
impossible due to privacy concerns.  Given this limitation, I instead construct a measure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Recall, the ACS health insurance question asks respondents whether they obtain their health 
insurance through “Medicaid, Medical Assistance, or any kind of government-assistance plan for 
those with low incomes or a disability.”  
30 They also contain additional state-level contextual variables as well as the proper weight 
components needed for a multilevel model. 
31 Wave 3 of the Add Health in-home survey was conducted from August 2001 - April 2002.  
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that serves as a proxy for the accuracy of a respondent’s Medicaid self-reporting.  To 
calculate this measure, I begin by estimating a respondent’s Medicaid eligibility.  
Medicaid eligibility is based primarily on state eligibility limits for total household 
income, parental status, employment status, and qualifying health conditions.  I use these 
determinants of eligibility to identify which Add Health respondents are likely to be 
Medicaid eligible.  I then limit my analysis to the survey respondents whom I estimate 
are eligible for Medicaid in their state.  
The dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous measure of whether or 
not a (potential) Medicaid-eligible respondent reports his or her Medicaid enrollment.  As 
this measure contains individual-level responses, it provides a useful complement to the 
ACS-MSIS data.  However, it is clearly less ideal than the linked MSIS-ACS data for 
determining the accuracy of Medicaid reporting.  Medicaid eligibility does not equate to 
enrollment. Additionally, my measures of eligibility are a rough proxy, rather than a 
reflection of the state’s actual eligibility determinations and subsequent enrollment.  This 
mismeasurement is likely to attenuate any effects of privatization, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of a type II error (i.e. a false negative).   This suggests that if I find a 
relationship, this correlation is particularly robust. 
  Another pressing concern caused by my construction of the dependent variable, 
however, is the possibility that a correlation between the dependent variable (accuracy of 
Medicaid reporting) and privatization is a function of a state’s Medicaid eligibility limits, 
as these limits may be correlated with a state’s decision to privatize Medicaid.  The state-
level political environment is likely to affect both eligibility cut-offs and privatization 
decisions.  Accordingly, as with model one, I include a measure of state-level political 
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ideology.32  I also control for the state’s general treatment of its Medicaid population by 
including measures of state-level Medicaid spending and Medicaid take-up, along with 
the series of indicators that capture Medicaid enrollment procedures.  Given that the Add 
Health data is collected at the individual level, I also include the following control 
variables from model one – TANF enrollment,33 language skills,34 race, education,35 and 
political ideology – at the individual level.36  The use of individual-level data also allows 
me to isolate additional personal characteristics that may affect how an enrollee 
experiences Medicaid.  Concerns that managed care providers will maneuver to serve 
only the healthiest populations (a practice known as creaming) suggests that people in 
MCOs might not have the same health needs as the general Medicaid population 
(Demone and Gibelman 2013).  I can address this potential bias by including a measure 
of respondents’ general health.  As with my analysis of the ACS-MSIS data, I add these 
control variables sequentially to show that my findings are robust across modeling 
specifications.  In this analysis, my explanatory variable of interest – Medicaid 
privatization – remains at the state-level.  As I include both individual and state-level 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 State-level political ideology is calculated as the difference between the proportion of votes 
cast for the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the 2000 election.   
33 Given the overlap between the TANF-eligible and Medicaid-eligible populations at the time of 
this survey (Nadel, Wamhoff, and Wiseman 2003), including self-reports of TANF enrollment 
allows this measure to serve as a proxy for a respondent’s ability to report social program use.  I 
also re-measure TANF based on state-level enrollment estimates and find that the inclusion of 
this aggregate measure does not change my results. 
34 The Add Health measure of language proficiency focuses on frequency of using a non-English 
language. 
35 I also re-measure education using a series of dichotomous variables that indicate one’s highest 
level of educational achievement (some high school, a high school diploma or the equivalent, 
some college, and a college degree or greater).  
36 In the Add Health analysis, I omit the variable measuring recipients aged 65 and older, given 
that the Add Health sample was limited to respondents aged 18-28.  Moreover, as the sample is 
already limited to persons under 200% FPL, I do not include measures of Medicaid 
expansiveness in the ACS-MSIS model.  Notably, when I re-specify the Add Health model to 
include these additional state-level indicators, my substantive findings do not change.      
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variables, I use a multilevel model.  Multilevel modeling allows me to account for 
systematic unexplained variation at both the individual and group levels when estimating 
group-level regression coefficients, such as states’ Medicaid privatization (Gelman 2006; 
Gelman and Hill 2007: 246).37  This improves the likelihood that if a relationship between 
Medicaid privatization and Medicaid reporting is detected, that this relationship is a 
function of Medicaid privatization and not a separate individual or state-level factor.  
This model (model two henceforth) is defined as: 
Pr(yi=1) = logit-1(αj[i] + βkXi,k ) for i= 1,…,n 
αj ~ N(µα, σ2state)  
 
where αj refers to the state intercepts and Xi,k is the vector of predictors specified above, 
with βk as their coefficients.  I also re-analyze this model as a logistic regression with 
standard errors clustered at the state level and find that these results are consistent with 
my findings from the hierarchical model.  Output from this logistic regression analysis 
can be found in the Appendix.   
Findings from the Add Health Data 
 
 I begin my analysis of the Add Health data by again testing for a bivariate 
relationship between Medicaid reporting and Medicaid privatization.  Here, I find a 
statistically significant correlation between both commercial MCO enrollment and 
Medicaid underreporting (p = .024) and enrollment in privately-named Medicaid plans 
and Medicaid underreporting (p = .022).  This relationship holds across model 
specifications.  As the percent of a state’s Medicaid population in a commercial MCO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 It is not possible to include state indicators along with state-level predictors in classical 
regression; however, multilevel models allow the regression slope and the intercept to vary 
simultaneously by state (Gelman and Hill 2007: 246). 
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increases, Medicaid-eligible respondents become less likely to report Medicaid 
enrollment (p < .05 for all specifications; see Table 3.5).  Likewise, as the percent of a 
state’s Medicaid population in privately-named MCOs increases, Medicaid-eligible 
respondents become less likely to report Medicaid enrollment (p < .05 for all 
specifications) (see Table 3.6).  
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 These results, however, do not tell us how these Medicaid eligible respondents are 
misreporting their insurance status.  Do the respondents who fail to report Medicaid 
enrollment report that they are uninsured or do they report a different type of insurance 
coverage, such as private insurance?  To evaluate this question, I keep the sample limited 
to Medicaid-eligible respondents, but I create a new dichotomous dependent variable that 
measures whether a respondent reports Medicaid or the respondent reports having private 
insurance.  By private insurance, I am referring to health insurance that is provided by a 
source other than government.  Using this measure, I find that increased commercial 
MCO enrollment, as well as increased enrollment in privately-named plans, relate to an 
increased propensity to report private insurance among the Medicaid-eligible population 
(p < .05).  These findings hold across all specifications (see Tables A3.7, A3.8, A3.11 & 
A3.12 in the Appendix).   
I also replicate this analysis using a dependent variable that measures whether the 
respondent reports either Medicaid or a lack of insurance.  With this measure of the 
dependent variable, I fail to find a statistically-significant relationship between 
enrollment in privately-named plans and Medicaid reporting at any traditional level of 
significance (see Tables A3.10 & A3.14 in the Appendix).  I also find that the 
relationship between enrollment in commercial MCOs and Medicaid reporting is 
dependent on modeling specifications (see Tables A3.9 & A3.13 in the Appendix).  This 
distinction is significant because it indicates that Medicaid privatization, in terms of 
commercial MCO penetration and privately-named MCOs, encourages Medicaid 
enrollees to think of their health insurance as private insurance, but it does not affect their 
perceptions of whether they are insured. 
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In sum, while the ACS data provides a robust measure of the relationship between 
Medicaid privatization and Medicaid underreporting in the aggregate, the Add Health 
data demonstrates that this misreporting is occurring at the individual level and that when 
this misreporting occurs, people are often misreporting their Medicaid enrollment as 
private insurance.  This finding is in line with Boudreaux et al.’s conclusion that 
respondents who misreport their Medicaid status are more likely to report having private 
health insurance rather than no health insurance (2015).  The similarity of their finding to 
the Add Health output suggests that my results are not merely an artifact of how I 
construct the Medicaid-eligibility variable.  This distinction between misreporting private 
health insurance and misreporting no health insurance is also consistent with my 
expectation for why Medicaid privatization should affect the Medicaid undercount.  I 
theorize that privatization has the potential to influence Medicaid reporting by making it 
more difficult to trace this health insurance back to government.  The relationships 
identified in this research confirm that forms of privatization which hamper this ease of 
traceability are related to Medicaid recipients’ decreased recognition of the public origins 
of their health insurance, but not necessarily whether they have health insurance.    
Implications of Submerging the State’s Role in Medicaid 
 
 This research shows that the privatization of a major social program can be 
related to decreased awareness of program use and increased difficulty in connecting an 
experience back to government.  Just as critically, it clarifies that not all privatization 
initiatives have the same effects and that the form of the privatization structures when this 
lack of recognition occurs.  These findings emphasize the importance of treating 
privatization as more than a dichotomous measure.  However, in interpreting these 
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findings, it is necessary to stress that my analysis establishes a correlation, but not 
necessarily causation.  In this chapter, I identify a pattern showing that an increase in 
design features that obscure government’s role in Medicaid corresponds with a larger 
portion of the Medicaid population failing to recognize and report their enrollment.  Yet 
the persistence of this pattern in two different data sets, and with multiple modeling 
specifications, demonstrates the robustness of this relationship.   
These findings caution against interpreting self-reports as an unbiased measure of 
program use, particularly when a government program is theorized to have submerged-
state characteristics.  Methodologically, this suggests that estimates of Medicaid 
enrollment which rely on self-reports should be corrected to account for states’ levels of 
privatization, specifically their reliance on commercial MCOs and privately-named 
MCOs.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), along with state governments, uses 
Medicaid enrollment statistics from Census surveys to estimate the cost of, and 
compliance with, legislation (see, for example, CBO Long-Term Budget Outlook 2015; 
Texas Legislative Budget Board Staff Estimate 2013).  Growth in Medicaid managed 
care reliance makes the relationship between privatization and measurement of Medicaid 
enrollment particularly relevant.  In 1991, less than ten percent of the Medicaid 
population was enrolled in managed care (HFCA 2000).  By 2014, that number had 
grown to seventy-seven percent (CMS 2016).  With managed care occupying an 
increasingly dominant role in Medicaid administration, this chapter provides guidance on 
which elements of managed care policy design to account for when generating corrected 
estimates of Medicaid enrollment.   
	   	  	  	   	  
	   74	  
The civic consequences of this research, however, extend beyond inaccurate 
measurement.  Medicaid is the largest source of public health insurance in the country.  It 
is directly responsible for the health care of communities at the margins of American 
society: children, their parents, the elderly, and the disabled living below or near the 
poverty line.  This research shows how privatization can make it difficult for the people 
who rely on Medicaid to understand how the political fate of this program affects them 
and their families.  Recipients who do not recognize Medicaid or the government’s 
relevance to their health insurance face a disadvantage in advocating for their self-interest 
in this area.  The Trump administration’s current health reform legislation involves 
proposals to repeal the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and restructure how the program is 
financed.  In covering this development, news outlets have provided anecdotal evidence 
highlighting people’s confusion over whether the fate of the Medicaid program affects 
them personally (Newkirk 2017).  This chapter provides empirical evidence on the causes 
and scope of this disconnect among the Medicaid population.   
This research also indicates that Medicaid recipients will be less likely to benefit 
from the boost in political participation that this enrollment can provide.  Medicaid 
expansion under the ACA has been shown to make the communities that gain insurance 
through this expansion more politically active (Sances and Clinton 2017).  However, this 
public responsiveness is predicated on people’s recognition of the role that Medicaid 
plays in their lives.  The findings in this chapter suggest that these participatory benefits 
will be limited depending on each state’s Medicaid MCO administrative arrangements.    
Beyond Medicaid, my findings suggest more generally that privatization can alter 
the public’s understanding of the personal relevance of government’s social policy.  
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When people fail to recognize that they are interacting with a public-assistance program, 
conceptions of government’s personal relevance and the usefulness of this program are –
by definition – distorted.  The presence of this distortion indicates that this portion of the 
population is forming opinions about government and its personal relevance based on a 
skewed image of government’s role in their lives.  The following chapters examine the 
political consequences of this informational distortion by testing whether these 
misperceptions influence subsequent political evaluations.  This research shows that by 
attenuating policy recipients’ perceived connection to government, policy submersion 
erodes trust in the state.  I begin testing for a relationship between privatization and trust 
in government by extending the Add Health analysis to measure whether the same 
features that affect Medicaid reporting rates also impact trust in government.      
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Chapter Four: Medicaid Privatization and Declining Trust in Government 
 
The public provision of health insurance in the United States is marked by a 
complicated interplay of government and non-state actors.  Consider Medicaid, the main 
government health insurance program for low income families, the elderly, and the 
disabled.  Although this program is publically financed, most Medicaid enrollees find that 
non-state actors are responsible for both the administration of this insurance and the 
provision of their healthcare (KFF 2014).  In the previous chapter, I showed that this 
outsourcing of Medicaid administration decreases enrollees’ recognition of the public 
origins of their health insurance.  This relationship indicates that privatization can distort 
people’s understanding of government’s personal relevance.  On its own, this is a 
significant political consequence.  It means that privatization can foster confusion over 
where the state operates, what the state does, and how this affects you and your family.  
In this chapter, I turn to testing whether the misperceptions that privatization engenders 
concerning government’s personal relevance also impact broader attitudes toward 
government and the political system.  More specifically, I ask: if a policy makes the state 
appear more distal, can this negatively affect evaluations of political institutions?  The 
ensuing research attempts to answer this question by examining whether Medicaid 
privatization influences trust in federal and state government.  
The results of this analysis show that Medicaid privatization can correlate with 
lower trust in government.  As with my earlier research on the Medicaid undercount, I 
explore this relationship using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult 
Health (Add Health).  In Chapter Three, I identified specific elements of Medicaid 
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privatization that create hurdles for tracing this health insurance back to government, and 
I found that these features (commercial MCO penetration and privately-named MCOs) 
are related to the underreporting of Medicaid enrollment.  Having established this 
relationship, I can now test whether these same privatization mechanisms also impact 
evaluations of government.  My results suggest that a relationship is possible, but not 
automatic.  I find that enrollment in privatized Medicaid plans that also serve non-
Medicaid enrollees is not significantly related to trust in government.  However, I do find 
clear and consistent evidence that the naming of privatized Medicaid plans, and the 
subsequent informational distortions that this creates, is related to decreased trust in 
federal and state government.  As the likelihood grows of being enrolled in a MCO 
whose plan name creates confusion over the public origins of this insurance, trust in 
government declines.  This analysis provides initial evidence that when the administrative 
design of public policies masks the role of the state, trust in government can deteriorate.  
Why (and When) Privatization Should Impact Political Trust 
 
Chapter Three establishes that privatization can make government appear more 
distal and less relevant.  Specifically, it shows that policy designs which attenuate the role 
of the state cause policy recipients to underestimate the extent to which they engage with 
and rely on government programs, thereby distorting these recipients’ understanding of 
government’s personal relevance.  In the current chapter, I test whether this distortion 
influences broader political evaluations.  Beliefs about whether the government abides by 
normative expectations of what it should be doing are commonly conceptualized as 
political trust (Levi and Stoker 2000).  Given the scope of what this concept captures, I 
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examine whether distorting perceptions of what government is doing – as a result of 
policy submersion – affects trust in government.  
Judgments of government’s trustworthiness are responsive to one’s political 
environment and lived experiences, underscoring the promise of this inquiry into policy 
submersion and political trust.  Major shifts in political trust have been connected to 
perceptions of current leaders, political scandals, the national economy, and crime-levels 
(see Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Keele 2005; Citrin and Green 1986; 
Hetherington 1998; Mansbridge 1997; Orren 1997).  Personal interactions with 
government and the welfare state have similarly been shown to influence trust in political 
actors, political institutions, and, to a lesser extent, evaluations of the political system at 
large (Kumlin 2004).  Moreover, there is evidence suggesting that policy delegation can 
impact political trust.  Increased reliance on private actors in the provision of health care 
has been shown to reduced trust in government (Cammett, Lynch, and Bilev 2015).  This 
finding shows that public policies can influence trust in government and that the design 
of these policies structures the emergence of this attitudinal change.  However, the causal 
mechanism in Cammett, Lynch, and Bivel’s work is not state visibility; rather, it is 
people’s perceived degree of financial exposure.  This study does not directly address 
whether one of the consequences of state submersion – confusion over government 
involvement – affects political trust.  Accordingly, it does not measure whether 
misperceiving the public dimension of an interaction with a government program or 
service influences trust in government.  
A recent study of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act similarly examines the 
relationship between privatization and trust in government.  The design of this research, 
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however, does not allow this study to address whether the informational distortions that 
this privatization can generate affects political trust.  This limitation occurs because the 
authors measure enrollment in newly-privatized Medicare options solely using self-
reports (Morgan and Campbell 2011).38  Consequently, this analysis addresses the related 
question of whether knowing about privatization influences political attitudes.  However, 
the submerged state literature suggests that privatization should generate behavioral and 
attitudinal effects by altering people’s perceptions of when they are interacting with, and 
benefitting from, the state.  Accordingly, by relying on self-reports alone, Morgan and 
Campbell cannot measure how misperceiving the origins of one’s health insurance 
impacts political trust.  As this suggests, although the policy feedback and political trust 
literatures show that program design can affect trust in government, there remains a 
dearth of research on whether the informational distortions that policy submersion 
creates also affect political trust.   
In addressing this research gap, the political psychology literature provides 
guidance on when and how the distortions that policy submersion creates should be 
expected to influence political trust.  A perennial debate in the study of public opinion 
centers around the relative importance of sociotropic versus egocentric evaluations.  
Egocentric evaluations refer to whether you think something is good or bad for you 
personally, whereas sociotropic evaluations are based on your opinion of something’s 
value for the collective good.  The sociotropic and policy feedback literatures both show 
that in order for personal experience with a policy to influence political evaluations, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Morgan and Campbell fail to find evidence that Medicare privatization influences political trust  
(2011).  They attribute this null finding in large part to the difficulty of conveying information 
about policy changes, such as privatization, to the individual user.   
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experience should be clearly connected to government (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lane 
1962; Mettler 2007; Mutz 1998).  This finding is critical because it indicates that 
government’s visibility in the administration of a policy should affect its target 
population’s political evaluations by shifting the balance of egocentric versus sociotropic 
evaluations.   
Applying this logic to policy submersion suggests that when beneficial 
government programs seem more distant and less relevant, people should be less likely to 
have a positive view of government, especially if they think that, in place of the 
government, they are benefitting from the private sector.  Political trust functions as an 
affective judgment about how government functions (Hetherington 2005).  Therefore, it 
seems plausible that if privatization creates distance between the government and the 
individual, that this added distance would manifest in evaluations concerning political 
trust.  With respect to Medicaid privatization, health insurance is a positive good.  At 
least from an economic standpoint, it is generally better to have health insurance over the 
alternative of not having health insurance.  If people connect the receipt of this good 
(Medicaid) to the market, rather than to government, this makes government appear less 
personally relevant to their procurement of this insurance.  The literature on sociotropic 
and egocentric judgments indicates that misperceptions concerning government’s 
relevance in the domain of health insurance should lead to less positive affect toward 
government, by making a major government intervention, Medicaid, seem less personally 
relevant, while overemphasizing the perceived role of the market.      
Although this theory makes intuitive sense, spatial distance theory – which posits 
that feelings become stronger as entities become closer – further supports the idea that 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   81	  
decreasing the visibility of the public aspect of a government benefit also reduces trust in 
government (Williams and Bargh 2008).  According to this theory, if increasing the 
visibility of submerged state policies improves people’s understanding of government 
actions and their personal relevance, this shrinkage of the distance between the individual 
and the government should heighten one’s emotional response to this new information.  
The reverse should hold true for policies that extend the distance between government 
and the policy recipient while reducing the distance between the policy recipient and the 
private sector.  In shifting this perceived distance, policy submersion transfers affect from 
the state toward the private sector.   
To explore this theory, I test the following prediction:  
H1: As privatization makes the state appear more distal, political trust declines. 
Measuring the Relationship Between Medicaid Privatization and Political Trust 
   
Remarking on the density of existing institutional commitments in the US 
political landscape, Patashnick and Zelizer point to the healthcare environment’s 
“patchwork [of] private-public insurance and delivery system[s]” (Patashnik and Zelizer 
2013: 1080).  The complexity of the institutional commitments within the healthcare 
arena, and the opacity of government involvement, is embodied by the reality that a dual 
Medicare-Medicaid enrollee, with extensive healthcare needs, can receive this care for 
many years while never encountering a government employee.  As this suggests, US 
health policy relies heavily on many of the administrative mechanisms that create 
government submersion, including the deferral of administrative capacity to private and 
nongovernmental organizations and a reliance on the tax code for wealth transfers.  
Medicaid administration, in particular, relies heavily on the practice of shifting 
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administrative authority away from the federal government.  Medicaid is a federal-state 
partnership program in which states administer the program in accordance with 
mandatory federal guidelines.  The extent to which Medicaid enrollees interact with 
government employees is in part determined by the type of Medicaid insurance plan in 
which they are enrolled.  Not long after Medicaid was created, state Medicaid agencies 
began implementing managed care under the Social Security Act’s Section 1915(b) 
waiver program (Tater, Paradise, and Garfield 2016).  In a managed care arrangement, 
Medicaid enrollees receive their health insurance from a nongovernmental entity called a 
managed care organization (MCO), which is paid a flat fee (capitation) from government 
to provide this service.  
I previously showed that elements of Medicaid managed care influence Medicaid 
participants’ recognition of their enrollment in this public program.  Specifically, 
commercial MCO and privately-named MCO penetration increase the underreporting of 
Medicaid enrollment among Medicaid enrollees.  I posited that these features of 
Medicaid managed care influence Medicaid reporting by sending confusing signals about 
the public nature of these insurance plans.  Commercial MCOs serve both Medicaid and 
non-Medicaid enrollees and, as such, their plan materials and representatives are also 
catered toward a non-Medicaid audience.  This broadened scope emphasizes the 
nongovernmental elements of these insurance plans.  Privately-named MCOs generate 
confusion over the public origins of this health insurance by including the name of the 
private entity running the MCO in the plan name, which reinforces the visibility of the 
nongovernmental administrators of these insurance plans.  Having established that these 
forms of Medicaid privatization can shape enrollees’ perceptions concerning the public 
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nature of their health insurance, I can now turn to testing whether this misperception 
affects other political views.  Specifically, I can trace whether the distortions that 
Medicaid privatization creates affect trust in federal and state government.   
I begin this examination by building on my prior analysis of the Add Health 
survey data.  As with this earlier analysis, I use wave three of the restricted-use version of 
this data.  This nationally-representative survey contains over 7,000 persons earning less 
than 200% of the federal poverty level (FPL).  As previously noted, the key determinants 
of Medicaid eligibility are income, age, and parental status.  Based on these criteria, I 
identify which survey participants are likely to be Medicaid eligible in their state of 
residency, as Medicaid eligibility limits vary by state.  I then restrict my analysis to the 
survey respondents who I estimate are eligible for Medicaid in their state and who report 
enrollment either in Medicaid or a private, non-governmental, insurance plan.39  
Respondents in this sample can be divided into one of four categories: (1) respondents 
who are eligible for Medicaid and who report their health insurance as Medicaid, (2) 
respondents who incorrectly report their Medicaid-based health insurance as a private, 
nongovernmental plan, (3) respondents who correctly report their health insurance status 
as private insurance, (4) respondents who are uninsured and erroneously report that they 
are enrolled in a private insurance plan.  Categories one and two contain the groups that I 
am trying to study; however, I cannot accurately distinguish persons in these categories 
from those in the latter groups.  It seems improbable that state-level Medicaid 
privatization would influence non-Medicaid enrollees’ attitudes toward government, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 I do not include those who report being uninsured, as Medicaid privatization was not shown to 
influence this response option (see Chapter Three).   
	   	  	  	   	  
	   84	  
this administrative shift is fairly technical and would not affect them directly. 40  
Accordingly, the mismeasurement created by including these respondents in my sample 
is likely to increase the probability of a type II error by attenuating the relationship 
between Medicaid privatization and political trust.  The potential for this attenuation, 
however, suggests that if I find a relationship between Medicaid privatization and 
political trust in my sample, that this correlation is particularly robust. 
To test the relationship between the use of Medicaid privatization and trust in 
government, I build on the models used in Chapter Three.  A key difference, however, is 
that my dependent variable measures trust in government.  The Add Health survey asks 
respondents to evaluate, on a five-point scale, how strongly they trust federal and state 
government.  This question wording is a modified version of an American National 
Election Survey (NES) trust-in-government question.  As Medicaid is a federal-state 
partnership program, I anticipate that Medicaid privatization has the potential to impact 
evaluations of both levels of government.  In turn, I analyze separate regression models 
based on the level of government (federal or state) under evaluation.  
My independent variables of interest are the elements of Medicaid privatization 
that relate to the underreporting of Medicaid enrollment.  These measures are (1) 
commercial MCOs, which refer to the percent of the Medicaid population enrolled in a 
commercial MCO, and (2) privately-named MCOs, which refer to the percent of the 
Medicaid population enrolled in a MCO with the private insurance company’s name in 
the plan name.   As discussed in Chapter Three, legal concerns over protecting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In specifying my regression model, I also account for this measurement error by including 
control variables that affect non-Medicaid enrollees and that may be correlated with Medicaid 
privatization rates.   
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anonymity of survey respondents prevents me from connecting the Add Health 
participants to Medicaid administrative records of enrollment and managed care use.  
Consequently, these measures of Medicaid privatization (commercial MCOs and 
privately-named MCOs) are calculated at the smallest publically-available unit, which is 
the respondent’s state of residency.  
Given that these independent variables are measured at the state level, but my 
dependent variable is measured at the individual level, I analyze the relationship between 
government trust and the penetration of privatized Medicaid plans using a multilevel 
model.  This multilevel model is also useful for addressing the concerns created by the 
measurement error that the expansiveness of my subsample introduces.  With a multilevel 
model, I can treat each state as a separate context, while specifying a variance component 
that changes the intercept according to respondents’ state of residency.  This allows me to 
model individual and group-level variation when estimating regression coefficients at the 
group level.  In other words, it helps to distinguish the relationship between Medicaid 
privatization and political trust from other state and individual-level factors that may be 
influencing respondents’ trust in government.  This minimizes the concern that a 
relationship between Medicaid privatization and trust in government is the product of a 
correlated state or individual-level factor.  
The statistical model that I use to analyze the Add Health data largely mirrors the 
model that I used to analyze this data in the previous chapter.  In specifying this model, 
however, I focus on identifying variables that can affect both the decision to enroll in 
Medicaid as well as trust in government.  Controlling for these variables minimizes the 
concern that those who are not enrolled in Medicaid either by choice or because they are 
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ineligible (and therefore are accurately reporting their insurance status) are driving my 
findings.  One such variable is the measure of a state’s Medicaid generosity.  The 
Medicaid generosity measure allows me to account for a factor that may be driving 
Medicaid-eligible recipients to opt-out of Medicaid enrollment, and which may lower 
their trust in government.  Including this measure also allows me to separate the 
consequences of Medicaid spending from those of Medicaid privatization.  Similarly, to 
control for the likelihood that a Medicaid-eligible respondent is actually enrolled in this 
program, I also include the state’s Medicaid take-up rate, which is the percent of the 
Medicaid-eligible population that enrolls in this program.  I also include the series of 
indicator variables that measure common enrollment hurdles, including: whether the state 
allows for joint family applications, whether the state has an in-person interview 
requirement, and whether the state has asset tests for eligibility.  These variables also help 
to address the concern that privatization initiatives are correlated with the stringency of a 
state’s enrollment criteria.  Thus, by including these enrollment hurdles, I can eliminate 
the likelihood that a spurious correlation with these design features is driving my finding 
of a relationship between Medicaid privatization and government trust.        
I also explicitly model state-level political ideology.  Including this measure 
allows me to control for whether the political environment of the state, which may be 
related to a state’s decision to further privatize Medicaid, influences political trust.  
Along with this state-level measure, I also include a measure capturing the political 
ideology of the survey respondents.  The inclusion of this covariate is particularly 
important considering that levels of trust in government have been shown to vary based 
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on political ideology (Pew Research Center 2015), with conservatives regularly reporting 
lower levels of trust in federal government compared to state government.  
My analyses also include the same demographic-based control variables that I 
used in Chapter Three.  For instance, to control for the potential confounding effects that 
English-language proficiency could have on interpreting the signals sent by commercial 
MCOs and privately-named MCOs, I include measures of English-language use and 
Hispanic identification in my regression model.  I also include a measure of TANF 
enrollment, which allows me to control for the potential that changes in government trust 
are due to a spurious correlation with enrollment in this alternative public program.  
Additionally, given the racialized history of Medicaid (see Chapter Three for an 
overview) and differing levels of trust in government between black and white Americans 
(see Howell and Fagan 1988; Mangum 2003), I also include race as a covariate in my 
model.41  Trust in government has likewise been shown to vary based on education 
(Perrin and Smolek 2009; Dalton 2005), and as such, I include the highest level of 
schooling the respondent completed as a control variable.42  Lastly, I add a measure of 
self-reported health, as the demands placed on one’s health care are likely to vary as 
health improves or falters.43  Controlling for health status allows me to disentangle the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Given that black Americans tend, on average, to have lower trust in government than many 
other racial categories, I model the percent of the state population that identifies as black rather 
than the percent of the population that identifies as white (as I did in Chapter Three).   
42 I measure education by using a series of indicator variables for a respondent’s highest level of 
education.  I also re-specify this measure using a continuous predictor variable for education.  My 
substantive findings remain unchanged across specifications of the education variable.      
43 As with my analysis in Chapter Three, I do not include income measures (as the sample is 
limited to those who earn less than 200% of the federal poverty level) or age (as the survey 
sample only includes individuals aged 18-28).  When I re-specify my model to include these 
variables, my substantive findings do not change.     
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administrative consequences of Medicaid privatization (on political trust) from the health 
of the persons whom these privatized plans serve.   
In sum, the multilevel model used in this analysis, model one, is defined as:  
Y = αj[i] + βj[i]Xj[i] + ε 
αj ~ N(µα, σ2state)  
 
where αj refers to the state intercepts and Xj[i] is the vector of predictor variables, with βj[i] 
as their coefficients.44 The vector X contains the following variables  
X1 = State’s Degree of Medicaid Privatization 
X2 = State-Level Political Ideology  
X3 = Political Ideology   
X4 = Identify as African-American  
X5 = English Language Usage 
X6 = TANF Enrollment 
X7 = State Medicaid Take-up 
X8 = Average State-Level Spending per Medicaid Enrollee 
X9 = Highest Educational Attainment  
X10 = Self-reported Health Status 
X11 = Identify as Hispanic 
X12 = Family Application Option for Enrollment (state-level) 
X13 = In-person Interview (state-level) 
X14 = Asset Test for Medicaid Eligibility (state-level) 
 
 
The theory outlined in this chapter predicts that privatization affects trust in 
government by making government seem more distant and less relevant to the provision 
of a program or benefit.  With respect to Medicaid, this suggests that privatization should 
decrease trust in government when it creates informational distortions that cause 
Medicaid recipients to fail to recognize the public origins of their insurance (and instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 I also re-analyze this model as an ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors, and I 
account for the heteroskedasticity caused by the inclusion of state-level measures by clustering 
standard errors at the state level.  The output for this analysis largely replicates the same 
substantive findings that I identify using the multilevel model.  
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view their health insurance as a private, non-government entity).  Those who report their 
health insurance status as Medicaid, however, are not expressing the informational 
distortions that privatization can create.   Accordingly, my causal mechanism – confusion 
over government involvement – is not applicable to those who recognize their health 
insurance as Medicaid.  To test whether my causal mechanism of interest (informational 
distortions) can explain when privatization depresses trust in government, I amend model 
one by interacting Medicaid reporting status (whether Medicaid-eligible respondents 
report their health insurance as Medicaid or as private insurance) with Medicaid 
privatization.  This interaction allows me to isolate whether shifts in government trust 
that are related to Medicaid privatization vary based on whether enrollees recognize the 
public origins of their health insurance.   
Findings: Analysis of Medicaid Privatization and Trust in Government 
	  
 I begin my analysis by using model one to test for a relationship between 
Medicaid privatization and trust in government.  As with my previous analysis of the Add 
Health data, I successively add control variables.  The sequential addition of these 
measures addresses the concern that the persistence of a relationship between Medicaid 
privatization and political trust results from multicollinearity among the substantively 
relevant control variables.  With respect to commercial MCO penetration, I largely fail to 
find evidence of a significant relationship between this measure of privatization and trust 
in either federal or state government (see Tables 4.1 & 4.2).  Here, commercial MCO 
penetration only relates to decreased trust in state government for the full model with all 
controls (see Table 4.2 column 11).   
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However, I do find that privately-named MCO penetration correlates with 
decreased trust in both federal and state government across most, but not all, models (see 
Tables 4.3 & 4.4).  This provides some suggestive evidence that there may be a 
relationship between how Medicaid plans are named and trust in government, but this 
finding is not robust.  This inconsistency, however, is not surprising.  I predict that 
privatization should affect trust in government when this privatization creates 
informational distortions that hide the role of the state.  Accordingly, I expect for the 
inclusion of respondents who report having Medicaid to attenuate the effect of Medicaid 
privatization on political trust given that, by definition, they recognize their Medicaid 
enrollment.   
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I address the potential for this attenuation, and better isolate my causal 
mechanism, by re-analyzing model one with an interaction term for Medicaid reporting 
and privatization rates.  The inclusion of this interaction term allows me to test whether 
any changes in political trust that privatization engenders are driven by those who fail to 
recognize their Medicaid enrollment.  In analyzing this new model, I once again fail to 
find a relationship between commercial MCO penetration and trust in government.  At 
both the state and federal level, neither the main effect nor the interaction term are 
significantly related to trust in government (see Table 4.5 & 4.6).  However, I find clear 
evidence of a relationship between privately-named MCO penetration and trust in 
government at both the federal and state levels.  As Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show, the main 
effect of privately-named MCOs is statistically significant across models, with increased 
penetration rates relating to decreased trust in government.  The interaction term shows 
that the size of this impact varies depending on whether the respondent reported 
Medicaid enrollment.  As privately-named MCO penetration increases, those who fail to 
recognize their Medicaid enrollment are increasingly less likely to trust either federal or 
state government.  In accordance with my theory, this interaction indicates that the 
informational distortions that privatization creates are depressing trust in government. 
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I further isolate the informational distortions caused by privatization as the 
mechanism depressing trust in government by re-analyzing model one with the sample 
population limited to those who fail to recognize their Medicaid enrollment.  I subset on 
this population because they are the population in my sample who are expressing these 
informational distortions.  Here, my results replicate my earlier findings.  With respect to 
commercial MCO penetration, I once again fail to find evidence of a significant 
relationship between this measure and trust in either federal or state government (see 
Tables 4.9 & 4.10).  However, in keeping with my previous results, I find a statistically 
significant relationship between enrollment in privately-named MCOs and trust in 
government.  Here, increased privately-named MCO penetration correlates with 
decreased trust in both federal and state government (see Tables 4.11 & 4.12). 
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These results suggest that Medicaid privatization does not have a monolithic 
impact on trust in government.  I find that the increased penetration of privately-named 
MCOs – which I previously showed is related to decreased government visibility – is also 
related to decreased trust in federal and state government.  My analyses also demonstrate 
that this change in trust in driven by the informational distortions that this form of 
privatization generates.  However, with the same consistency, I fail to find a statistically 
significant relationship between commercial MCO penetration and trust in government.  
This null finding does not eliminate the possibility that a relationship between 
commercial MCO penetration and government trust exists, particularly given that 
measurement error in my sample population biases my findings against such a 
relationship.  However, my results do clearly indicate that I lack evidence to support 
claims to such a relationship.  Notably, the same bias that may be affecting the 
relationship between commercial MCO penetration and trust in government is also 
present for my analysis of privately-named MCOs, suggesting that the relationship 
between MCO naming and trust in government is robust.   
With regression analyses, however, the potential for reverse causation is always a 
concern.  My output shows that as the penetration of privately-named MCOs increases, 
trust in government decreases.  While this finding demonstrates that a correlation exists, 
it does not prove that this is a causal relationship nor does it establish that causality flows 
from privatization to decreased trust in government.  If these variables are causally 
connected, however, the construction of my variables provides insight into the directional 
flow of this relationship.  It seems improbable that an individual’s trust in government 
would change the way in which MCOs decide to name their Medicaid plans, suggesting 
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that causality is most likely to flow from Medicaid privatization to government trust.  I 
also control for political ideology at the state and individual levels, which helps to 
address environmental factors that could influence government trust and that would 
ultimately encourage MCOs to include the name of a private organization in their 
Medicaid plan names.  Nonetheless, I cannot rule out the possibility that the causal arrow 
flows from trust in government to MCO plan naming.   
Another concern is that my findings are merely a product of measurement error.  
For part of my analyses, I restrict my survey population to persons who are eligible for 
Medicaid, but who reported that they have private insurance.  I utilize this subsample to 
restrict my analysis to those who erroneously think that their health insurance is privately 
provided and not connected to government.  It is extremely probable, however, that some 
persons in this subsample are correctly reporting that they have private health insurance.  
If the relationship between trust and Medicaid privatization is driven by these “correct” 
insurance reporters, this would skew my interpretation of the regression output.  It is 
possible that low trust in government is causing respondents to opt-out of Medicaid in 
favor of private insurance.  Such a relationship would undercut the claim that 
privatization is causing low trust in government.  The biggest flaw in this alternative 
explanation, however, is that Medicaid respondents, particularly at the time of this 
survey, are overwhelmingly drawn from persons who are uninsured and who do not have 
accessible private-insurance alternatives (Holahan and Zedlewski 1991; Sommers 2008).  
As a result, most people who qualify for Medicaid do not have an alternative private 
insurance plan to which they can viably turn, regardless of their trust in government.   
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However, it is also possible that persons who I designated as Medicaid-eligible 
are not actually eligible for Medicaid and that my results are skewed by the wrongful 
inclusion of these ineligible respondents.  If anything, however, I would expect for the 
wrongful inclusion of non-Medicaid eligible persons in my sample to attenuate the 
relationship between privately-named MCOs and trust in government.  If respondents are 
not enrolled in Medicaid because they are not eligible for this program, it is hard to 
imagine how trust in government varies as the percent of privately-named MCOs grows. 
This holds especially true given that I control for state-level ideology, individual-level 
political ideology, and Medicaid generosity.  Lastly, my sample may also erroneously 
include persons who are uninsured, but who report having private health insurance.  Once 
again, however, it is unclear how changes to the naming of Medicaid MCO plans would 
influence the uninsured population’s trust in government, particularly considering that the 
most probable factors that would drive a spurious correlation (such as state-level political 
environment) are accounted for in my regression model.          
Overall, my findings suggest that a relationship between privately-named MCOs 
and political trust exists and flows from the former to the latter.  Yet, given my mode of 
analysis, I cannot eliminate the possibility that this relationship between Medicaid 
privatization and government trust is caused by a correlated state-level variable.  As a 
result, I am limited in my ability to establish a causal relationship between privatization 
and trust in federal and state government with these analyses alone.  
Government Attenuation and Political Trust, Moving Forward 
 
This chapter shows that increased privatization can be related to decreased 
government trust among a privatized program’s target population and that this 
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relationship is driven by an administrative design – in this case, privately-named MCO 
penetration – which also obscures the visibility of the state.  This finding reinforces the 
importance of isolating specific elements of privatized policies when studying the 
consequences of policy submersion.  By disaggregating Medicaid managed care design 
elements, I am able to more accurately isolate the conditions under which privatization 
impacts the political attitudes of a policy’s target population.  
Moreover, although my inquiry is limited in the causal claims it can make with 
respect to Medicaid privatization and decreased government trust, it does establish that 
privatization mechanisms which make the state appear more distal are also associated 
with decreased trust in government.  This finding is particularly meaningful because it 
suggests that the relationship between privatization and government trust is based, at least 
in part, on the misperceptions that policy submersion generates.  The same administrative 
mechanism that creates confusion over the public nature of Medicaid (privately-named 
MCOs) also appears to be driving down trust in government among Medicaid enrollees 
who fail to recognize the public nature of their health insurance.   
In assessing the normative implications of this finding, it is important to stress 
that lower trust in government is not necessarily a democratic ill.  If governments act in a 
corrupt or ineffective manner, the public’s ability to adjust its opinions of political 
institutions is both rational and important.  Yet, when governments enact public policies 
that send confusing or incomplete information to the public, attitudes that are derived 
from the resulting misperceptions become problematic.  This concern emanates from the 
fact that these misperceptions create added hurdles for holding political institutions 
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accountable in a manner that reflects what government is doing, how it is operating, and 
how its actions affect your well-being and the well-being of those in your communities.   
In the next chapter, I test the robustness of the link between government visibility 
and political trust.  I complement the observational research conducted in this chapter by 
using a survey experiment to isolate government visibility as a causal mechanism 
diminishing trust in government.  This survey experiment tests a different submerged 
policy (contraceptive accessibility) to show that this pattern exists in domains beyond 
Medicaid.  Together, these observational and experimental findings establish a critical 
link in the PADD cycle.  Chapter Three revealed the first link this chain, by showing that 
privatization creates confusion over when you are affected by government.  In this 
current chapter (Chapter Four) and in the subsequent chapter, I connect these 
misperceptions to diminished trust in government.  
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Chapter Five: Testing the Relationship between Government Visibility and Political 
Trust 
 
 
The Affordable Care Act of 2010 includes a provision that requires most insurers 
to cover many forms of contraception with no cost sharing for the individual user.45  For 
most persons with insurance, this legislation means that they no longer pay out-of-pocket 
costs to access FDA-approved contraceptive measures such as the birth control pill or 
intrauterine devices (IUDs).  This legislation functions as a submerged policy in that 
government’s involvement with this insurance change is often obscured for its individual 
beneficiaries.   For instance, when a woman goes to a pharmacy to pick up her birth 
control prescription and does not pay a co-pay, this interaction is occurring between a 
private organization and an individual, with little to clarify government’s role in 
structuring this exchange.  Submerged policies, like the ACA’s contraceptive mandate, 
made it more difficult for policy recipients to clearly connect a government intervention 
to their own lives.  In this chapter, I explore the individual-level political consequences of 
the breakdown of this linkage.  When program recipients gain a clearer understanding of 
government’s role, how does trust in government fare?  
The contraceptive mandate’s low degree of government visibility, at the level of 
implementation, makes this an ideal policy for testing how altering this visibility 
influences trust in government.  To leverage the opportunity that this policy presents, I 
use a survey experiment to randomly shift awareness of this federal mandate.  I then ask 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Successful legal challenges have limited the scope of this legislation, but the basic premise of 
the measure currently remains intact.  There are strong indicators, however, that the 115th 
Congress and the Trump administration will eliminate or severely restrict the contraceptive 
mandate (Pear 2017).   
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survey participants to rate their trust in government and I compare these evaluations 
across survey conditions.  The results of this comparison are consistent with my theory 
and analysis from Chapter Four.  I find that shifting the visibility of submerged state 
policies effects evaluations of government trust.  When submerged state policies are 
made visible to the public, trust in political institutions grows.  However, when public 
policies are administered in a manner that fails to clarify the public elements of the 
policy, trust in government suffers.  Critically, I find that the greatest change in political 
trust occurs among persons for whom the policy is most likely to be directly relevant: 
women.  This indicates that increased government visibility influences political trust in 
part by clarifying the personal relevance of government actions.  The gendered 
implications of this research also shed light on how government contributes to the 
construction of gender as a distinctive category of political behavior.  Overall, this study 
highlights how the delivery mechanism of a public policy can foster misperceptions that 
have a causal impact on evaluations of government among large segments of the 
population.  In establishing this relationship, this research demonstrates how submerged 
public policies are eroding both political trust and the promise of democratic 
accountability.  
How the Submerged State Diminishes Political Trust 
 
Submerged policy designs shift policy administration away from the federal 
government via federal mandates, locating wealth transfers in the tax code, and 
delegating administrative authority to subnational and nongovernmental entities 
(Campbell 2012).  In the process, they present the target populations of these policies 
with added huddles for understanding when and how they are interacting with, and 
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affected by, the state.  In Chapter Three, I established that this attenuation of government 
visibility (via shifting administrative authority away from the state) can make it more 
difficult for policy recipients both to understand when they are benefitting from a specific 
policy and to connect that policy back to government.  Chapter Four highlights the 
consequences of this disconnect by showing that submerged policy designs are correlated 
with decreased trust in government.  In the current chapter, I build upon this research to 
test whether a causal relationship exists between low-visibility government policies and 
trust in government.   
As Chapter Four notes, a policy is best able to influence egocentric political 
evaluations if one’s personal experience with this policy can be clearly connected back to 
government (see Campbell 2012; Funk 2000; Green and Gerken 1989; Kinder and 
Kiewiet 1981; Lane 1962; Mettler 2007; Mutz 1998).46  This finding suggests that the 
degree of government visibility in a policy is a key mediating factor in determining how a 
policy shapes subsequent political attitudes.  If submerged public policies are hiding the 
role of government, then they are preventing the public from connecting government 
actions to their own well-being.  As people become less aware of how either they 
personally, or the public collectively, benefits from a policy, they are less able to use this 
information to update their evaluations of government.   
I posit that, by skewing informational cues in a manner which makes government 
seem less relevant and which overemphasizes the benefits of the private sector, policy 
submersion ultimately causes recipients to develop less positive views of government.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Recall, egocentric policy evaluations refer to perceptions of how a government policy affects 
you personally, whereas sociotropic evaluations involve opinions of the policy’s value for the 
collective good. 
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As affective appraisals of government are often captured via evaluations of political trust, 
these negative views of government should be particularly likely to manifest as decreased 
trust in government.             
If the visibility of submerged policies is raised, however, the public should be 
better positioned to use these (formerly submerged) policies to inform their evaluations of 
government.  When you better understand how you, personally, benefit from government, 
this updated information should have a positive impact on how you feel toward, and trust 
in, the state.  As noted in Chapter Four, spatial distance theory provides additional 
evidence to suggest that increasing government visibility should improve evaluations of 
government (Williams and Bargh 2008).  This theory describes the phenomenon in which 
emotional responses become stronger as entities become closer.  If submerged policies 
shift the perceived relevance of the public and private sectors, spatial distance theory 
implies that this should affect the intensity of one’s emotional affect toward these realms.  
As increasing the visibility of submerged state policies shrinks the distance between the 
individual and the government, this should heighten one’s emotional response to this new 
information and the relevant political institutions.  In particular, by tying government 
actions more directly to the procurement of this social protection, excavating a 
submerged policy should increase trust in government.   
To assess this proposed relationship between increased policy visibility and 
political trust, I test the following hypothesis:    
H1: Increasing the visibility of popular submerged state policies increases trust in 
government.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that increased state visibility will shift evaluations of 
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government.  Implicit in this prediction is the idea that increased visibility affects 
evaluations of government because these new signals help you to understand how 
government impacts you, personally, or people like you.  People often make political 
evaluations based on how they think a generalized public is fairing, rather than their own 
personal circumstances (see e.g. Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Funk 2000).  For instance, 
perceptions of the nation’s economic health have a considerably stronger influence on 
political opinions than do evaluations of one’s own financial circumstances (Kinder 
1981).  Likewise, trade policy preferences are more influenced by perceptions of how the 
policy impacts the country as a whole, rather than how a policy influences personal 
financial interests (Mansfield and Mutz 2009).  The tendency to “morselize” personal 
experience – by viewing these experiences as separate from larger political themes or 
events – decenters the importance of personal experience from evaluations of politics 
(Lane 1962).  Whereas government’s relevance to the wellbeing of collectives and the 
general public is generally self-evident, it can be cognitively taxing to connect one’s day-
to-day life to larger evaluations of the political system.47  When the political salience of a 
personal experience is made clear, however, there is greater room for egocentric 
evaluations to shape political judgments.  For instance, exposure to news coverage of 
unemployment has been shown to de-morselize personal experience with joblessness, 
which in turn enhances the relative importance of egocentric economic perceptions in 
forming political attitudes (Mutz 1994).   
These findings suggest that if state visibility influences trust in government by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The news media promotes this reliance on sociotropic evaluations by highlighting national 
trends and collective opinions (Mutz 1994).   
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directly politicizing personal experiences, changes in political trust should depend at least 
in part on whether a person belongs to the target population of this policy.  In other 
words, increasing the visibility of government involvement in submerged policy domains 
should have an outsized impact on policy recipients, as this new information helps them 
to understand how the government is structuring a personal experience.  To assess the 
moderating effect of a submerged state policy’s personal relevance, I test the following 
hypothesis:   
H2: Increasing the visibility of a submerged state policy has the biggest impact on 
trust in government among persons who belong to the target populations that are 
most directly affected by the previously submerged policy.  
 
Research Design: Shifting Government Visibility in the Contraceptive Mandate 
 
To test these hypotheses, I use a survey experiment that manipulates the visibility 
of government involvement in healthcare administration.  Recent controversies, such as 
the Health Insurance Exchange rollout and mismanagement at Veterans Affairs hospitals, 
have highlighted government’s reliance on private actors and the dearth of government 
personnel in this area.  The prevalence of complex public-private dynamics in healthcare 
administration suggests that this is a fruitful and highly relevant policy domain to mine 
when examining the implications of submerged government policies.  Within this 
domain, the federal contraceptive mandate is particularly well-suited for the purposes of 
my research.  In the Affordable Care Act of 2010, Congress requires most insurance 
companies to cover all FDA-approved forms of contraception at no cost to the individual 
user.  In practice, this means that when most people with health insurance go to the 
pharmacy to fill their birth control prescription, or when they go to their doctor’s office to 
get an IUD, they should not have any out-of-pocket costs.  The administration of this 
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mandate, however, includes few signals to assist policy recipients in tracing this 
insurance change back to government.  The low visibility of this policy is reflected in the 
fact that the majority of adults in the US are unaware of this insurance mandate (Hamel, 
Firth, and Brodie 2014).  I found this same lack of awareness in my pre-test sample, in 
which more than 65% of respondents did not have knowledge of this insurance mandate.  
The dearth of familiarity with this federal mandate allows me to use survey prompts to 
shift awareness of government involvement in expanded contraceptive coverage among 
recipients and non-recipients alike.   
Moreover, the scope of this policy’s target population allows me to test whether 
variation in the personal relevance of the policy moderates the consequences of 
government visibility.  The federal contraceptive mandate applies to a broad enough 
portion of the population that a national survey sample of adults will capture a substantial 
number of persons who are targeted by the legislation.48  Just as critically, the policy does 
not uniformly apply to all citizens nor is it uniformly relevant to all persons.  The 
overwhelming majority of contraceptive measures covered under this federal mandate are 
exclusively used by women (see Birth Control Benefits Healthcare.gov 2016; Campo-
Engelstein 2011).  The recent finding that a majority of men do not feel that they have 
personally benefitted from women’s access to affordable birth control reinforces the 
notion that there are gender-based differences in the perceived personal relevance of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Although estimates of the breadth of the contraceptive mandate fluctuate, the widespread use of 
contraception is well-documented, with the Centers for Disease Control reporting that, among 
women of reproductive age, 62% are currently using some form of contraception.  The birth 
control pill is the most prevalent form of birth control and its usage is most widespread among 
younger women.  Approximately one out of every four women between the ages of 15-34 is 
currently using the birth control pill (Daniels, Daugherty, and Jones 2014).   
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contraceptive mandate (PerryUndem 2017).  Given the gendered nature of this policy, I 
can evaluate the moderating impact of a policy’s personal relevance by testing whether 
changes to government visibility in contraceptive accessibility have the same effect for 
women as for men.  This comparison, however, tests something different from a simple 
egocentric consideration of whether this policy is personally relevant.  By testing the 
interactive effect of gender, I am measuring whether identifying with a group that a 
policy targets – in this case, women – moderates the size of a change in government trust 
(Hypothesis 2).  Given the difficulty of sampling persons who vary in their gender and 
sex identity (see Reisner et al. 2015), I treat gender and sex as synonymous for the 
purposes of measurement and self-identification in this survey. 
The persistently positive public views of the contraceptive mandate suggest that 
on average, if increased government visibility leads to changes in government trust, this 
shift in visibility would strengthen trust in government.  Numerous surveys conducted by 
different organizations across multiple years have consistently have found that 
approximately 70% of Americans support the contraceptive mandate (see Sobel, 
Salganicoff, and Rosenzweig 2017 (findings published by The Kaiser Family 
Foundation); Moniz, Davis, and Chang 2014 (findings published in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association); and The Pew Research Center 2016).  Support for this 
mandate, however, does vary based on demographic characteristics.  Those who are most 
likely to support the mandate identify as women, as black, and as Hispanic.  Men and 
older Americans are the most opposed to the mandate (Moniz, Davis, and Chang 2014).  
The presence of some opposition to the mandate is likely to attenuate the effect of 
increased visibility on improving levels of political trust.  The prospect of this attenuation 
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suggests that if I find evidence of a positive relationship between increased visibility and 
political trust, that this relationship is particularly robust.  Moreover, this finding of 
demographic-based differences in mandate support also suggests that I should control for 
these factors (race, ethnicity, gender, and age) in my analysis.    
I use the federal contraceptive mandate to test my hypotheses by embedding an 
experiment, which randomly clarifies the linkage between government and insurance 
coverage of birth control, in a short survey.  This research design allows me to 
manipulate my mechanism of interest (government visibility), while keeping all else 
constant.  Here, random assignment into survey groups should create a scenario where 
the only difference between the survey conditions is the treatment that they are shown.  
This design isolates the treatment (government visibility) as the causal factor driving any 
differences in political trust between survey conditions.   
Survey Sampling International (SSI) administered my online survey to a diverse 
national sample of 1800 US residents.  By using a nonprobability opt-in sample, 
however, my survey population may not be representative of the national population.  
This limits the extent to which I can generalize my findings to the larger population, but 
it does not negate the validity of a finding of a causal relationship between government 
visibility and political trust within my sample population.  Moreover, well-executed opt-
in samples have been shown to produce estimates of political indicators that are similar to 
probability-based RDD landline and cell phone surveys (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 
2014; Pasek 2015).  The firm fielding my survey (SSI) also uses actively managed 
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proprietary panels that are subject to rigorous quality controls.49  In order to more readily 
obtain economic diversity in my sample, participants were allowed to access the survey 
online through either their PCs, laptops, tablets, or mobile phones (Dillman, Smyth, and 
Christian 2014). 
As previously noted, participants in this survey were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions.  Persons in both conditions were shown a mock-up of a short newspaper 
article that discusses the recent expansion of insurance coverage for many forms of 
contraception.  Those in the High Visibility condition were shown a version of this article 
that discusses Congress’s role in mandating this insurance coverage change.  Persons in 
the Low Visibility condition were similarly shown an article that details the expansion of 
insurance coverage for many forms of contraception, however this article does not 
discuss Congress’s role in mandating this insurance change.  To minimize partisan 
reasoning, neither article mentions that this federal mandate was a part of the Affordable 
Care Act nor do they mention the litigation that has sought, with varying degrees of 
success, to limit the scope and applicability of the mandate (see e.g. Burwell v. Hobby 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 SSI recruits potential panel participants via banners ads, keywords, messaging, search links, 
pop-up polls, email, and personal messages. It also uses targeted procedures to recruit “hard to 
reach groups” online, including seniors and minorities.  Panel participants are assigned a unique 
ID to track their participation online.  This, along with digital fingerprinting and their quality-
control suite, is used to prevent a single person from taking the same survey on one or more 
devices.  To reduce bias, SSI employs a three-stage randomization process in selecting 
participants from their survey panels.   Due to a related research project I conducted that also uses 
this survey population, I asked SSI to oversample women 18-29.  Within the designated age and 
gender parameters, SSI selected panel participants for my survey that matched the ACS Census 
population on educational attainment and geographic distribution.   These sampling procedures 
have been shown to create a well-balanced national sample, which is reflected in the number of 
published political science studies that have conducted their research using samples from SSI (see 
Berinsky, Margolis, and Sances 2014; Kam 2012; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; see also 
Margolis 2015). 
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Lobby Stores, 2014; Zubick v. Burwell, 2016).  However, the possibility remains that the 
article may prompt partisan assessments.  To address this concern, I include respondents’ 
self-reported partisanship as a covariate in my analyses.   
Prior to administering my survey, I conducted a pre-test of the survey instrument 
using a 1,600-person opt-in sample from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).  This pre-
test confirmed that the experimental treatments worked.  After reading different mock 
newspaper articles, 93% of respondents in the High Visibility condition were aware of 
government involvement in expanded contraceptive coverage compared to 41% of 
respondents in the Low Visibility condition.  I also performed this manipulation check for 
my subsequent SSI sample and found that this pattern held.  After reading their respective 
news articles, respondents in the High Visibility condition were three times as likely as 
those in the Low Visibility condition to recognize Congress’s role in expanded 
contraceptive coverage.50  This pattern establishes that the key difference between my 
two survey conditions is their likelihood of connecting the federal government to 
expanded contraceptive coverage. 
The main outcome of interest in these survey experiments is political trust.  I 
measure this concept using the NES question on government trust that asks respondents 
how often they can trust government “to do what is right?” (Levi and Stoker 2000).  This 
question wording is one of the most widely-accepted measures for taping evaluations of 
political trust, with many large-scale national surveys using this same operationalization, 
including The Quinnipiac University Poll, The Associate Press NORC survey, The Pew 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The Odds Ratio of the mean difference between survey conditions was 3.2 with a p-value of 
less than .001.  The text of these mock news articles is reprinted in the Appendix.   
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Governance Survey, The Harvard Institute of Politics’ Young Americans Poll, and ABC, 
CNN, and CBS news, to name only a few.  Given that the contraceptive mandate is a 
result of federal legislation, I specify the government referent by asking respondents to 
evaluate how often they trust Congress to do what is right.  Respondents can select one of 
five options ranging from “always” to “never.”  As this response is captured with an 
ordered categorical measure, I examine the survey data using ordered logistic regressions. 
I analyze the relationship between political trust and government visibility both 
with and without covariates.  As social trust is well known to predict trust in government 
(Keele 2007), in my analysis with covariates I include a measure of generalized social 
trust.  Trust in government has also been shown to vary according to the following 
demographic characteristics: age (Dalton 2005; Street et al. 2013; Street et al. 2015);  
education (Perrin and Smolek 2009; Dalton 2005); income (Hahn and Perez 2014); race 
and ethnicity (Howell and Fagan 1988; Mangum 2003; Michelson 2003); and gender 
(Lawless 2004).  Accordingly, I include these demographic variables as covariates as 
well.  I also control for partisan identification, given that partisan congruence with 
leaders in political office affects trust in government (Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane 
2006; Keele 2005) and political identification may affect support for the mandate.  
Frequency of religious attendance is likewise associated with political trust and is 
therefore included as a covariate (Perrin and Smolek 2009).  Moreover, some religious 
institutions have been vocal opponents of the contraceptive mandate (Pew 2013), 
suggesting that knowledge of the mandate and attitudes toward the mandate may vary 
based on frequency of attendance at religious services.  In sum, my analysis with 
covariates (model one) is specified as follows:    
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Pr(yi=1) = logit-1(αj + β1XSurvey Condition + β2XFemale + β3XSocial Trust + β4XAge + β5XEducation + 
β6XIncome + β7XIdentify as Black + β8XIdentify as Latinx + β9XParty ID +β10XFreq. of Religious Attendance) 
 
To test my second hypothesis – that change in political trust should be greatest 
among persons in a policy’s target population – I add an interaction term for treatment 
condition and gender to my ordered logistic regression.  I also calculate the cross-partial 
difference for changes in political trust between men and women across survey 
conditions.  
 
Results from Experimentally Manipulating Government Visibility 
 
I begin my analysis by testing whether shifting the visibility of the submerged 
state – via raising awareness of Congress’s role in the contraceptive mandate – influences 
trust in government (H1).  My results support this hypothesis.  Compared to those in the 
low visibility group, respondents in the high visibility condition have significantly higher 
levels of trust in government (p < .01).  The output for this comparison is shown in Table 
5.1 in terms of logistic coefficients and odds ratios, which are the exponentiated forms of 
ordered logistic coefficients.  As Table 5.1 indicates, trust in government is 
approximately 1.32 times greater for persons in the high visibility condition, compared to 
those in the low visibility condition, holding all other variables in the model constant.  
Notably, this relationship persists even without the inclusion of covariates.  In the simple 
bivariate analysis, respondents in the high visibility condition report significantly higher 
trust in government (p=.017).  The effect size in the bivariate model is also similar, with 
trust in government roughly 1.25 times greater in the high visibility condition compared 
to the low visibility condition (see Table 1).  Accordingly, my results provide clear 
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evidence of a causal relationship between increased government visibility, with respect to 
the federal contraceptive mandate, and enhanced political trust. 
 
Table 5.1: Trust in Government and Government Visibility 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logistic 
Coefficient 
with 
covariates 
Odds  
Ratio 
with 
covariates 
Logistic 
Coefficient 
without 
 covariates 
Odds 
Ratio 
without 
covariates 
     
High Government Visibility Condition 0.281* 1.324* 0.222* 1.248* 
 (0.095) (0.125) (0.093) (0.116) 
     
Observations 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,528 
           
  Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05; see Appendix for output with full covariates  
 
 
 
To provide a better sense of how trust in government varies by survey condition, I 
also plot the raw difference in reported trust in government between survey conditions.  
As Figure 5.1 shows, respondents in the high visibility condition are less likely to report 
never trusting government or only trusting government occasionally, whereas they are 
more likely to report trusting government at least half of the time.  
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Figure 5.1 Difference in Reported Trust by Treatment Condition  
(at each level)  
 
	  
	  
 
 
 
Having established this main effect, I can now test whether the size of this change 
varies based on whether you belong to the target population of the policy (H2).  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that enhanced awareness of the contraceptive mandate should 
create a larger change in political trust for women compared to men.  In other words, it 
posits that the treatment effect will vary by gender.  In nonlinear models, the marginal 
effect of the interaction term is not equivalent to the magnitude of the interaction effect 
(Ai and Norton 2003; Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd 2012).51  However, a z-test for 
the coefficient of the interaction term in my ordered logistic regression model does 
provide useful information on whether interacting the treatment condition with gender 
improves the goodness-of-fit of my model (Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd 2012).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Because the marginal effect of an explanatory variable in a nonlinear model is not constant 
over its entire range, even in the absence of an explicit interaction term the addition of a binary 
covariate, such as gender, shifts the range of the conditional probability. Accordingly, the 
coefficient of an interaction term added to a nonlinear model does not capture the difference in 
the size of the treatment effect across genders (i.e. the cross-partial difference). 
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When I add an interaction term for treatment and gender to model one, I find a z-score of 
2.04, which indicates that the interaction term helps to explain variation in government 
trust (see Tale 5.2).  With this confirmed, I can then test Hypothesis 2 by calculating the 
cross-partial difference, which captures the difference in the marginal effect of being in 
the high visibility condition versus the low visibility condition across genders.   
 
Table 5.2: Trust in Government and Government Visibility  
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Logistic 
Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio 
   
High Government Visibility Condition -0.022 0.978 
 (0.178) (0.174) 
Female -0.820* 0.440* 
 (0.159) (0.070) 
High Government Visibility * Female 0.431* 1.540* 
 (0.211) (0.325) 
   
Observations 1,528 1,528 
     
    Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
    * p < 0.05; see Appendix for output with full covariates 
 
To test for the cross-partial difference, I transform my dependent variable 
(government trust) into a binary measure.  People who report trusting Congress always or 
most of the time are coded one, with everyone else coded as zero.  This dichotomization 
allows for a simpler comparison across groups.  With this measure, I can directly 
compare those who mostly trust Congress to those who do not.  In calculating the cross-
partial difference, I find that the difference in political trust between genders across 
survey conditions is statistically significant (p=.035), and is driven by an increase in trust 
among women in the high visibility condition.  The change in political trust for women in 
the low visibility condition compared to the high visibility treatment condition was 
approximately 8% larger than this change across treatment conditions for their male 
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counterparts.  This difference is demonstrated visually in Figure 5.2, which charts the 
difference in political trust between survey conditions based on gender.  As this graph 
shows, the change in political trust is the result of a boost in political trust among women 
in the high visibility treatment condition.52 
 
 Figure 5.2 Trust in Government Between Survey Treatments  
  Across Genders 
 
 
 
  
 
To further visualize the substantive meaning of the variation in effect size across 
genders, I also the plot difference in the raw values of self-reported trust between survey 
conditions for men and women separately.  In breaking down these raw differences based 
on gender, I find that women replicate the patterns shown in Figure 5.1.  A greater 
portion of women in the high visibility condition report positive evaluations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52Although trust in government is generally slightly higher among women than men (Lawless 
2004), priming reproductive issues can depress trust in government among women (Tallevi 
forthcoming).  This suggests that the lower level of trust reported among women compared to 
men in this survey is to be expected.    
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government trust, compared to women in the low-visibility condition (see Figure 5.3).  
However, as Figure 5.4 shows, this pattern is not present for men.  The absence of this 
replication reinforces the notion that the increase in government trust that un-submerging 
the contraceptive mandate generates is driven by women.  
 
  Figure 5.3 Women’s Difference in Reported  Figure 5.4 Men’s Difference in Reported 
  Trust by Treatment Condition (at each level) Trust by Treatment Condition (at each level) 
 
   
 
 
I theorize that the birth control mandate will have a bigger impact on women 
compared to men because this policy is more likely to be directly relevant to women, 
given that most FDA-approved contraceptive measures which require interacting with 
physicians or pharmacists are used exclusively by women.  However, it is also possible 
that women experience a greater change in government trust because they tend to be 
more supportive of this mandate.  To explore this possibility, I amend my model to 
include support for the contraceptive mandate as a covariate.53  As Table 5.3 shows, 
although policy support has a significant positive relationship with trust in government, 
the interactive effect of gender and treatment condition continues to function as a strong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 To assist with interpreting the interaction term, I dichotomize the “mandate support” variable. 
Respondents who support the mandate at least somewhat are coded as one, while those who 
somewhat or strongly oppose the mandate are coded as zero.   
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predictor of variation in political trust (z =2.06).54  In other words, the finding that 
women experience a greater change in political trust compared to men cannot be 
explained away by a correlation between gender and policy support.   Moreover, when I 
add an interaction term for treatment condition and support for the birth control mandate, 
the interaction effect for gender and treatment condition remains significant and I do not 
find evidence that the mandate-support interaction term improves the goodness-of-fit of 
the model (z = .22) (see Table 5.3).  Similarly, although the cross-partial difference 
between treatment conditions based on policy support is significant, the effect size is 
modest, with policy supporters experiencing a .5% boost in political trust across 
conditions compared to policy opponents.   
 
Table 5.3: Trust in Government and Government Visibility 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Logistic 
Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio 
   
High Government Visibility Condition -0.122 0.885 
 (0.276) (0.244) 
Female  -0.858* 0.424* 
 (0.160) (0.068) 
High Government Visibility * Female 0.421* 1.524* 
 (0.211) (0.322) 
Support Mandate  0.618* 1.855* 
 (0.184) (0.342) 
High Government Visibility * Support Mandate 0.131 1.140 
 (0.256) (0.291) 
   
Observations 1,528 1,528 
        Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
              * p<0.05; see Appendix for output with full covariates 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 To prevent the experimental treatment from influencing mandate support, respondents are 
asked whether they feel that insurers should be required to cover birth control prior to reading the 
mock news article. 
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Eliminating mandate support as a potential confounding variable adds credence to 
the notion that policy proximity is producing these divergent effects based on gender.  
The differential effect size between genders also cannot be attributed to common 
demographic disparities between men and women in my sample.  Recall, predictors of 
political trust that are often correlated with gender, such as partisanship, income, 
religious attendance, and education level, are also accounted for in this model.  Yet, given 
that I use a nonprobability sample, the possibility remains that the women in this survey 
systematically differ from women in the larger US population.  However, my survey 
sample was designed to match the demographic distribution of the US population, and in 
my models I account for the effects of political trust on many of the most commonly-
measured demographic characteristics.  
To ensure the robustness of my findings, I also check whether interacting survey 
condition with other covariates that have a strong potential to vary based on gender 
improves the fit of my model.  Specifically, I include interaction terms for party 
identification, given that women identify as Democrats at higher rates than men (Street et 
al. 2015), and prior knowledge of the mandate, as adult women are the target population 
and therefore should be more likely to know about this policy change.  Neither 
interaction term has a significant cross-partial difference nor do these interactions explain 
significant variation in government trust (see Table 5.4).  Most critically, neither 
interaction term impacts the significance of the finding of an interaction effect between 
survey condition and gender.  
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Table 5.4: Trust in Government and Government Visibility 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Logistic 
Coefficient 
Odds  
Ratio 
   
High Government Visibility Condition 0.015 1.015 
 (0.290) (0.294) 
Female -0.850* 0.428* 
 (0.159) (0.068) 
High Government Visibility * Female 0.378* 1.459* 
 (0.212) (0.309) 
Support Mandate 0.581* 1.787* 
 (0.186) (0.332) 
High Government Visibility * Support Mandate 0.105 1.111 
 (0.260) (0.289) 
Democrat 0.527* 1.694* 
 (0.142) (0.240) 
High Government Visibility * Democrat -0.027 0.974 
 (0.196) (0.190) 
Prior Knowledge of Mandate 0.567* 1.763* 
 (0.147) (0.259) 
High Government Visibility * Prior Knowledge -0.239 0.787 
 (0.199) (0.157) 
   
Observations 1,528 1,528            
           Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
                 * p<0.05; see Appendix for output with full covariates 
 
	  
The Implications of Low Government Visibility and Shifting Political Trust  
 
 Overall, this research provides clear evidence that by hiding the visibility of 
government, submerged state policies depress political trust.  My results suggest that 
when the government adopts a policy that is generally well-liked, but the persons at 
whom the policy is targeted are unaware of government’s involvement, this obfuscation 
influences people’s ability to evaluate government in accordance with this policy change.  
This finding emphasizes how the administration of a policy – and not just its substance – 
can shift whether and when the public uses a government policy to inform evaluations of 
the political system.  In particular, it shows that making clear previously obscured 
government actions shifts the degree to which the public, and potential policy recipients, 
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trust political institutions.  Put simply, when the link between government and a popular 
policy is clarified, trust in government increases.  
This chapter also demonstrates that this change in political trust is driven by the 
portion of the population that is most likely to be directly affected by the submerged 
public policy.  I test how the effects of increasing the visibility of government’s 
contraceptive mandate vary based on gender, given that the contraceptive mandate has a 
disproportionate effect on women compared to their male counterparts.  I find that 
policies which target women shape how they feel toward the state and that the clarity of 
government involvement structures how these opinions are informed.  This result 
illustrates how government actions can produce variation in political attitudes between 
men and women and it reinforces that these patterns cannot be reduced to an innate or 
immutable difference between gender or sex-based categories.  In this vein, it is 
important to note that the targeting of long-term contraceptive measures toward women is 
owed as much to societal and market forces as to biology (Campo-Engelstein 2011).  
Taken together, these considerations underscore how the design and implementation of 
government policies structure the ways in which the political relevance of socially-
constructed categories – like gender – manifest.    
Ultimately, the findings presented in this chapter also demonstrate how 
submerged state policies pose a threat to democratic accountability and American 
political institutions.  In a healthy democracy, public opinion can be used to hold the 
government and its institutions responsible for their actions.  People observe what 
government is doing and react to it accordingly, with positive or negative evaluations.  
Low visibility policies that hide the role of the state prevent this public responsiveness.  
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Instead, they foster misperceptions about what government is doing and how the private 
sector is structured.  The survey experiment analyzed in this chapter shows that these 
misperceptions can impact how people evaluate political institutions.  Specifically, it 
shows that they can depress trust in the country’s highest legislative body.  The 
relationship that this research identifies, between state visibility and government trust, is 
shaped by the fact that the submerged policy being evaluated, the federal contraceptive 
mandate, is viewed positively by most Americans.  However, my findings do not 
preclude the possibility that submerged policy designs muffle the emergence of negative 
responses to public policies that people oppose.  Such an outcome, however, would also 
present a threat to democratic accountability. A normative issue with submerged policy 
designs is that they generate perceptions about what government is doing that are 
unmoored from political realities.  This confusion is similarly problematic if it masks 
negatively-perceived policies.  The main difference, however, concerns the types of 
policies that are being submerged.  My theory and research concerns submerged domestic 
social welfare programs.  Studies have repeatedly shown that support for most individual 
welfare state programs is strong, particularly among their target populations, despite 
weak public support for welfare spending in the abstract (Gilens 2009; Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2015).  Therefore, in the aggregate, the net effect of submerging traditional 
social welfare programs is to obscure well-liked programs that sustain the social safety 
net.  Moreover, Americans’ tendency to assume that poor performing services are public 
rather than private, even when this is not the case, makes it even less likely that the public 
will wrongly attribute unpopular programs to the private sector, and thereby boost trust in 
government (Lerman 2013).   
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In sum, this survey experiment, along with the observational study in Chapter 
Four, provides clear evidence that the submersion of social welfare policies erodes trust 
in government.  In the following chapter, I explore why this finding of diminished trust in 
government is so politically consequential.  This forthcoming analysis shows that 
declining trust in government enhances support for delegating administrative authority 
away from the state.  In highlighting this pattern, I demonstrate how decreased political 
trust shifts the public mood in a direction that favors implementing policies and 
administrative designs that ultimately strain government trust and accountability.  
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Chapter Six:  How Decreased Trust in Government Bolsters the Submerged State 
 
 The previous two chapters established that decreasing the visibility of social 
welfare programs serves to depress trust in government.  Using a combination of 
observational data and survey experiments, they show that submerged state policies 
distort perceptions concerning the personal relevance of government’s actions and that 
these distortions can result in decreased trust in government.  Having identified this 
causal relationship, I now turn to exploring the implications of this attitudinal shift for the 
maintenance of the submerged state.  In the ensuing chapter, I examine how diminished 
political trust affects support for the policies, administrative mechanisms, and ideological 
undercurrents that are used to entrench policy submersion.   
This analysis shows that low trust in government bolsters public support for state 
submersion.  As trust in government declines, the public becomes more likely to embrace 
policies and general political attitudes that favor reducing government visibility.  I find 
that trust in government affects support for government intervention (over a reliance on 
the free market); reducing the number of federal employees in government; and 
increasing the number of services government provides.  I also show that declining trust 
in government increases opposition to un-submerging existing social welfare programs. 
These findings establish the final links in the “PADD” cycle.  The first processes in this 
cycle show that privatization creates confusion over what government is doing and that 
this confusion leads to decreased trust in government.  In this current chapter, I connect 
decreased trust in government to stronger public support for the very submerged policy 
designs and initiatives that are helping to diminish this trust.  By linking decreased trust 
in government to greater support for the attitudes and policies that create state 
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submersion, I demonstrate how submerged policy designs function as part of a self-
reinforcing cycle, where policy submersion (via eroding trust in government) creates a 
political environment that is ultimately more favorable to greater policy submersion.  
 
Political Trust’s Sphere of Influence (or why political trust should affect policy 
attitudes)   
 
Although trust in government has shifted dramatically over the past half-century, 
research into political trust has identified one constant: the determinants of trust in 
government are primarily political (Levi and Stoker 2000).  Perceptions of current events, 
policies, and elected officials all function as predictors of trust in government (see 
Chapters Four and Five; Citrin and Green 1986; Hetherington 1998; Miller 1974; 
Mansbridge 1997; Orren 1997).55  With political trust increasingly understood as a 
product of political forces, it seems plausible that the reverse relationship may also hold 
true.56  Indeed, a growing body of research shows that trust in government plays an 
influential role in shaping political attitudes.  For instance, it has long been understood 
that partisan congruence with the executive branch can impact evaluations of political 
trust (Citrin 1974).  However, more recent research shows that political trust has an even 
stronger impact on attitudes toward the president (Hetherington 1998).  This finding flips 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Many of these inquiries into the underlying constructs that trust in government captures use the 
American National Election Survey (NES) to measure government trust (Citrin 1974; Muller 
1977; Abramson and Finifter 1981; Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Feldman 1983;Williams 
1985; Weatherford 1987; Jennings and Deth 1990; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990).  
56 Research on social and organizational trust indicates that there is a theoretical foundation, and 
precedent, for trust to affect political attitudes.  Social trust plays a critical role in facilitating 
cooperation and group interaction (Putnam 2000).  It also has been shown to bolster the stability 
of democratic institutions (Putnam 1993). Organizational trust has likewise been shown to 
influence individual-level attitudes by mediating workers’ willingness to accept decisions by 
management (Tyler and Degoey 1996).  
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the narrative that treats declining support for public leaders as an explanation for 
decreased political trust to one where diminished political trust provides a causal 
explanation for government officials’ waning support.  
Notably, political trust shapes more than perceptions of public figures; it can also 
shift people’s attitudes toward specific public policies.  In particular, political trust plays 
a critical role in moderating public support for policy liberalism.  Greater trust in 
government increases support for spending on redistributive social programs (such as 
welfare and food stamps) as well as racial justice initiatives (Hetherington 2005).  It also 
shapes the national policy mood by increasing aggregate support for liberal domestic 
policies, including those in the health, education, and environmental domains (Chanley, 
Rudolph, and Rahn 2000).  However, political trust’s impact on support for specific 
policies can vary based on issue salience.  When national attention is focused on foreign 
affairs, political trust’s influence on support for domestic policies wanes, while its impact 
on support for international engagements grows.  Conversely, when domestic priorities 
dominate the news media cycle, political trust plays a significant role in moderating 
support for this policy agenda, and its effect on attitudes toward foreign affairs 
diminishes (Hetherington and Husser 2012; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015).57  Overall, 
this research suggests that political trust can impact attitudes that relate to the direction of 
government growth.  Greater trust in government can bolster public support for social 
welfare policies that seek to create a more robust social safety net, and this effect is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, as the media focused more attention on 
national security, political trust played a large role in predicting attitudes toward foreign 
interventions, while political trust’s impact on support for domestic policies weakened.  Later in 
the decade, when domestic priorities gained greater media prominence, this relationship reversed 
and political trust became a bigger predictor of attitudes toward domestic policy.  
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particularly pronounced when national attention is focused on domestic policies, as it 
often is during periods of economic crisis.  Yet, when trust in government contracts, so 
too does support for these initiatives.   
The theoretical grounding for this relationship is based on two tenets.  Political 
trust should be expected to influence political attitudes, broadly, because of its cognitive 
accessibility, and it should be expected to influence policy liberalism, specifically, 
because of trust’s role in moderating perceptions of risk-benefit trade-offs.  The cognitive 
accessibility argument is based on the recognition that the more difficult a concept is to 
grasp, the harder it becomes to form a consistent opinion on that concept.  Instead, people 
tend to develop non-attitudes, or ever-fluctuating opinions, that reflect the absence of an 
underlying attitudinal commitment (Converse 1964).  With respect to political trust, 
however, people do not need to be political experts to form a judgment about whether 
they trust the state.  Rather, as Hetherington argues, trust is “a simple concept, about 
which almost all people will express true attitudes” (2005: 51).  Trust is considered a 
simple-to-form attitude in part because people tend to arrive at trust evaluations through 
gut-level responses that capture their general affect toward the referent.  As gut-level 
responses are easily accessed, these types of affective judgments can play a central role in 
the maintenance of political belief systems (Campbell et al. 1960).  They do so by 
operating as a heuristic, or informational short-cut.  Rather than taking the far more 
cognitively taxing route of learning about and forming opinions on the merits of a 
specific policy or program, people can use their evaluation of whether they trust 
government to determine whether they support a government action.  Political trust’s 
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usefulness as a heuristic suggests that there is a strong potential for trust in government to 
shape subsequent political attitudes, including support for policy outputs. 
Political trust should have a pronounced effect on support for policy liberalism, in 
particular, because of trust’s influence on perceptions of risk-benefit trade-offs 
(Hetherington 2005).  According to this logic, if a policy does not seem directly relevant 
to your own well-being, trust in government should make you more receptive to the idea 
that the policy is ultimately beneficial and not wasteful. (In this theory, a policy’s 
personal relevance is based on individuals’ perceptions of how the policy affects them, 
not an objective measure of who benefits from the policy and to what extent).  
Hetherington’s explanation is supported by psychological research showing that people 
tend to prioritize fairness, and overemphasize perceived slights, in reacting to events 
(Alford and Hibbing 2004).58  This ingrained fear of being taken advantage of suggests 
that political trust should be particularly relevant to generating support for liberal policies 
that you may not benefit from directly, as trust reduces the fear that you will be swindled 
(Hetherington 2005).  Notably, this same reasoning can be applied to attitudes toward 
state submersion.  If you trust government, you should be less likely to view state-led 
initiatives as risky and less amendable to eschewing government actors in favor of the 
private sector.       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For instance, people will reject a guaranteed monetary gain if they feel that the financial benefit 
is not high enough given the initial expected outcome.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse connect this 
finding to politics by showing that the fear of getting a less than optimal deal drives opposition to 
congressional actions that are still perceived as a net-positive (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).  
Note, this finding stands in contrast to the rational choice literature’s emphasis on maximizing 
personal utility. 
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Yet, whether political trust influences perceptions of how public policies should 
be executed remains less well understood.  Although political trust can influence support 
for expanding the scope of the state and the strength of its social welfare institutions, 
whether political trust affects perceptions of how these welfare programs should be 
administered remains understudied.  The research on political trust and support for policy 
liberalism provides theoretical grounding for a potential relationship between political 
trust and support for policy submersion.  However, this potential relationship is further 
bolstered by studies of policy devolution.  A key feature of policy submersion concerns 
the diminished role of government actors.  Research on policy devolution, which involves 
transferring administrative authority from the federal government to state and local 
actors, has shown that political trust influences perceptions of when and how federal 
employees should be involved in program administration.  Specifically, low levels of 
trust in the federal government increases support for transferring administrative 
responsibility from the federal government to subnational government units 
(Hetherington and Nugent 2001).  This finding persists even after controlling for factors 
associated with a state’s capacity for effective government.  By showing that low levels 
of trust in the federal government increase support for shifting administrative authority to 
subnational governments, this finding underscores the potential for political trust to 
moderate support for shifting administrative authority away from the federal government 
and toward non-state actors as well.    
Given this theoretical basis, in the following analysis I test whether political trust 
can influence support for delegating administrative authority away from the state.  If 
political trust operates by minimizing concern over the risk of pursuing government-run 
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policies, then I would expect for trust in government to encourage support for direct – 
versus submerged – state actions.  Here, trust in government should make direct 
government involvement appear inherently less risky.  To test this theory, I offer the 
following hypotheses:  
H1:  Higher levels of political trust increase support for expanding the 
administrative capacity of the federal government.  
 
H2: Lower levels of political trust predict greater support for policies that use 
submerged-state mechanisms. 
 
Measuring Political Trust’s Effect on Support for Policy Submersion  
 
I analyze these hypotheses using data from the 2012 NES Times Series Study, 
which samples a nationally-representative cross-section of 3,860 eligible voters in the 
United States.  The 2012 NES was conducted in four waves using both face-to-face and 
Internet-based samples.  The prevalence of policy submersion across issue domains 
suggests that a broad cross-section of the American public engages with policies that 
utilize submerged designs, indicating that it is appropriate to study this phenomenon 
using a nationally-representative sample like the 2012 NES.  Moreover, Mettler’s 
research establishes that many of the tax-code based submerged programs, which 
disproportionately benefit higher income individuals, obscure these recipients’ 
understanding of when they are benefitting from a federal program (2011).  In Chapter 
Three, I show that these informational distortions are also present in more “traditional” 
welfare programs that affect middle and lower-income communities.  While the degree to 
which people engage with policy submersion certainly varies, these findings indicate that 
most persons interviewed in the NES are likely to have interacted with submerged 
policies at some point in time.  However, I also subset this national sample on the 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   141	  
communities that are affected by the submerged programs studied in Chapters Four and 
Five to isolate how engagement with these specific policies shifts support for the 
submerged state.  
The 2012 NES survey is particularly well-suited for these purposes because it 
includes a battery of questions on government trust, support for specific policies, and 
perceptions of the appropriate role of the federal government.  As previously noted, the 
NES questions on trust in government are among the most widely-used measures of 
political trust (Levi and Stoker 2000).  Accordingly, I measure political trust (my 
explanatory variable) by creating an index out of the four government trust questions in 
the 2012 NES.  These questions tap respondents’ perceptions of: whether they trust the 
federal government to do what is right; whether government is run by a few big interests; 
whether government is wasteful; and whether many in government are corrupt.  This 
index has a Cronbach’s alpha of .61, suggesting a fair degree of internal consistency.59  
 My first group of dependent variables capture attitudes toward expanding the 
administrative capacity of the federal government. Specially, I measure support for (1) 
government intervention over reliance on the free market, (2) expanding government 
services, and (3) reducing the number of federal employees.60  These three measures each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The NES measure of whether you trust the federal government to do what is right mirrors the 
measure used in the survey experiment presented in Chapter Five.  To help maintain consistency, 
I also operationalize political trust using this question on its own, and I find that it does not alter 
the substantive implications of my findings.  Output with this measure is located in the Appendix.      
60 These measures are based on responses to the following questions:  
1. Intervention v. free market: Which of the two statements comes closer to your view? (A) We 
need a strong government to handle today's complex economic problems; (B) The free market 
can handle these problems without government being involved. 
2. Government Services: Which of the two statements comes closer to your view? (A) There are 
more things that government should be doing; (B) The less government, the better.  
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capture a different dimension of attitudes toward the role of the state and whether policy 
designs should adopt submerged elements.  Measure 1 (prefer government intervention 
over the free market) denotes perceptions of the appropriate extent of government 
involvement by capturing whether respondents favor policies that rely on market-based 
principles.  Measure 2 asks about the number of services that government should provide, 
rather than whether government should increase or decrease spending (and thus is distinct 
from the questions analyzed by Hetherington).  Note, the structure of this question 
captures explicit attitudes about the direct state by asking whether government services 
should be expanded.  Lastly, measure 3 captures attitudes toward the federal bureaucracy.  
Shifting administrative authority away from federal employees to non-state actors is a 
cornerstone of state submersion.  Measure 3 indicates whether respondents support the 
general principle (moving away from a reliance on federal employees) that undergirds 
this practice.    
My second group of dependent variables measures support for specific policies 
that present either a move toward or away from submerged state administrative 
mechanisms.  The 2012 NES includes questions measuring people’s support for: a 
government-sponsored health insurance plan for all Americans (i.e. a public option); 
turning Medicare into a voucher program; and privatizing social security.61  In measuring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3. Reduce Federal Employees: Would you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose a plan to 
reduce the federal budget deficit if it included the following: reduce the number of federal 
government employees by 10 percent.  
61 The question wording for these measures is as follows:      
1. Public Option: There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some 
people feel there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and 
hospital expenses for everyone. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others 
feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance plans like 
Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   143	  
support for these proposals, I can examine whether government trust influences not just 
the general principles behind attenuating the roll of the state, but also whether this trust 
affects preferences for policies whose administrative design promotes submersion.       
To assess my predictions, I control for several factors that are related to 
evaluations of government trust and perceptions of the role of government.  Including 
these relevant variables in my analysis increases the likelihood that a relationship 
between political trust and support for the submerged state is not merely the product of a 
correlated variable.  Accordingly, I include demographic variables that are known to be 
related to political trust, including age (Dalton 2005; Street et al. 2013; Street et al. 2015), 
education (Perrin and Smolek 2009; Dalton 2005), income (Hahn and Perez 2014), race 
(Howell and Fagan 1988; Mangum 2003; Michelson 2003), and gender (Lawless 2004).62  
I also include a measure of respondents’ social trust, as trust in other people also predicts 
trust in government (Keele 2007).  Party identification is likewise an important covariate 
for my analyses.  Adding this measure allows me to distinguish the effects of partisanship 
from those of political trust (see Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane 2006; Keele 2005).  
Similarly, to disentangle the effects of self-identification along the liberal-conservative 
axis from those of political trust, I also control for respondents’ political ideology.  This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6.  
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?  
2. Medicare Voucher: Would you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose a plan to reduce the 
federal budget deficit if it included the following: Replace Medicare with a Voucher Program.  
3. Social Security Privatization: A proposal has been made that would allow people to put a 
portion of their Social Security payroll taxes into personal retirement accounts that would be 
invested in stocks and bonds. Do you favor this idea, oppose it, or neither favor nor oppose it? 
(Follow-up question: how strongly do you favor or oppose it).   
62 These are the same demographic variables that I control for in my analysis of whether state 
submersion reduces trust in government. 
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measure is particularly important considering that conservatism, which values limited 
government, is likely to shape how supporters view direct state involvement and that 
conservatives tend to be less trusting of the national government (Pew 2015).  Lastly, the 
submerged state involves questions of how labor should be organized.  Accordingly, 
there is a strong potential for one’s experience with organized labor to impact perceptions 
of submerged policies.  To account for this, I also include a measure of union 
membership in my model.63  
 In sum, I analyze Hypotheses 1 and 2 using the following basic model (model 
one henceforth): 
 
Pr(yi=1) = logit-1(𝛼 + 𝛽1Trust in Government + 𝛽2Conservatism + 𝛽3Political Party + 𝛽4Social Trust + 𝛽5Age + 
𝛽6Highest Level of Education + 𝛽7Black + 𝛽8Income + 𝛽9Female + 𝛽10Union Membership) 
     
 
where yi represents one of the six dependent variables on submerged state attitudes, 
described above.  I analyze each of these dependent variables in separate regression 
models, which all have the same independent and control variables.  The model takes the 
form of either an ordered logistic regression model or a logistic regression model 
depending on whether the dependent variable is binary or categorical.  
To examine the robustness of this finding, I also reanalyze model one using 
coarsened exact matching (CEM).  Matching methods pair observations that share similar 
values on the covariates, but which differ on the key explanatory variable of interest.  
This nonparametric method creates covariate balance between the “treatment” and 
“control” groups (meaning the different levels of the key independent variable), which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 The 2012 NES question on union membership asks if anyone in the respondent’s household is 
in a union.  However, this measure does not distinguish between public or private sector unions.     
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for the purposes of this research is political trust.  CEM belongs to the Monotonic 
Imbalance Bounding (MIB) class of matching methods (see Iacus, King, and Porro 
2011).  In this class of matching methods, the maximum imbalance between matched 
pairs is determined by the researcher based on substantively meaningful cut-off points.  
This minimizes CEM’s imbalance, model dependence, estimation error, bias, variance, 
and mean square error compared to other matching methods (Iacus, King, Porro 2011).  
In using CEM, I match on the same covariates listed in model one.  The CEM software 
package preprocesses the matched pairs using the CEM algorithm to create weights, 
which I then apply to a bivariate analysis of my treatment variable (political trust) and 
dependent variables (support for the submerged state).  
 
Findings: Political Trust as a Driver of Support for the Submerged State 
I begin my analysis by testing Hypothesis 1, which posits that political trust 
should affect support for expanding the direct administrative capacity of the federal 
government.  Recall, to assess these attitudes, I test whether political trust impacts: 1) 
support for government intervention over reliance on the free market, 2) support for 
increased government activity, and 3) support for reducing the number of federal 
employees.  I find that trust in the federal government predicts attitudes toward all three 
positions (p <.01 for all).  As Table 6.1 shows, this relationship holds even after 
controlling for factors that are known to structure attitudes toward the state, including 
political ideology and partisanship.  People who are more trusting of government are also 
more likely to support government intervention over the free market; to support 
increasing government-run services; and to oppose reducing the number of federal 
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employees.  The effect size of political trust is also substantial.   A one standard deviation 
increase in political trust makes respondents approximately 46% more likely to prefer 
increased government services and increased government intervention (over a reliance on 
market forces); and 49% more likely to oppose reducing the number of federal 
employees.  
       Table 6.1: Trust in Government and Support for Limiting Government’s Administrative 
         Capacity 
 
 (1) a (2) b (3) b 
 Government 
Intervention over 
Market 
Increase 
Government 
Services 
Reduce 
Federal 
Employees 
(oppose) 
    
Trust in Government c 1.458*** 1.461*** 1.489*** 
 (0.112) (0.077) (0.082) 
Conservatism 0.674*** 0.624*** 0.713*** 
 (0.041) (0.034) (0.038) 
Party Identification 0.751*** 0.779*** 0.876*** 
 (0.032) (0.027) (0.035) 
Strength of Social Trust 1.028 1.127** 1.021 
 (0.080) (0.068) (0.069) 
Age 1.005 1.004 0.975*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Highest Education Level 0.850** 0.908** 0.896* 
 (0.057) (0.043) (0.053) 
Identify as Black 1.638* 1.447** 1.460** 
 (0.470) (0.248) (0.244) 
Household Income 1.001 0.982** 1.006 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) 
Identify as Male 0.637*** 0.720*** 0.703*** 
 (0.084) (0.070) (0.083) 
Union Membership  0.954 1.249 1.036 
 (0.178) (0.172) (0.162) 
    
Observations 2,323 2,506 2,335 
Source: NES 2012 
Notes:  a = logistic regression model; b = ordered logistic regression model; c = Trust in 
government index (standardized) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients presented as odds ratios  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Having established a correlation between political trust and attitudes toward 
submerged state mechanisms, I re-analyze this data using coarsened exact matching.64  
As Table 6.2 reinforces, political trust affects support for the submerged state.  Among 
respondents who share similar covariate characteristics – but who differ on political trust 
– I find that their more trusting, but otherwise similar, counterparts express greater 
support for: expanding the scope of government; rejecting market-only interventions; and 
rejecting attempts to cut the number of federal employees.  Taken together, these findings 
present strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 1 by showing that increased trust in 
government drives opposition to limiting the government’s administrative capacity.  In 
the CEM analysis, the effect size is even more pronounced than for the logistic regression 
model.  A one standard deviation increase in political trust corresponds with respondents 
becoming approximately twice as likely to support increased government intervention; 
60% more likely to prefer increased government services; and 86% more likely to oppose 
reducing the number of federal employees.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 To apply coarsened exact matching, I dichotomized the trust index into high and low trust 
groups.  I coded those whose trust index score was either at or above the median trust level as 
“high government trust” individuals, and I classified those whose reported trust fell below the 
median as “low government trust” individuals.    
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               Table 6.2: Trust in Government and Support for Limiting Government’s  
                Administrative Capacity  
 
 (1) a (2) b (3) b 
 Government 
Intervention 
over Market 
Increase 
Government 
Services 
Reduce 
Federal 
Employees 
(oppose) 
    
Trust in Government 2.003*** 1.607*** 1.855*** 
 (0.312) (0.201) (0.267) 
    
Observations 759 824 765 
     Source: NES 2012 
Notes: Coarsened Exact Matching; a = logistic regression model; b = ordered logistic   
regression model  
             Robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients presented as odds ratios 
             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Having shown that political trust affects support for limiting government’s 
administrative capacity, I can now turn to testing whether political trust affects support 
for specific submerged state policies (Hypothesis 2).  The NES asks respondents to 
evaluate policy proposals that introduce either submerged or direct-state mechanisms, 
including: a government health insurance plan for all (a direct-state amendment); 
Medicare as a voucher program (a submerged-state amendment); and social security 
privatization (a submerged-state amendment).   When assessing support for the two 
health insurance proposals, I amend model one to include respondents’ self-reported 
health status and whether they are insured, as these factors are known to shape attitudes 
toward healthcare policy (see Kaiser Family Foundation 2015b).  My analyses reveal 
mixed results.  I find that political trust predicts support for creating a public option, with 
more trusting individuals expressing greater support for a government-run insurance plan 
(see Table 6.3).  My results also show that increasing trust in government is related to 
greater opposition to Social Security privatization.   However, I fail to find evidence that 
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political trust affects support for turning Medicare into a voucher program.  This finding 
is not entirely surprising, given that Medicare is popular across segments of the electorate 
(Pew 2012) and that previous Medicare reform efforts have been stymied by the 
electorates’ entrenched support for this program in its current form (see Morgan and 
Campbell 2011).    
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      Table 6.3: Trust in Government and Support for Submerged-State Policies 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Public Option  
(v. private health 
insurance only) 
Medicare 
into 
Voucher  
Social 
Security 
Privatization  
    
Trust in Government a 1.163*** 0.986 0.906* 
 (0.065) (0.061) (0.046) 
Conservatism 0.638*** 1.433*** 1.238*** 
 (0.031) (0.085) (0.055) 
Party Identification 0.755*** 1.130*** 1.097*** 
 (0.025) (0.042) (0.035) 
Strength of Social Trust 1.031 0.975 0.959 
 (0.062) (0.068) (0.056) 
Age 1.002 0.971*** 0.977*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Highest Education Level 1.080 1.082 1.009 
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.051) 
Identify as African American 0.808 0.849 1.024 
 (0.131) (0.179) (0.174) 
Household Income 0.991 1.001 1.020*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Identify as Male 1.115 1.170 0.904 
 (0.108) (0.136) (0.091) 
Union Membership  0.992 0.786 0.786* 
 (0.139) (0.119) (0.110) 
Has Health Insurance 0.528*** 0.914  
 (0.075) (0.170)  
Has Good Personal Health 0.910* 1.051  
  (0.060)  
    
Observations 2,501 2,290 2,334 
    Source: NES 2012 
  Model: Ordered logistic regression 
  Notes:  a = Trust in government index (standardized)  
    Robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients presented as odds ratios 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When analyzing these relationships using CEM, however, political trust is only 
shown to have a statistically significant effect on support for creating a public option (see 
Table 6.4).  Notably, the point estimates for political trust remain very similar to those 
from the ordered logistic regression model.  However, the nonparametric CEM analysis 
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uses fewer observations and returns larger standard errors, explaining the shift in 
statistical significance.  
      Table 6.4: Trust in Government and Support for Submerged-State Policies 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Public Option  
(v. private health 
insurance only) 
Medicare into 
Voucher  
Social Security 
Privatization  
    
Trust in Government 1.53** 0.974 0.880 
 (0.252) (0.188) (0.151) 
    
Observations 460 422 429 
          Source: NES 2012 
       Model: Ordered logistic regression with Coarsened Exact Matching 
       Robust standard errors in parentheses; coefficients presented as odds ratios  
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
   
These findings suggest that the relationship between political trust and support for 
specific privatization initiatives depends on the policy domain and its salience.  When the 
NES survey was fielded in 2012, health insurance reform for the general public (as it 
relates to the ACA) was a more salient issue than social security privatization or 
converting Medicare into vouchers.  Accordingly, my pattern of results is in keeping with 
Hetherington and Rudolph’s finding that issue salience moderates political trust’s effect 
on support for specific policies (2015).  
 
The Magnitude of Shifting Support for Policy Submersion  
 
Overall, the NES data show that political trust relates to support for the 
submerged state.   As trust in government declines, people become more supportive of 
the arguments used to justify submersion and they are also more likely to oppose 
prominent direct-state proposals.   By showing how declining trust in government affects 
support for the submerged state, these findings provide an opportunity to estimate the 
	   	  	  	   	  
	   152	  
magnitude of the increase in public support that submerged policies generate for enacting 
state submersion.  Chapter Five shows that submerging government’s role in the 
contraceptive mandate decreases trust in the federal government by approximately 1/7th 
of a standard deviation.  In the NES data, a one standard deviation increase in political 
trust translates to a respondent becoming 46% more likely to support government 
intervention over a reliance on the free market (see Table 6.1).  Based on these 
measurements, depressing the visibility of the birth control mandate should correspond 
with respondents becoming roughly 21% less likely to support government intervention.  
Applying this estimation formula to the other issue domains, the NES data suggests that 
depressing the visibility of the birth control mandate also results in an individual 
becoming approximately 21% less likely to support increasing government services, 21% 
less likely to oppose reducing the number of federal employees, and 17% less likely to 
support a public option for health insurance.  Recall, however, that the changes in 
political trust caused by un-submerging the contraceptive mandate are driven by the 
policy’s target population: women.  Accordingly, the effect size grows when I subset this 
analysis based on gender.  Chapter Five shows that depressing government visibility for 
the contraceptive mandate decreases women’s trust in government by 1/6.25 of a 
standard deviation.  To measure how this shift in trust impacts support for submerged 
state policies, as captured in the NES, I limit the NES sample to women and I re-estimate 
the relationship between trust and support for the submerged state.65  Based on these new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In this subsample, a one-standard deviation increase in political trust corresponds with 
respondents becoming 56% more likely to support government intervention over a reliance on the 
free market, 51% more likely to support increasing government services, 47% more likely to 
oppose shrinking the number of federal bureaucrats, and 13% more likely to support a private 
option.   
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estimates, I find that depressing the visibility of the birth control mandate corresponds 
with a woman becoming 25% less likely to support government intervention over a 
reliance on the free market, 24% less likely to support increasing government services, 
23% less likely to oppose shrinking the number of federal bureaucrats, and 18% less 
likely to support a private option.      
The NES data also allows me to measure how declining trust in government 
associated with privately-named Medicaid MCOs affects support for the submerged state.  
Chapter Four shows that a one standard deviation increase in privately-named MCO 
penetration shifts trust in the federal government by approximately 1/5th of a standard 
deviation.  I approximate Medicaid eligibly in the NES data using income and, limiting 
my survey sample to Medicaid-eligible respondents, I re-estimate the relationship 
between political trust and support for policy submersion.66  I find that the shift in trust 
associated with privately-named MCOs should result in those who are likely to 
experience this privatization becoming 26% less likely to support government 
intervention, 24% less likely to support increasing government services, 28% less likely 
to oppose reducing the number of federal employees, and 23% less likely to support a 
public option. 
These findings show that policy submersion can result in substantial shifts in 
support for the submerged state.  By quantifying how much the movement toward policy 
submersion in Medicaid and contraceptive coverage is ultimately influencing support for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  In this NES Medicaid subsample, a one-standard deviation increase in political trust 
corresponds with respondents becoming 31% more likely to support government intervention 
over a reliance on the free market, 19% more likely to support increasing government services, 
41% more likely to oppose shrinking the number of federal bureaucrats, and 16% more likely to 
support a private option.   
	   	  	  	   	  
	   154	  
the submerged state, this analysis provides a rough approximation of the magnitude of the 
“divest” link in the PADD cycle.  Yet, the size of these findings, while substantial, are 
even more notable because they are derived from individual programs.  In practice, 
people are likely to be interacting with multiple submerged programs, each of which has 
the potential to amply the effects found in the previous analysis.  For instance, according 
to my estimates, a person who is likely to be affected by both the contraceptive mandate 
and privately-named Medicaid MCOs is 51% less likely to support government 
intervention over a reliance on the free market, 48% less likely to support increasing 
government services, 51% less likely to oppose reducing the number of federal 
employees, and 41% less likely to support a public option.   In this vein, if a person 
interacts with three programs that each generate a similar impact on government trust as 
do privately-named Medicaid MCOs, then the effects sizes may increase threefold.  
However, given that I do not measure how engaging with multiple submerged programs 
influences trust in government, I cannot capture whether there is a multiplicative or 
ceiling effect associated with the usage of multiple programs.  As this limitation 
highlights, the estimates detailed in this section provide a first attempt to capture the 
totality of this process and should be interpreted as a rough indicator of the size of this 
relationship, rather than a precise estimate.    
	  
Why Shifting Public Opinion Matters  
 
The political ramifications of the process documented in this chapter – that 
declining trust in government bolsters public support for the submerged state – 
underscores the importance of this inquiry.  Shifting public opinion in a direction that 
favors shrinking the state’s administrative capacity generates a wellspring of support for 
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submerged policy mechanisms, which elected officials can draw from when deciding 
how to structure policy proposals.  In other words, public support for policy submersion 
creates political space for legislation that challenges the direct role of the state.  In a 
functioning democratic society, legislation is expected to reflect, at least in part, the 
preferences of its citizenry.  While the extent of public opinion’s impact on legislative 
outputs is debated, researchers have repeatedly shown that major shifts in public opinion 
can affect the types of legislation that gets enacted (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 
1995; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Stimson 2004; B. I. Page and Shapiro 1983).  
When public sentiment shifts, “political actors sense this shift.  And then they alter their 
policy behavior at the margin” (Stimson, MacKuen, Erikson 1995).  Public opinion has 
been shown to shape both the liberalism of government outputs and the degree of public 
spending.  When the public’s policy mood favors more liberal policy enactment, 
Congress responds by voting in support of liberal legislation (Stimson, MacKuen, 
Erikson 1995).67  Similarly, when public opinion holds that government spending is 
either too high or too low in a policy domain, such as social welfare spending, the 
government adjusts its spending levels accordingly (Soroka and Wlezien 2010).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson identify relevant legislation using an updated version of 
Mayhew’s designation of the number of major laws passed by each Congress (1995; Mayhew 
1991).  Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson then calculate the number of federal laws that can clearly 
be identified as conservative or liberal.  In this operationalization, a policy is defined as 
conservative or liberal based its substance (i.e. greater tax cuts or restricted abortion access), 
rather than the mechanisms by which the policy is implemented. “Policy liberalism” is defined as 
the net difference in these liberal and conservative policy outputs.  This construction of policy 
liberalism has been critiqued for only including laws that can be clearly classified as conservative 
or liberal, which may bias this measure in a direction that makes it particularly likely to be 
affected by the public’s policy mood (Page 2002: 329).  Burstein takes up this critique and shows 
that if Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson had used a random sample of policies, the effect size of 
the public’s policy attitudes shrinks, but it does not disappear (Burstein 2006).  
	   	  	  	   	  
	   156	  
Political trust, specifically, has also been shown to influence the nature of policy 
outputs.  When aggregate political trust declines, this decline is followed by more 
conservative legislation (Hetherington 2005: 55-56).  This process is entirely consistent 
with the notion that political elites play a critical role in shaping public opinion (Zaller 
1992).  Recognizing the role of public opinion simply suggests that this is a 
multidirectional process in which public attitudes both shape and are shaped by political 
elites (Wlezien 1995).  Moreover, accounting for the elite-level factors that shape public 
opinion does not change the finding that legislative output responds to the shape that this 
public opinion ultimately takes.  It does, however, highlight the circularity of this 
process, which has also been likened to a thermostat.  In this analogy, elites (including 
elected officials) set the terms of the debate, the public then responds to these terms, and 
politicians adjust their preferences accordingly (Soroka and Wlezien 2010).      
As public opinion concerning policy liberalism and political trust have both been 
shown to influence which laws are enacted, this provides clear evidence that the 
attitudinal shifts which submerged policies generate have the potential to influence the 
direction of government’s actions.  The Clinton Administration’s failed attempt to 
achieve universal healthcare coverage highlights this process.  As the 1993 health reform 
legislation was being debated in Congress, less politically trusting individuals became 
more likely to view President Clinton’s healthcare proposal as extreme (Hetherington 
2005: Chapter Seven).  Here, political distrust functioned as a perceptual screen, making 
the distrusting public increasingly likely to perceive this health reform initiative as a 
radical government take-over of health insurance.  The prevalence of public fear over this 
proposal helped to hasten the legislation’s defeat, as it became more politically palatable 
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for legislators to block this health reform effort and its attempts to achieve universal 
health coverage (Hetherington 2005).68  Notably, after the demise of the 1993 health 
reform plan, neither a national single-payer healthcare system nor a public option was 
seriously pursued by Democratic or Republican leadership in the health reform debates of 
the following decade.  This reticence can in part be attributed to the perception that these 
proposals lacked popular support, a notion which the failure of California’s single-payer 
ballot initiative in 1994 (by a margin of 73-23) reinforced.  In short, the absence of major 
health reform legislation under the Clinton administration demonstrates how the public’s 
lack of trust in government has constrained the implementation of policies that seek, at 
least in part, to strengthen the direct administrative capacity of the state.  Moreover, the 
heavy reliance on submerged designs in subsequent health reform efforts, including the 
Medicare Modernization Act and the ACA, indicates that when this reform is successful, 
its success has been predicated in large part on the use of submerged designs.     
The constraining effects of low trust in government are also visible in the 
legislative response to the 2008 financial crisis.  Public opinion data from this time-
period shows that low trust in government affected policy preferences concerning how 
the government should respond to this crisis.  Compared to those who distrusted 
government, politically trusting individuals expressed similar levels of support for using 
tax cuts to stimulate economic growth.  However, support for using government spending 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 To test the political risk thesis on this healthcare example, Hetherington interacted political 
trust with respondents’ ability to afford health insurance, as those who could afford health 
insurance under the status quo ostensibly had the most to risk with government reform in the area.  
In support of this theory, Hetherington found that the effect of trust on perceptions of President 
Clinton’s health reform proposal was greatest among those who could already afford health 
insurance.  
	   	  	  	   	  
	   158	  
to stimulate economic growth varied dramatically based on political trust.  70% of 
trusting individuals expressed support for this policy response, whereas just 20% of 
distrusting persons supported this option.  This suggests that declining trust in 
government can constrict the policy tools that are available to elected officials.  
Hetherington and Rudolph note that “[i]n Lyndon Johnson’s day, when nearly everyone 
trusted government, policymakers would have had a much stronger hand in gaining 
support for more government spending as fiscal policy” (2015: 151).  Yet, in 2009, 
decreased trust in government served to limit the options available to President Obama, 
with public preferences strongly favoring submerged designs, like tax cuts, compared to 
direct state intervention.  Although public opinion certainly was not the only factor that 
imposed these constraints, it was and remains a visible part of the equation.     
Consequently, the main finding presented in this chapter – that eroding political 
trust can strengthen public support for the submerged state – suggests that policy designs 
which decrease government trust are ultimately contributing to a political environment 
that favors the further enactment of submerged state policies.  When submerged policies 
create informational distortions that make policy recipients more likely to support 
government submersion, implementing this submersion becomes more feasible.  Public 
support for policy submersion makes it simpler, politically, for legislators to comply with 
the lobbying interests of private actors and interest groups that benefit from federal 
contracts and tax credits.  Accordingly, although shifting public opinion in support of 
policy submersion does not ensure that policy submersion is adopted, it does remove an 
obstacle that can slow the tide of this submersion.  
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Conclusion: The Prospect of Excavating the State 
 
Administrative delegation has become a hallmark of American government.  
Examine any policy domain and you will find an entrenched interplay of state and private 
actors.  In the previous chapters, I explored the informational and attitudinal 
consequences of this institutional arrangement.  This analysis shows that shifting 
administrative authority away from the state affects where and how people view 
government.  In Chapter Three, I identified the conditions under which privatization 
causes people to fail to recognize when they are personally affected by a specific 
government initiative.  Through studying variation in the administration of Medicaid 
managed care, I show that privatized policies that attenuate the role of the state, and that 
emphasize the centrality of private actors, cause policy-recipients to underestimate the 
personal relevance of government’s social policy.  Next, I used a combination of 
observational and experimental data to show that the misperceptions which this 
government attenuation generates serve to erode trust in government.  The empirical 
portion of my research concludes by using national public opinion surveys to illustrate 
how decreasing government trust leads to greater support for submerging government 
policies.  Drawing on previous health reform efforts, I also highlight how shifting public 
support makes it easier for politicians to implement this submersion.  Taken together, 
these findings form the PADD cycle.  As this cycle demonstrates, submerged government 
policies create informational distortions that encourage the continued implementation of 
these policy designs.  In this concluding chapter, I discuss the substantive and normative 
implications of this process for governance, political organizing, and democratic 
accountability.   
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Democratic Accountability and American Civic Culture in a Time of Submersion 
 
The PADD cycle highlights how privatization influences where and when 
Americans see their government.  It also shows that, as a result of these attitudinal 
consequences, government submersion is unlikely to lose its prominent role in US social 
policy.  Yet, why should scholars or citizens care about the perpetuation of policy 
delegation and subsequent submersion?  In a healthy democracy, citizens can hold 
government actors and institutions accountable for their actions.  A basic prerequisite for 
generating this accountability, however, is that the public understands what the 
government’s actions are.  In Chapter Three, I found that when privatization attenuates 
the role of the state (by both increasing the distance between program recipients and 
government and emphasizing the role of private actors), people underestimate the extent 
to which they are personally affected by a privatized program.  By creating these 
distorted perceptions of government, policy submersion diminishes the prospect of 
democratic accountability.  It does so by threatening a core pillar – transparency – that 
sustains this process.  When private actors are tasked with executing a public function, it 
is not entirely surprising that people see the government as less relevant to their lives. 
And in many ways, this perception is accurate – public actors are less directly involved in 
day-to-day interactions.  However, this perception also sustains a false narrative that 
these exchanges are disconnected from government policy.  As a result, subsequent 
evaluations of a submerged policy, and the conditions that it creates, are based on a 
distorted understanding of how the political environment functions.  This disconnect 
makes it more difficult for program recipients to evaluate and respond to government in a 
manner that accounts for what government is doing.  Critically, connecting these 
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distortions to policy design shows that this lack of accountability cannot be written off as 
individual folly.    
This research also demonstrates that the range and consequences of these 
informational distortions are broader than has previously been shown.  Although the 
tendency to underestimate the federal assistance you receive through the tax code has 
been well established (Mettler 2011); I find that the distortions policy submersion creates 
can affect the visibility of one of the largest “traditional” social welfare programs in the 
country: Medicaid.  Moreover, by illustrating how these distortions affect evaluations of 
government and its appropriate role, this research also firmly establishes that the 
attitudinal consequences of policy submersion extend well-beyond lack of awareness.  
Policy submersion not only influences where people see government, it also affects how 
they see government.  By making government appear more distant, submerged policies 
encourage people to lose trust in government and, in turn, think that the direct role of 
government should be limited.  This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy on the value of 
keeping government small.  It also helps to sustain a prominent trend in American civic 
culture.  As noted in Chapter Two, Americans tend to embrace calls for limited 
government, particularly in the abstract.  This rhetorical appeal has promoted the use of 
policy submersion as an attractive policy tool for limiting the formal size of government.  
The PADD cycle shows, however, that the reverse also holds true, with policy 
submersion promoting this commitment to the symbolic rallying cry of less government.  
Independent of whether limiting state actors in favor of the private sector is good 
for most people, this cycle is normatively concerning because the attitudes it promotes 
are driven by a fundamental misperception generated by the administrative design of 
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these public policies.  Policy submersion encourages recipients to conflate a narrowing of 
government’s administrative reach with the narrowing of government’s purview.  This 
misperception can help to explain why people who have benefitted from government 
interventions also support limiting government involvement in social policy.  Regardless 
of one’s personal stance on the appropriate role of the state, it should be concerning to all 
that policy submersion creates obstacles that make it difficult for those affected by these 
policies to recognize the role of government and to evaluate government in accordance 
with this recognition.   
These findings, moreover, show that policy submersion impacts who is best 
positioned to hold government accountable.  In documenting the PADD cycle, I focus on 
policies that are disproportionately relevant to groups that have historically been removed 
from the levers of power: women and those with lower incomes.  I find that submerging 
major social programs presents these groups with substantial obstacles to understanding 
government’s role in structuring the social safety net.  By reducing this visibility, it 
becomes more difficult to advance the political discourse in a direction that reflects the 
interests of the people whom these social programs are (at least in theory) designed to 
serve.  Meanwhile, this lack of transparency does nothing to restrain the voice of private 
service providers and special interests that benefit from this submersion.  As this 
disjuncture illustrates, submerging major social programs ultimately further depresses the 
voice of communities that are still struggling to gain equal political inclusion.      
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Policy Submersion and Trust in Government: Beyond the PADD Cycle  
 
The PADD cycle shows that submerged policies increase support for submerging 
the state by depressing trust in government.  While this highlights the centrality of 
political trust to this process, it also suggests that the decline in political trust over the 
past half century can be traced, in part, back to policy submersion.   Over the same time 
that the submerged state has flourished, trust in government has plummeted.  In the 
1950s, more than 70% of Americans felt that they could trust the federal government to 
do what is right most of the time. Today, less than 20% of Americans share this sentiment 
(Pew 2017).  During these same decades, the submerged state has grown exponentially 
(Kettl 1988; Mettler 2011; Morgan and Campbell 2011; Howard 1999).  While policy 
submersion certainly is not the sole reason for the decline in political trust, the PADD 
cycle shows that policy submersion can shape this attitude and, therefore, serve as a 
contributing factor in its decline.   
Chapter Five provides insight into how much of a factor policy submersion has 
played.  Un-submerging the birth control mandate made respondents’ approximately 33% 
more likely to report that they trusted government.  This suggests that the number of 
Americans who trust the federal government would rise from 20% to roughly 26%.  
However, this is only one submerged policy.  If, in a conservative estimate (given that 
policy submersion affects all areas of government and social policy) people interact with 
two submerged policies that have a similar effect size, we could expect for the percent of 
Americans who trust the federal government to rise to approximately 32%.  This is, of 
course, a rough estimate that does not account for potential multiplicative, or ceiling, 
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effects.  However, this approximation provides a sense of the submerged state’s forceful 
capacity to accelerate the decline in political trust.   
The consequences of this erosion in political trust can be sever.  When trust in 
government plummets, it becomes more challenging to maintain democratic governance 
and the rule of law. In the absence of political trust, the potential for legislative 
compromise becomes far more tenuous, legislation stalls, and gridlock flourishes 
(Hetherington and Rudolph 2015).  Trust in government, however, is not just relevant to 
whether legislation gets passed, it also influences if laws are followed.  Low trust in 
government decreases compliance with the law and makes individuals more accepting of 
illegal behavior, such as tax fraud (Marien and Hooghe 2011).  Political trust can also 
influence what people are willing to believe about government.  In particular, depleted 
trust in government has been shown to increase people’s willingness to believe political 
conspiracy theories (Miller, Saunders, and Farhart 2016).  As Chapter Six details, trust in 
government even influences the types of legislative output that people support, with 
greater trust in government associated with greater support for liberal policy outputs and 
increased government spending (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Hetherington 2005; 
Rudolph and Evans 2005) as well as greater support for the submerged state.  
Accordingly, by diminishing political trust, the PADD cycle impacts the basic 
functioning of government.  	   
However, this does not imply that political trust should be maintained at all costs 
or that political trust is always preferable to distrust.  Political trust and distrust can serve 
complementary functions for promoting good governance.  Political theorists and 
researchers have offered various formulations in which trust and distrust function in 
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concert (see Andeweg 2017; Braithwaite 1998; Lenard 2012; Levi and Stoker 2000; Pettit 
1997; Van De Walle and Six 2014).  A recent reading of Bentham’s theory of publicity 
advances a formulation in which ideal governance is promoted by “sober distrust toward 
public authorities generally” paired with “particularized trust in those (and only those) 
institutions or officials who prove themselves worthy of it” (Bruno 2017).  Yet across 
these formulations, political trust or distrust based on misinformation presents a 
democratic ill.  It is neither desirable nor advisable to promote judgments of government 
that are derived from misperceptions about what government is doing and how 
government affects you personally.  Common sense dictates that if the government takes 
actions that are concerning to its citizens, it is both healthy and advisable for citizens to 
incorporate these concerns into their evaluations of government.  What makes the PADD 
cycle’s erosion of political trust so concerning, however, is that this shift in trust is 
derived from a misunderstanding of what government is doing.  Across 
conceptualizations of political trust in American democracy, the finding that 
informational distortions are influencing this attitude should be disconcerting.  This 
skewing indicates that evaluations of political trust are becoming unmoored from 
structural realties and it demonstrates a clear public interest in correcting the factors that 
sustain this process.      
Service Provision and the Submerged State 
	  
Policy submersion’s effects on the quality of service provision also highlight the 
normative concerns that this administrative practice raises.  Much of the existing research 
on policy delegation focuses on the consequences of these policies in terms of service 
delivery.  Here, the outcome of interest is whether delegation is “better” or more efficient 
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than direct state administration.  While findings vary by policy area, on the whole – and 
contrary to some initial expectations – delegation results in less efficient, and less fiscally 
sound, policy administration.  It is often more expensive to implement a policy via 
delegation compared to direct-state administration.  A 2011 report from the non-partisan 
Project on Government Oversight found that, on average, private contractors cost twice 
as much as a federal bureaucrat.  This pattern bore out in assessments of the cost of the 
federal hiring freezes under Presidents Carter and Reagan, which forced federal agencies 
to hire private contractors (in place of civil servants) to keep pace with departmental 
responsibilities.  The Government Accountability Office found that outsourcing this 
employment ultimately increased operating costs (Bowsher 1982).  Targeted analyses of 
specific federal programs also substantiate this pattern.  Compared to traditional fee-for-
service Medicare, private insurance companies (i.e. managed care firms) cost Medicare 
an additional $282.6 billion from 1985 - 2012, with the majority of this increase 
occurring after the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act expanded the role of private 
managed care entities (Hellander, Himmelstein, and Woolhandler 2013).  As this 
example shows, when non-state actors are required to administer a government program 
or services in a manner that is consistent with the scope of services that state actors 
provide, these non-state actors often fail to administer this service in a cost-effective 
manner.           
There are, of course, instances when private actors provide a public function for a 
lower cost than traditional state actors.  One popular practice that non-state actors have 
used to reduce costs when bidding for federal contracts, however, is to curtail the scope 
of their services.  Notably, among for-profit providers, cuts to services are also used to 
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increase profit margins, meaning that these cuts do not fully or automatically translate 
into cost-savings for the government.  For instance, contractors operating in prisons have 
kept bids for federal contracts low by reducing security and access to healthcare at their 
facilities (Wessler 2017).   However, in commenting on the Office of the Inspector 
General’s finding that private prisons had higher rates of safety and security incidents 
than government-run facilities, the Department of Justice noted that, even with the 
reduced quality of services, these contract facilities “do not save substantially on costs” 
(Yates 2016).  While private companies may implement cost-savings measures, their for-
profit status often means that these savings are passed to shareholders rather than 
taxpayers.    
As this suggests, when privatization is applied to social policy, the pressure to 
increase profit margins can result in substandard service provision.  The degradation in 
service quality that accompanied the outsourcing of emergency response services 
underscores this danger.  In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, as many 
municipalities faced difficult financial constraints, private equity firms began to acquire 
public utilities and services, including emergency medical response operations.  Recent 
investigations of this ownership have revealed disturbing trends.  When emergency 
response services proved to be less profitable than originally expected, investors sought 
to maintain profitability by implementing drastic spending cuts.  In turn, response times 
slowed, aggressive billing practices increased, and eventual bankruptcies left towns – 
overnight – without an ambulance service (Ivory, Protess, and Bennet 2016).  In one 
private-equity owned ambulance outfit, Transcare, the budget for maintaining their 
ambulances was slashed so dramatically that EMTs regularly resorted to stealing supplies 
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from ERs to refill depleted and expired inventory, and ambulances were sent out without 
properly functioning breaks (Ivory, Protess, and Bennet 2016).  
These measures bring the dilemma at the heart of privatizing social policy into 
stark relief.  What is good for business does not always align with what is best for the 
public.  When private actors attempt to capture market efficiencies, these cost savings are 
often achieved by undercutting the original objectives of the public policy. The 
privatization of emergency response outlets shows how attempts to maintain profitability 
by reducing services undermined the public’s interest in providing access to adequate 
emergency-response care.  These dueling pressures of profit and quality service provision 
help to explain why privatization so often erodes the robustness of the social safety net.   
  The potential for conflict between maximizing profit and serving the public 
interest is particularly acute in the domain of social policy because private actors often 
capture market efficiencies by differentiating among whom they are willing to serve, the 
scope of what they will provide, and what they will charge them.   In other words, the 
pressure to increase profits incentivizes private entities to administer public policies in a 
manner that would make the social safety net more porous.  For instance, insurance 
providers have an incentive to restrict their insurance plans to healthy individuals (a 
practice known as creaming), as this would help to minimize their healthcare 
expenditures.  Yet, if Medicare adopted this policy, by only enrolling senior citizens in 
good health, this would defeat the program’s primary objective.  Medicare was created to 
provide health insurance to the country’s elderly, not the country’s elderly who are 
already in good health and therefore rely on health insurance the least.  This disjuncture 
between profits and robust policy implementation helps to explain why Medicare 
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Advantage plans, which are administered by private entities, have failed to create cost-
savings compared to traditional fee-for-service Medicare.69 
When service providers seek to maximize profits, and limit the scope of social 
protections, the public interest at large suffers; however, those who are already at the 
margins are likely to feel this impact the most.  Ensuring equality of service when a 
program is privatized requires oversight and political will.   Private actors’ propensity to 
deliver leaner and less equitable service is not unknown, and politicians have at times 
used privatization as an intentional means of eroding social guarantees for the most 
vulnerable.  In this research, I focus on Medicaid managed care.  Managed care gained 
popularity for Medicaid administration in part because it was viewed as a potentially less 
generous means of administering health insurance plans to low-income families (Pracht 
2007).  Notably, an erosion in the quality of this government-funded insurance would 
have the biggest impact on addressing the medical needs of the most economically 
disadvantaged and the sick, as these are the communities that are least able to afford this 
care and that need this care the most.  As this demonstrates, the resulting service gaps that 
privatization can create are disproportionately likely to affect members of society whom 
are already disenfranchised.  Consequently, privatizing social policies that are intended to 
help vulnerable communities often instead increases the likelihood that the administration 
of these policies reinscribes the structural disadvantages that these communities already 
face.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Medicaid Advantage’s failure to achieve cost-savings can also be partly attributed to 
unscrupulous behavior, which the pressure to maintain profits can encourage.  A whistleblower 
recently provided the Justice Department with evidence of Medicare Advantage insurance 
companies’ use of false billing codes to extract billions in fraudulent payments from the federal 
government (Walsh 2017). 
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Consumer-choice delegation, which has grown in popularity in recent decades, 
presents an additional challenge for maintaining the social safety net.  While this program 
design provides participants with more choice, it also shifts risk back onto the individual.  
For instance, under proposals for social security privatization, individuals would be 
allowed to invest a portion of these savings.  While increased individual control in 
investing this pension may be appealing, if these investments fail, the funds that are 
critical to many seniors’ financial survival wither.  Accordingly, transferring risk onto the 
individual undercuts the guarantee of the protections that this social welfare policy is 
designed to provide.   
Many social welfare domains also require administrative decisions that are highly 
technical and that require a significant investment of time and knowledge, making it 
difficult for recipients to capture the personalized benefits that consumer-choice 
delegation aims to provide.  The complexity of the insurance plans offered through 
Medicare Advantage has led many members to select plans that are less than optimal for 
their coverage needs (Morgan and Campbell 2011).  The tendency to “satisfice,” and 
stick with an insurance plan where you know the doctors and the rates, further decreases 
the likelihood that seniors, once enrolled, will switch to their optimal plan.  Insurance 
companies are well-aware of this trend and consequently target their advertising to new 
Medicare enrollees rather than those who are already enrolled in competing Medicare 
Advantage plans (Morgan and Campbell 2011).  This tendency to select, and stay with, 
suboptimal plans further illustrates why there is a lack of consistent evidence showing 
that Medicare Advantage plans provide enrollees, and government, with clear cost 
savings.  Instead, this program highlights how consumer choice delegation can retract the 
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scope of the social protections that a policy is designed to provide, while placing 
recipients in an ecosystem in which it is difficult to realize the gains that this increased 
autonomy can potentially produce.      
Although policy delegation has threatened the social protections that are critical to 
low-income Americans, it has been a boon to the country’s wealthy.  Consumer-choice 
delegation is particularly effective at re-lining the social safety-net with an upwardly 
redistributive bounce.  Placing government benefits in the tax code disproportionately 
benefits those in the top income brackets, who spend more and are more likely to itemize 
their tax returns (Mettler 2011).  For instance, the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction 
(HMID) allows homeowners to deduct mortgage interest payments from their taxable 
income.  In describing this policy, Metter notes, “if a middle-income family had a 
mortgage of $230,000, around the value of the median-priced home nationwide, they 
would owe $3,619 less in taxes, but a family in the top 2 percent of the income 
distribution with the very same mortgage would see savings of $6,673.   In reality, of 
course, these high-income families are likely to spend far more on the activities that are 
tax-advantaged than are families with moderate incomes.  If they take on a mortgage of 
$500,000, their savings jumps to $14,506; if they borrow $1 million, they will keep 
$29,012” (Mettler 2011b).  Notably, only home owners who itemize their deductions 
(which middle and lower income individuals are far less likely to do) can benefit from the 
HMID at all.  Similarly, Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) allow individuals to set aside 
pre-tax dollars to use for designated medical expenses.  This program, however, only 
benefits those with enough disposable income to fund these accounts.  As a result, this 
program effectively excludes the most economically vulnerable while it subsidizes the 
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healthcare spending of those in higher income brackets.  Chapter Six shows that the 
PADD cycle is turning public opinion in a direction that favors the policy mechanisms of 
consumer-choice delegation.  Yet, promoting social policies that disproportionately 
subsidize behaviors of the most economically advantaged seems to be a perverse priority 
for appropriating spending on social policy, particularly given concerns over the growing 
federal deficit.      
 In sum, an increase in policy delegation is problematic because this 
administrative design creates a more porous social safety net, with for-profit corporations 
providing more limited services and consumer-choice delegation shifting additional risk 
onto the individual.  This is not to say that policy delegation is always inefficient, or that 
it functions uniformly in all issue domains.  However, there is a vast body of research that 
documents how policy delegation has repeatedly resulted in inferior service delivery, 
without cost savings, and that this trend is particularly acute in the domain of social 
policy.  If delegation begets further delegation, this suggests that, in the aggregate, this 
type of policy implementation will lead to the adoption of social programs that do not 
save money and that fail to improve service quality.  What is more, the people who are 
most likely to suffer are those who are already marginalized.   
Evaluating the benefits of delegated governance, however, is an admittedly 
contentious undertaking.  Those on opposite ends of the political spectrum have 
ideological commitments to highlighting either the value or harms of this administrative 
design.  For some, these commitments may color their interpretation of the research 
detailed above.  Moreover, it is not the objective of this dissertation to evaluate the 
quality of delegated governance in terms of service provision.  There is an abundance of 
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research on this topic, which I drew on for the summary provided in this chapter.  The 
aim of this dissertation is to examine how service privatization shapes perceptions of the 
state.  Accordingly, even if this discussion on the quality of delegated governance is 
bracketed, the start of this chapter makes clear that the normative implications of policy 
delegation transcend service provision.  Policy delegation should be of concern to people 
of all political persuasions because of the threat it poses to democratic accountability and 
the healthy functioning of government.	  	     
 
Political Mobilizing in the Age of Submersion  
 
 Correcting the harms that policy submersion creates, however, is likely to be 
constrained by the challenges that this process poses to political organizing.  As research 
on policy feeds has shown, new federal programs are best able to mobilize their target 
population when the effects of the policy are clearly visible and easily traced back to 
government (Campbell 2012; Mettler and Soss 2004; Pierson 1993).  However, by 
definition, submerged policies obscure both this visibility and traceability, making it 
more difficult for their target populations to rally around protecting or reforming these 
policies.  Consider AARP.  This non-profit organization plays a prominent role in 
mobilizing senior citizens around legislative efforts that affect Social Security.  The 
design of Social Security, however, simplifies AARP’s task of mobilizing seniors in 
relation to this program.  Under Social Security, seniors receive regular payments from 
the federal government, which reinforces the personal financial importance of this 
program and its direct connection to government.  In turn, AARP does not have to 
expend resources convincing senior citizens why Social Security matters and how 
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government can affect this program.  Yet, any organization that seeks to mobilize the 
target constituencies of highly submerged policies would first have to engage in an 
informational campaign that 1) explains why this policy may be personally relevant, and 
2) clarifies government’s role in structuring this policy.  Notably, the very fact that they 
would need to engage in this informational campaign underscores why this effort is 
necessary.  Absent this concerted outreach, these constituencies are poorly positioned to 
protect their interests as they relate to this government policy.   
Evidence of this difficulty is playing out in the current debate over the repeal and 
replace of the Affordable Care Act.  The entrenchment of legislative victories has often 
depended on the maintenance of mobilized publics that can organize to prevent the repeal 
or reconfiguration of this legislation (Campbell 2012).  However, as the legislative battle 
over the ACA shows, submerged policies amplify the difficulty of establishing and 
maintaining mobilized publics.  The state of Kentucky is often heralded as an ACA 
success story.  The implementation of this legislation created a precipitous drop in the 
percentage of the state that was uninsured.  By the end of 2015, the uninsured rate had 
fallen to 7.5%, down from 20% just two years prior (Witters 2016).  Much of this 
insurance gain can be attributed to Medicaid expansion under the ACA, with nearly 1 in 3 
Kentuckians enrolled in Medicaid (Witters 2016).  However, Kentucky made a concerted 
effort to disassociate these insurance gains from the ACA.  The state engaged in 
aggressive enrollment campaigns that avoided “mentioning Obamacare, the Affordable 
Care Act or the federal government” (Newkirk 2017).  The state sustained this omission 
by establishing their own enrollment portal, Kynect, and by using managed care plans to 
handle Medicaid administration.  In commenting on the success of this separation, one 
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resident who is enrolled in Medicaid described how most people she knows think of their 
health insurance as “Passport Insurance,” which refers to a prominent Medicaid managed 
care provider in the state (Newkirk 2017).  This disconnect makes it far less surprising 
that the state elected Republican Matt Bevin as Governor.  Bevin’s central campaign 
promise was to repeal Obamacare, including its Medicaid expansion.  Due to how 
Medicaid was administered in the state, the Democratic Party faced the added challenge 
of communicating to Medicaid enrollees how they would be affected by repeals or cuts to 
the Medicaid program.  Bevin’s victory ultimately underscores the need for extensive 
local organizing efforts that focus on un-submerging the social safety net, with such 
actions serving as a necessary precursor for broader political mobilization to safeguard 
the social protections that are enacted via policy submersion.   
Kentucky’s gubernatorial race also suggests a fruitful venue for future research.   
Much of the discussion on the relationship between policy submersion and electoral 
outcomes is anecdotal.  This descriptive evidence is suggestive, but it does not provide a 
clear picture of the size and robustness of the electoral consequences of policy 
submersion.  To better identify the full scope of the PADD cycle’s impact, additional 
empirical studies are needed that can examine the causal relationship between the 
informational disjuncture that policy submersion creates and voting behavior.    
What Comes Next?    
 
The damage that policy submersion inflicts on the healthy functioning of 
democratic governance raises the questions of who is best able to correct these harms and 
how.  The PADD cycle shows that these harms are actively produced by a political 
program – policy submersion – that is firmly enmeshed throughout government.  This 
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finding is critical because it shows that this process cannot be dismissed as the fault of 
lazy or ignorant citizens.  Rather, this research shows that these threats to democratic 
accountability are being produced by a policy design that the government has openly 
embraced.  Accordingly, any attempt to treat the root causes of this cycle must directly 
address the policies that create them.  In short, solving this problem requires a 
commitment to implementing specific legislative objectives.   
This undertaking, however, requires a combination of near and long-term 
strategies that can immediately address the symptoms of this process while laying the 
groundwork for confronting its origins.  Such a strategy can be broken down into a three-
pronged approach of: 1) raising constituents’ awareness of how they are currently 
affected by low-visibility policies, 2) amending the design of these policies to send 
sustained signals that clarify the role of the state, and 3) restructuring submerged policies’ 
administration to re-center the state’s direct role.  For the first prong of awareness-
raising, it may be tempting to suggest that the media provides a promising corrective for 
the informational distortions that policy submersion creates.  Unfortunately, the potential 
for the media to offer this remedy is muted by current trends in media consumption.  The 
exponential growth of media options over the past several decades has made it easy for 
people with little interest in politics to avoid political news (Prior 2007).  As a result, 
submerged state policies are leaving the public dependent on the news media to clarify 
what the government is doing at the very time when people without a strong 
predisposition for politics are spending less time consuming news media.  Moreover, the 
specific administrative features of a policy are unlikely to dominate the headlines of news 
programs and publications, even if news coverage of the policy is prominent.  For 
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instance, the submersion of the ACA is not due to a lack of news coverage.  The political 
turmoil of healthcare reform efforts has dominated many news cycles.  However, national 
news outlets are ill-equipped to connect the dots between federal programs that are proxy 
administered, in varying manners, across municipal lines.  Additionally, as coverage of 
the ACA shows, both local and national news media are prone to covering upheaval or 
change – and therefore are unlikely to persistently address the mundane panoply of 
submerged programs that dominate the social policy landscape in the US.  While the 
news media may pay intermittent attention to these policy features, un-submerging 
policies requires a more sustained and personalized effort that can engage with a wider 
breadth of the American public than the current news media landscape is likely to 
provide.   
 A more promising means of un-submerging social policy is through local 
organizing that directly addresses how specific communities are affected by submerged 
social policies.  As the Kentucky ACA example shows, political parties have an interest 
in leading some of these campaigns.  However, among the trove of submerged social 
policies, neither major party is likely to have either the interest in or the bandwidth to un-
submerge the full breadth of the submerged state.  For one, such outreach may call 
attention to the shortcomings of these policies and may result in pressure for more direct 
state intervention.  Such a move could run counter to the demands of the entrenched 
special interests on which both parties depend for support.  Passing legislation in the 
current political environment is also challenging, and some legislators may be 
understandably reluctant to remove a negotiating chip (privatization) from the table.  
Accordingly, whether the Democratic or Republican Parties have the will or ability to 
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communicate the extent of the submerged state is uncertain at best.  However, this past 
year has experienced a resurgence of political organizing outside of the dominant 
paradigm of democratic corporatism.  Much of this organizing aligns with the interests 
that the PADD cycle threatens – accountability and making the government work for all.  
Accordingly, these efforts are well-position to communicate both the pervasiveness of 
government-by-proxy and its effects on the communities that it targets.  If a focus on 
increasing state visibility becomes an integral part of their organizing strategy, the current 
political momentum and the organizations this momentum supports offer a powerful tool 
for advancing awareness of the submerged state outside of the legislative process.   
Yet, sustaining this communication still requires attention to specific legislative 
goals.  A clear way to correct the informational distortions that submerged policies 
produce is to add new administrative features to these policies that help to clarify the 
state’s role in these domains.  These amendments are particularly attractive because they 
require a smaller legislative lift than restructuring the fundamental design of a policy to 
re-center the state’s administrative roll.  As the discussion of political mobilizing stresses, 
elite support for these amendments is likely to be contingent on whether raising the 
visibility of these policies threatens the interests of well-placed lobbies.  These 
administrative adjustments, however, may appeal to elected officials in specific domains 
at varying levels of government.  This is particularly likely to occur when a party can use 
amendments that clarify government’s role in submerged policies to highlight how its 
actions have benefited their constituencies.  For instance, in my survey experiment 
involving birth control, I un-submerged this policy with a few short sentences that 
explained why women are not paying co-pays for birth control.  Building on this design, 
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the contraceptive mandate could be amended to require the inclusion of a short label or 
note in the packaging of LARCs explaining why this contraception is fully covered by 
insurance.  While such an amendment is unlikely to succeed at the federal level, 
Democratically-controlled state houses may have an interest in promoting this corrective 
measure, particularly as they grapple with addressing the health reform debates occurring 
at the federal level.  In a similar vein, Mettler recommends having federal student-loan 
lenders send a report to grantees that details how the grantee is personally affected by 
federal loan subsidies (2011).  She similarly proposes having the IRS send taxpayers a 
report listing the subsidies and savings that tax deductions generate for you personally as 
well as for families at different income levels.  Although this tax code proposal is likely 
to face stark opposition from the special interests that disproportionately benefit from 
these deductions, the recent reform efforts around student loans may make clarifying this 
lending process slightly less politically contentious.   
Aside from their political feasibility, some may object to these legislative 
adjustments as mere Band-Aids that serve to entrench the status quo.  This critique would 
be short-sighted.  If these amendments succeed in raising the visibility of submerged 
policies, this increased awareness would place the groups affected by this legislation in a 
better position to advocate for their interests.  In the case of tax deductions, highlighting 
the iniquity of the current institutional arrangements would play a valuable role in 
generating support for substantive reform, which is why such an amendment is likely to 
face opposition in the first place.  For the (relatively) more politically-feasible examples 
of birth control and student lending, increased visibility would help the affected 
constituencies to organize around preventing a degradation in service quality and to 
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advocate for more favorable and inclusive service provision.  Accordingly, although 
these amendments are only likely to be adopted for policies that already have a more 
inclusive bend, these measures would still play a valuable role in protecting policy 
objectives and encouraging advocacy for continued administrative improvements.70   
These legislative amendments, however, are not a panacea.  Rather, they provide 
a valuable stepping stone to instituting more fundamental reform.  The PADD cycle 
shows a troubling disconnect between the legislative process and the interests and voice 
of the average citizen.  Correcting this disjuncture with some permanency requires 
restructuring the material realties of the prevailing institutional terrain.  Specifically, it 
necessitates advancing a legislative agenda that re-centers the direct administrative 
capacity of the state.  The special interests that this reconstitution would displace make it 
unlikely that either major party can effectively serve as the sole standard-bearers of this 
effort.  Instead, such a fundamental restructuring requires pressure, likely emanating from 
outside of these parties’ leadership, that challenges the current distribution of political 
power.  The discourse and organizing surrounding the 2016 presidential campaign and its 
aftermath suggest that there is fertile ground for this effort.   
As these organizing efforts reflect, recent years have given rise to a wellspring of 
political activism grounded in a clear dissatisfaction with the status quo and the country’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 As this suggests, correcting the unjust redistributions that submerged policies promote, without 
also increasing state visibility, is not a sustainable or advisable solution. Such an action would be 
“analogous to the tree that falls in the forest when no one is around” (Mettler 2011: 113).  This 
reform is hollow because it fails to create conditions that protect advancements from 
retrenchment and disintegration.  If a policy becomes more evenly administered, but the 
beneficiaries of these amendments remain unaware of this policy, these beneficiaries cannot 
organize to protect these reforms.  It would therefore be unwise to improve the equitable 
administration of submerged policies without also increasing their visibility.     
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persistent inequality.  Some of these efforts have been critiqued for focusing on obtuse 
social ills while failing to translate these concerns into specific legislative priorities that 
address the historically-contingent institutions that produce these conditions.  However, 
many organizations are building on well-established political traditions to advance a 
legislative agenda that re-centers the role of the state and state actors, with public-sector 
labor organizing providing a model for this process.  The upside to the breadth of policy 
submersion is that efforts to counter the conditions that promote its promulgation provide 
a broad framework around which complementary progressive interests can coalesce.  The 
cost-effectiveness of direct-state administration could even make this coalition appealing 
to some deficit hawks.  My hope is that the PADD cycle stresses the urgency of 
harnessing the current political momentum to support an excavation of the state.  In the 
absence of such a coalition, submerged policies will continue to leave the American 
public, and the prospect of equitable governance, up a proverbial creek without a very 
visible paddle.    
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APPENDIX  
 
Chapter Three 
Figure A3.1 Medicaid Commercial MCO Penetration and Medicaid Reporting Rates 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.2 Privately-Named Medicaid MCO Penetration and Medicaid Reporting Rates 
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Figure A3.3 Medicaid Managed Care Penetration and Medicaid Reporting Rates 
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  Table A3. 1: State-Level Medicaid Commercial MCO Enrollment and State-Level  
   Medicaid Reporting (with health politics controls) 
 
  Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.05 
 
 
Table A3.2: State-Level Privately-Named MCO Enrollment and State-Level  
Medicaid Reporting (with health politics controls) 
 
  Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.05 
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Table A3.3: State-Level Medicaid Commercial MCO Enrollment and State-Level Medicaid  
Reporting  
 
 
  Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.05 
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Table A3.4: State-Level Privately-Named MCO Enrollment and State-Level Medicaid Reporting 
 
 
  Source: Linked ACS-MSIS Data 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  * p < 0.05 
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Chapter Five 
 
  Table A5.1: Trust in Government and Government Visibility (with full covariates and no interaction  
    terms) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logistic 
Coefficient 
Odds  
Ratio 
Logistic 
Coefficient 
Odds  
Ratio 
     
High Government Visibility  0.285* 1.330* 0.272* 1.313* 
 (0.096) (0.127) (0.096) (0.126) 
Female -0.601* 0.548* -0.635* 0.530* 
 (0.118) (0.065) (0.119) (0.063) 
Party Identification: Republican (v. strong Republican) -0.301 0.740 -0.277 0.758 
 (0.206) (0.152) (0.205) (0.156) 
Party Identification: Leans Republican -0.376 0.687 -0.435* 0.647* 
 (0.236) (0.162) (0.237) (0.153) 
Party Identification: Independent -0.645* 0.525* -0.731* 0.481* 
 (0.199) (0.105) (0.200) (0.096) 
Party Identification: Leans Democrat -0.364* 0.695* -0.500* 0.607* 
 (0.210) (0.146) (0.211) (0.128) 
Party Identification: Democrat 0.197 1.217 0.091 1.095 
 (0.195) (0.238) (0.195) (0.214) 
Party Identification: Strong Democrat 0.636* 1.890* 0.499* 1.647* 
 (0.187) (0.353) (0.188) (0.309) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: Once a year or less  0.578* 1.783* 0.591* 1.805* 
 (0.156) (0.278) (0.157) (0.283) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: A few times a year 0.595* 1.813* 0.629* 1.875* 
 (0.159) (0.288) (0.161) (0.301) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: Once or twice a month 0.890* 2.435* 0.912* 2.491* 
 (0.170) (0.414) (0.172) (0.429) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: Once a week 1.230* 3.420* 1.321* 3.749* 
 (0.146) (0.501) (0.149) (0.559) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: More than once a week 1.511* 4.532* 1.628* 5.096* 
 (0.211) (0.955) (0.212) (1.079) 
Trust Others to Do What is Right  0.177* 1.193* 0.148 1.159 
 (0.098) (0.117) (0.099) (0.114) 
Household Income: 30,000 - 39,999 (v. under 30,000)  0.102 1.107 0.077 1.080 
 (0.163) (0.181) (0.163) (0.176) 
Household Income: 40,000 - 49,999 0.164 1.178 0.167 1.181 
 (0.184) (0.217) (0.186) (0.219) 
Household Income: 50,000 - 59,999 0.231 1.260 0.217 1.242 
 (0.190) (0.239) (0.191) (0.237) 
Household Income: 60,000 - 69,999 0.520* 1.683* 0.439* 1.552* 
 (0.215) (0.362) (0.216) (0.336) 
Household Income: 70,000 - 79,999 0.418* 1.519* 0.372* 1.451* 
 (0.182) (0.277) (0.183) (0.265) 
Household Income: 80,000 - 89,999 -0.120 0.887 -0.096 0.908 
 (0.251) (0.223) (0.251) (0.228) 
Household Income: 90,000 - 99,999 0.687* 1.988* 0.635* 1.887* 
 (0.249) (0.495) (0.251) (0.474) 
Household Income: 100,000 or more 0.433* 1.541* 0.416* 1.515* 
 (0.176) (0.272) (0.177) (0.268) 
Identify as Black  -0.456* 0.634* -0.487* 0.615* 
 (0.167) (0.106) (0.168) (0.103) 
Identify as Latinx  -0.318* 0.728* -0.306* 0.736* 
 (0.136) (0.099) (0.137) (0.101) 
Highest Educational Achievement: H.S. (v. no H.S. diploma)  -0.147 0.864 -0.067 0.935 
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 (0.303) (0.261) (0.304) (0.284) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Some college, no degree -0.602* 0.548* -0.529* 0.589* 
 (0.301) (0.165) (0.302) (0.178) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Associate Degree -0.526* 0.591* -0.433 0.649 
 (0.318) (0.188) (0.320) (0.207) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Bachelor's Degree  -0.406 0.666 -0.294 0.745 
 (0.306) (0.204) (0.308) (0.230) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Master's Degree -0.053 0.948 -0.007 0.993 
 (0.333) (0.315) (0.334) (0.331) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Professional Degree 0.800* 2.227* 0.838* 2.311* 
 (0.369) (0.821) (0.370) (0.855) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Doctoral Degree 0.745* 2.107* 0.753* 2.123* 
 (0.444) (0.936) (0.446) (0.946) 
Age -0.029* 0.971* -0.027* 0.974* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Support Mandate: Somewhat Disagree (v. Strongly Disagree)   0.577* 1.781* 
   (0.326) (0.581) 
Support Mandate: Neither Agree nor Disagree   0.903* 2.467* 
   (0.324) (0.800) 
Support Mandate: Somewhat Agree   1.271* 3.566* 
   (0.285) (1.015) 
Support Mandate: Strongly Agree   1.310* 3.705* 
   (0.281) (1.043) 
Constant cut1 -3.668* 0.026* -2.490* 0.083* 
 (0.398) (0.010) (0.473) (0.039) 
Constant cut2 -1.342* 0.261* -0.141 0.868 
 (0.384) (0.100) (0.466) (0.404) 
Constant cut3 0.610 1.840 1.842* 6.312* 
 (0.384) (0.706) (0.468) (2.955) 
Constant cut4 2.648* 14.129* 3.909* 49.833* 
 (0.395) (5.577) (0.479) (23.881) 
     
Observations 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,528 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
   * p<0.05 
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Table A5.2 Trust in Government and Government Visibility (with full covariates and interaction term) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Logistic 
Coefficient 
Odds 
Ratio 
Logistic 
Coefficient 
Odds  
Ratio 
     
High Government Visibility -0.022 0.978 -0.038 0.962 
 (0.178) (0.174) (0.178) (0.172) 
Female  -0.820* 0.440* -0.857* 0.424* 
 (0.159) (0.070) (0.161) (0.068) 
Treated * High Government Visibility  0.431* 1.540* 0.437* 1.548* 
 (0.211) (0.325) (0.212) (0.328) 
Party Identification: Republican (v. Strong Republican) -0.289 0.749 -0.263 0.769 
 (0.206) (0.154) (0.205) (0.158) 
Party Identification: Leans Republican -0.378 0.685 -0.435* 0.647* 
 (0.237) (0.162) (0.238) (0.154) 
Party Identification: Independent -0.642* 0.526* -0.726* 0.484* 
 (0.199) (0.105) (0.200) (0.097) 
Party Identification: Leans Democrat -0.364* 0.695* -0.499* 0.607* 
 (0.210) (0.146) (0.211) (0.128) 
Party Identification: Democrat 0.199 1.220 0.094 1.098 
 (0.195) (0.238) (0.196) (0.215) 
Party Identification: Strong Democrat 0.638* 1.892* 0.501* 1.650* 
 (0.187) (0.353) (0.188) (0.310) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: Once a year or less  0.587* 1.799* 0.599* 1.821* 
 (0.156) (0.281) (0.157) (0.286) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: A few times a year 0.598* 1.819* 0.632* 1.882* 
 (0.159) (0.289) (0.161) (0.302) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: Once or twice a month 0.891* 2.438* 0.914* 2.495* 
 (0.170) (0.415) (0.172) (0.430) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance: Once a week 1.245* 3.472* 1.338* 3.812* 
 (0.147) (0.509) (0.149) (0.570) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance” More than once a week 1.517* 4.558* 1.636* 5.136* 
 (0.211) (0.960) (0.212) (1.088) 
Trust Others to Do What is Right 0.172* 1.187* 0.143 1.154 
 (0.098) (0.116) (0.099) (0.114) 
Household Income: 30,000 - 39,999 (v. under 30,000) 0.096 1.101 0.071 1.074 
 (0.163) (0.180) (0.163) (0.175) 
Household Income: 40,000 - 49,999 0.157 1.170 0.160 1.174 
 (0.184) (0.215) (0.186) (0.218) 
Household Income: 50,000 - 59,999 0.228 1.256 0.215 1.240 
 (0.190) (0.238) (0.191) (0.237) 
Household Income: 60,000 - 69,999 0.516* 1.675* 0.435* 1.544* 
 (0.215) (0.361) (0.217) (0.335) 
Household Income: 70,000 - 79,999 0.416* 1.515* 0.370* 1.448* 
 (0.182) (0.276) (0.183) (0.265) 
Household Income: 80,000 - 89,999 -0.132 0.876 -0.106 0.899 
 (0.251) (0.220) (0.251) (0.225) 
Household Income: 90,000 - 99,999 0.697* 2.008* 0.646* 1.909* 
 (0.249) (0.499) (0.250) (0.478) 
Household Income: 100,000 or more 0.441* 1.554* 0.425* 1.529* 
 (0.177) (0.275) (0.177) (0.271) 
Identify as Black  -0.447* 0.640* -0.478* 0.620* 
 (0.166) (0.106) (0.167) (0.104) 
Identify as Latinx  -0.335* 0.716* -0.324* 0.724* 
 (0.137) (0.098) (0.138) (0.100) 
Highest Educational Achievement: H.S. (v. No H.S. Diploma)  -0.143 0.866 -0.065 0.937 
 (0.304) (0.263) (0.305) (0.286) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Some college, no degree -0.601* 0.548* -0.527* 0.591* 
 (0.302) (0.166) (0.303) (0.179) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Associate Degree  -0.523 0.593 -0.429 0.651 
 (0.319) (0.189) (0.321) (0.209) 
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Highest Educational Achievement: Bachelor's Degree  -0.397 0.672 -0.285 0.752 
 (0.307) (0.207) (0.309) (0.232) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Master's Degree -0.038 0.963 0.010 1.010 
 (0.334) (0.321) (0.335) (0.338) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Professional Degree 0.813* 2.254* 0.851* 2.342* 
 (0.370) (0.833) (0.371) (0.868) 
Highest Educational Achievement: Doctoral Degree 0.753* 2.123* 0.760* 2.137* 
 (0.445) (0.945) (0.447) (0.954) 
Age -0.029* 0.971* -0.027* 0.973* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Support Mandate: Somewhat Disagree (v. Strongly Disagree)    0.602* 1.825* 
   (0.326) (0.595) 
Support Mandate: Neither Agree nor Disagree   0.918* 2.504* 
   (0.325) (0.813) 
Support Mandate: Somewhat Agree   1.283* 3.606* 
   (0.285) (1.027) 
Support Mandate: Strongly Agree   1.326* 3.765* 
   (0.282) (1.061) 
Constant cut1 -3.827* 0.022* -2.637* 0.072* 
 (0.407) (0.009) (0.479) (0.034) 
Constant cut2 -1.495* 0.224* -0.281 0.755 
 (0.393) (0.088) (0.471) (0.356) 
Constant cut3 0.462 1.587 1.708* 5.519* 
 (0.391) (0.621) (0.474) (2.613) 
Constant cut4 2.500* 12.178* 3.774* 43.565* 
 (0.402) (4.896) (0.484) (21.099) 
     
Observations 1,528 1,528 1,528 1,528 
     Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.05 
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Table A5.3 Trust in Government and Government Visibility (with full covariates and full interaction 
terms) 
 
  
VARIABLES Logistic Coefficient 
  
High Government Visibility -0.322 
 (0.622) 
Female -0.870*** 
 (0.163) 
High Government Visibility * Female  0.435** 
 (0.216) 
Had previous knowledge of contraceptive mandate 0.480*** 
 (0.151) 
High Government Visibility * Know Mandate -0.193 
 (0.204) 
Party Identification: Republican -0.096 
 (0.294) 
Party Identification: Leans Republican 0.132 
 (0.330) 
Party Identification: Independent -0.689** 
 (0.277) 
Party Identification: Leans Democrat -0.309 
 (0.298) 
Party Identification: Democrat 0.214 
 (0.275) 
Party Identification: Strong Democrat 0.686** 
 (0.268) 
High Government Visibility * Republican -0.175 
 (0.405) 
High Government Visibility * Leans Republican -1.125** 
 (0.472) 
High Government Visibility * Independent 0.139 
 (0.384) 
High Government Visibility * Leans Democrat -0.225 
 (0.404) 
High Government Visibility * Democrat -0.039 
 (0.380) 
High Government Visibility * Strong Democrat -0.290 
 (0.362) 
Support Mandate = Somewhat Disagree 0.430 
 (0.439) 
Support Mandate = Neither Agree nor Disagree 0.966** 
 (0.435) 
Support Mandate = Somewhat Agree 1.046*** 
 (0.367) 
Support Mandate = Strongly Agree 1.173*** 
 (0.364) 
High Government Visibility * Support Mandate (Somewhat Disagree) 0.575 
 (0.668) 
High Government Visibility * Support Mandate (Neutral)  0.200 
 (0.663) 
High Government Visibility * Support Mandate (Somewhat Agree) 0.710 
 (0.583) 
High Government Visibility * Support Mandate (Strongly Agree)  0.472 
 (0.576) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance = Once a year or less 0.600*** 
 (0.159) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance = A few times a year 0.621*** 
 (0.161) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance = One or twice a month 0.926*** 
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 (0.174) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance = Once a week 1.393*** 
 (0.150) 
Frequency of Religious Attendance = More than once a week 1.661*** 
 (0.212) 
High Social Trust 0.155 
 (0.099) 
Household Income = 30,000 - 39,999 0.060 
 (0.164) 
Household Income = 40,000 - 49,999 0.156 
 (0.187) 
Household Income = 50,000 - 59,999 0.237 
 (0.191) 
Household Income = 60,000 - 69,999 0.423* 
 (0.217) 
Household Income = 70,000 - 79,999 0.361** 
 (0.184) 
Household Income = 80,000 - 89,999 -0.135 
 (0.252) 
Household Income = 90,000 - 99,999 0.626** 
 (0.251) 
Household Income = 100,000 or more 0.427** 
 (0.178) 
Identify as Black = Yes -0.470*** 
 (0.168) 
Identify as Hispanic = Yes -0.313** 
 (0.138) 
Highest Educational Achievement = High school graduate -0.069 
 (0.307) 
Highest Educational Achievement = Some college but no degree -0.559* 
 (0.305) 
Highest Educational Achievement = Associate degree in college -0.482 
 (0.323) 
Highest Educational Achievement = Bachelor's degree in college -0.383 
 (0.312) 
Highest Educational Achievement = Master's degree -0.065 
 (0.337) 
Highest Educational Achievement = Professional degree 0.700* 
 (0.375) 
Highest Educational Achievement = Doctoral degree 0.607 
 (0.453) 
Age -0.024*** 
 (0.005) 
Constant cut1 -2.446*** 
 (0.548) 
Constant cut2 -0.074 
 (0.541) 
Constant cut3 1.938*** 
 (0.544) 
Constant cut4 4.037*** 
 (0.555) 
  
Observations 1,528 
   Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
     * p<0.05 
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High Visibility Treatment:  
 
 
After Health Insurance Change, Dramatic Savings for Women 
  
        After a national law began requiring most insurance plans to cover several forms of 
contraception at no cost to the individual user, out-of-pocket spending on most major 
birth control methods fell sharply, a new study has found.  The covered forms 
of contraceptives include, but are not limited to, birth control pills and intrauterine 
devices (IUDs).  The legislation requiring this coverage was passed by Congress and 
signed into law by the President.  Researchers found that in the law’s first full year of 
implementation, it generated over $1.4 billion in savings for women using oral 
contraception (i.e. the birth control pill). 
  
        A U.S. senator who helped to draft the recent law on contraceptive coverage called 
birth control “an extremely important part of women’s health” and said that the new law 
was a “signature legislative achievement.”   
  
        Cost has long been a major obstacle to accessing birth control.  Findings from pilot 
studies in St. Louis and Colorado show that when cost was not an issue, birth control use 
increased and women tended to choose the most effective methods, such as long-acting 
intrauterine devices and implants.    
  
 
 
Low Visibility Treatment: 
 
 
Insurance Coverage Creates Dramatic Savings for Women 
  
        After most insurance plans began covering several forms of contraception at no cost 
to the individual user, out-of-pocket spending on most major birth control methods fell 
sharply, a new study has found.  The covered forms of contraceptives include, but are not 
limited to, birth control pills and intrauterine devices (IUDs). Researchers found that 
since insurers began covering the full cost of oral contraception (i.e. the birth control pill) 
more than a year ago, this has generated over $1.4 billion in savings for women using this 
form of contraception 
  
        Cost has long been a major obstacle to accessing birth control.  Findings from pilot 
studies in St. Louis and Colorado show that when cost was not an issue, birth control use 
increased and women tended to choose the most effective methods, such as long-acting 
intrauterine devices and implants. An insurance company representative described the 
expanded birth control coverage as protecting “an extremely important part of women’s 
health.”  
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Chapter Six 
      Table A6.1: Trust in Government and Support for Limiting Government’s Administrative Capacity 
 
 (1) a (2) b (3) b 
VARIABLES Government 
Intervention 
over Market 
Increase 
Government 
Services 
Reduce 
Federal 
Employees 
(oppose) 
    
Trust in Federal Government: 5 Point Scale 0.453*** 0.402*** 0.398*** 
 (0.090) (0.060) (0.055) 
Conservatism -0.370*** -0.469*** -0.338*** 
 (0.061) (0.054) (0.053) 
Party Identification -0.304*** -0.258*** -0.132*** 
 (0.043) (0.034) (0.039) 
Strength of Social Trust 0.048 0.140** 0.021 
 (0.078) (0.060) (0.068) 
Age 0.005 0.003 -0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Highest Education Level -0.134** -0.088* -0.110* 
 (0.067) (0.047) (0.059) 
Identify as African American 0.546* 0.435** 0.379** 
 (0.285) (0.172) (0.167) 
Household Income 0.001 -0.020*** 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) 
Identify as Male -0.444*** -0.287*** -0.353*** 
 (0.132) (0.096) (0.118) 
Union Membership (Anyone in Household) -0.042 0.180 0.035 
 (0.189) (0.137) (0.156) 
Constant cut3  -2.589***  
  (0.400)  
Constant cut4  -0.678*  
  (0.390)  
Constant cut5  0.565  
  (0.390)  
Constant cut6  1.551***  
  (0.400)  
Constant cut1  -5.193*** -3.033*** 
  (0.428) (0.434) 
Constant cut2  -3.712*** -1.541*** 
  (0.409) (0.425) 
Constant 2.280***  0.398*** 
 (0.550)  (0.425) 
    
Observations 2,376 2,569 2,387 
   Source: NES 2012 
   Notes: a = Logistic regression model; b = ordered logistic regression model 
   Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6.2: Trust in Government and Support for Submerged State Policies 
	  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Public Option  
(v. Private Health 
Insurance Only) 
Medicare into 
Voucher 
Social 
Security 
Privatization 
    
Trust in Federal Government: 5-Point Scale 0.151*** -0.023 0.003 
 (0.056) (0.073) (0.062) 
Conservatism -0.450*** 0.356*** 0.225*** 
 (0.049) (0.058) (0.044) 
Party Identification -0.281*** 0.121*** 0.098*** 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.032) 
Strength of Social Trust 0.030 -0.038 -0.021 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.058) 
Age 0.002 -0.028*** -0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Highest Education Level 0.077 0.073 0.008 
 (0.050) (0.056) (0.050) 
Identify as African American -0.214 -0.151 -0.002 
 (0.162) (0.205) (0.168) 
Household Income -0.009 0.002 0.021*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Identify as Male 0.109 0.157 -0.101 
 (0.097) (0.115) (0.100) 
Union Membership (Anyone in Household) -0.008 -0.245 -0.230* 
 (0.140) (0.151) (0.138) 
Has Health Insurance -0.639*** -0.108  
 (0.142) (0.183)  
Has Good Personal Health -0.095* 0.051  
 (0.056) (0.057)  
Constant cut3   -0.471 
   (0.390) 
Constant cut4   0.623 
   (0.393) 
Constant cut5 -5.724***  0.940** 
 (0.417)  (0.393) 
Constant cut6 -4.702***  1.500*** 
 (0.406)  (0.395) 
Constant cut1 -3.981*** 1.184** -1.000** 
 (0.397) (0.512) (0.392) 
Constant cut2 -2.649*** 2.945*** -0.706* 
 (0.386) (0.513) (0.391) 
    
Observations 2,563 2,338 2,387 
Source: NES 2012 
Model: Ordered logistic regression model  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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